

The labour market: is the unemployment rate a good indicator?

By [Bruno Ducoudré](#) and [Pierre Madec](#)

Considering the euro zone on the one hand and the United States and the United Kingdom on the other, changes in unemployment rates are a reflection of the divergences in growth highlighted in our [last fiscal year forecast](#). While between 2008 and late 2010, trends in unemployment reflected the sharp deterioration in growth and did not differ much between the euro zone, the UK and the USA, differences began to emerge from 2011. In the United Kingdom and the United States, unemployment has been falling since 2011, whereas, after a brief respite, a second phase of rising rates took place in most euro zone countries (Table 1). It was only more recently that the unemployment rate has really begun to fall in Europe (late 2013 in Spain and early 2015 in France and Italy). Overall, for the period 2011-2015 the rate rose overall (+2.7 points) in Spain. In Italy, this deterioration in the labour market even worsened (+4.5 points in this period, against +2.2 points from early 2007 to late 2010). France, though to a lesser extent, was not spared.

An analysis of the unemployment rate does not however convey the full dynamics at work in the labour market (Tables 2 and 3), in particular in terms of underemployment. Thus during the crisis most European countries reduced the effective working time [\[1\]](#) to a greater or lesser degree, through policies on partial unemployment, the reduction of overtime, or the use of working-time accounts, but also through the expansion of part-time work (especially in Italy and Spain), including on an involuntary basis. Conversely, the favourable trend in the US labour market is partly due to a significant decline in the

participation rate, which stood in the first quarter of 2015 at 62.8%, 3.3 points lower than eight years ago.

Table 1. Changes in the ILO unemployment rate

In % points

	Q1 2007 - Q4 2010	Q1 2011 - Q1 2015	Q1 2007 - Q1 2015
Germany	-2.4	-1.4	-4.2
Spain	12.1	2.7	+15.0
France	0.7	1.3	+1.9
Italy	2.2	4.5	+6.4
United Kingdom	2.4	-2.2	0.0
United States	5.0	-3.5	+1.1

Sources: National accounts, OFCE calculations.

Table 2. Changes in the labour force participation rate

In % points

	Q1 2007 - Q4 2010	Q1 2011 - Q1 2015	Q1 2007 - Q1 2015
Germany	+1.5	+0.7	+2.2
Spain	+1.3	-0.7	+0.7
France	+0.5	+1.3	+1.8
Italy	+0.1	+1.8	+1.9
United Kingdom	-0.2	+1.3	+1.1
United States	-1.9	-1.4	-3.3

Sources: National accounts, OFCE calculations.

Table 3. Changes in working time

In %

	Q1 2007 - Q4 2010	Q1 2011 - Q1 2015	Q1 2007 - Q1 2015
Germany	-2.0	-2.1	-4.1
Spain	+0.5	-3.5	-3.0
France	-0.9	-0.8	-1.7
Italy	-2.9	-2.4	-5.3
United Kingdom	-0.9	+1.4	+0.5
United States	-0.7	+0.8	+0.1

Sources: National accounts, OFCE calculations; Scope: total employment.

In order to measure the impact of these adjustments (working time and participation rate) on unemployment, it is possible, subject to a number of assumptions [\[21\]](#), to calculate the unemployment rate at constant employment and control for these adjustments. Except for the United States, where the participation rate has fallen sharply since 2007, all the countries studied experienced an increase in their labour force (employed + unemployed) that was greater than in the general population; in many countries this was due to pension

reforms. Mechanically, in the absence of job creation, the impact of this demographic trend is to push up the unemployment rate in the countries concerned. For instance, if the participation rate had remained at its 2007 level, the unemployment rate would be lower by 1.6 points in France and 1.1 points in Italy (Table 4). Conversely, without the significant contraction in the US labour force, the unemployment rate would have been more than 3 points higher than what was seen in 2015. Also note that since the crisis Germany has experienced a significant drop in unemployment (-4.2 points) even though its participation rate grew by 2.2 points. Assuming an unchanged participation rate, Germany's unemployment rate would be 3.1% (Figure 1).

In terms of working time, the lessons seem quite different. It thus appears that if working time had been maintained in all the countries at its pre-crisis level, the unemployment rate would have been more than 3 points higher in Germany and Italy and about 1 point higher in France and Spain, countries in which working time decreased sharply only from 2011. In the US and UK, the situation is very different: working time has changed only very little since the crisis. By controlling for working time, the unemployment rate thus changes along the lines observed in the two countries.

The tendency for working time to fall is a familiar story. Since the late 1990s, all the countries studied have greatly reduced their working hours. In Germany, between 1998 and 2008, the reduction was on average 0.6% per quarter. In France, the transition to the 35-hour week caused a similar reduction over the period. In Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States, the downward shifts in average working hours were respectively -0.3%, -0.4% and -0.3% per quarter. In total, between 1998 and 2008, working time fell by 6% in Germany and France, 4% in Italy, 3% in the United Kingdom and the United States and 2% in Spain, which was *de facto* the only country that during the crisis intensified the decline in

working time that started in the late 1990s.


Table 4. Difference between the unemployment rate observed in the first quarter 2015 and the unemployment rate observed in case of ...

In %

	... maintaining working time at its 2007 level	...maintaining the participation rate at its 2007 level	...maintaining the 2007 participation rate and working time levels
Germany	+3.1	-1.7	+1.4
Spain	+1.0	-0.1	+0.9
France	+1.2	-1.6	-0.4
Italy	+3.6	-1.1	+1.5
United Kingdom	0.0	-1.0	-1.0
United States	0.0	+3.1	+3.1

Sources : National accounts, OFCE calculations.

Figure 1. Unemployment rate in first quarter 2015 in the case of ...



Sources : National accounts, OFCE calculations; Scope: total employment.

[1] Working time is understood here as the total number of hours worked by employees and the self-employed (i.e. total

employment).

[2] It is assumed that, at constant use, a one-point increase in the participation rate leads to an increase in the unemployment rate. Employment and working time are not considered here in full-time equivalents. Finally, neither the “halo of unemployment” nor any possible “bending effects” are taken into account.

The labour market on the road to recovery

By [Bruno Ducoudré](#)


A look at the figures just published by France's Pôle Emploi job centre for the month of September 2015 shows that the number of job seekers who were registered and inactive (category A) has declined significantly (-23,800), following an increase in August (+20,000). While this is encouraging news, the decrease has to be compared with the increases seen in categories B and C (+25,600). So while employment has indeed picked up, this has not resulted in the numbers of people exiting unemployment as measured by the job centre, *i.e.* it has not put a stop to the continuing rise in the number of long-term unemployed (+10.4% in one year). Nevertheless, these trends do support the conclusions drawn from current analysis which indicate that [a recovery has indeed begun](#).

After seeing 76,000 jobs created in France in 2014 due to growth in non-commercial jobs, the first half of 2015 was

marked by an increase in the workforce in the commercial sector (+26,000), which resulted in an acceleration of job creation in the economy overall (+45,000) over the first half of the year. The recently released statistics on employment confirm the accelerating trend in the third quarter of 2015: hence, over a year, declarations on job hires of over one month recorded by ACOSS rose by 3.7%, following 0.7% in the previous quarter. Business surveys also point to an increase in hiring intentions in the third quarter; these have turned positive in the service sector since the year started, which is also when the low point seen in construction was probably reached (see Figure 1).

Our analysis of the labour market up to 2017, which was spelled out in the latest OFCE forecasts of October 2015, indicates that the commercial sector will continue to generate jobs up to the end of 2015 (+0.1% in the third and fourth quarters). The pace of job creation will nevertheless remain too low to foresee a fall in the unemployment rate by year end, particularly in light of our forecast for the GDP growth rate (0.3% in Q3 2015 and 0.4% in Q4) and the existence of overstaffing in companies, which we estimate at 100,000 in Q2 2015. The unemployment rate should remain stable at 10% until year end. With GDP growth of 1.8% in 2016, job creation will pick up markedly in the commercial sector once the overstaffing has been absorbed by companies, allowing the unemployment rate to fall starting in the second quarter of 2016. This decline will continue until the end of 2017.

Figure 1. Forecast of labour force trends



Sources: INSEE, business surveys.

The last three years of weak growth have hurt employment in the commercial sector (-73,000 jobs between the start of 2012 and the end of 2014, cf. the Table). The strength of employment in the non-commercial sector, supported by the ramp-up of subsidized contracts (the “jobs for the future” programme and non-commercial job integration contracts) helped to offset the loss of commercial sector jobs, with total employment rising by 164,000 over the same period, which slowed the increase in the ILO unemployment rate: this figure for mainland France rose from 9% of the labour force in late 2011 to 10.1% at end 2014, i.e. a 1.1 point increase.

Tableau. Employment and unemployment

Annual change in 1000s, at last quarter

Year on year	2012	2013	2014	2015*	2016*	2017*
Observed labour force	265	46	203	62	134	139
Total employment	31	57	76	103	193	242
– Commercial sector	0	-38	-35	73	238	245
Employed	-63	-58	-43	60	209	216
Unemployed	63	20	8	14	28	29
– Non commercial sector	31	95	111	29	-45	-3
Subsidized jobs	5	60	21	17	-54	-4
Non-subsidized jobs	26	35	90	12	10	1
Unemployment	234	-11	127	-41	-58	-103
Unemployment rate at Q4 (%)	9,7	9,7	10,1	10,0	9,8	9,4
GDP growth rate (%)	0,3	0,8	0,2	1,1	1,8	2,0

* OFCE forecast

Sources : INSEE and Ministry of Labour, OFCE forecasts, e-mod.fr 2015-2017, October 2015.


2015 is a year of transition, with a resumption of job creation in the commercial sector (+73,000 expected for the year as a whole) but less dynamic job creation in the non-commercial sector. For the full year, job creation will be boosted by the acceleration of growth (an annual average of +1.1% expected in 2015 but 1.4% yoy) and the implementation of policies to cut labour costs (CICE tax credit and the Responsibility Pact). The cumulative impact of the CICE and the Responsibility Pact, after taking into account the effect of financing, will create or save 42,000 jobs in 2015. However, job creation will be hampered by the presence of overstaffing^[1]: as economic activity picks up pace, companies typically absorb underutilized labour before increasing the volume of employment.

As for the non-commercial sector, employment policy is continuing to support the labour market in 2015 through the increase in subsidized job contracts. This increase has nevertheless been slower than in previous years, with the number of “jobs for the future” contracts peaking in 2015 (Figure 2). Ultimately, total employment will increase by 103,000 in 2015, with the unemployment rate remaining stable at 10% till year end.

For 2016 and 2017, the acceleration of growth (at respectively

1.8% and 2%) combined with the ongoing implementation of policies to cut labour costs and the closing of the productivity cycle in the course of 2016 will lead to accelerating job creation in the commercial sector. This will increase, year on year, to 238,000 in 2016 and 245,000 in 2017 for the commercial sector alone, a rate comparable to what was seen between mid-2010 and mid-2011 (234,000 jobs created). However, in 2016, the number of subsidized contracts in the non-commercial sector set out in the 2016 Finance Bill will be down from previous years (200,000 CUI-CAE jobs and 25,000 “jobs for the future” in 2016, compared with 270,000 and 65,000 respectively for 2015). For 2017, we are assuming stability in the stock of subsidized non-commercial job contracts (see Figure 2). Overall, the long-term return of job creation by business will trigger a decline in the unemployment rate starting in the second quarter of 2016. Although sluggish, this fall should be sustainable, with the unemployment rate down to 9.8% of the labour force at end 2016 and 9.4% by end 2017.

Figure 2. Subsidized contracts in the non-commercial sector



Note : The fall in CUI-CAE contracts seen in the second half of 2014 comes from the switch from CAE job integration contracts to CDD fixed-term contracts.

Scope: Mainland France.

Sources : DARES, OFCE forecasts *emod.fr* 2015-2017, October 2015.

[1] The presence of overstaffing in businesses derives from the gap between labour productivity and its long-term trend, called the productivity cycle. This reflects the time employment takes to adjust to economic activity. See Ducoudré and Plane, 2015, « [Les demandes de facteurs de production en France](#) » [The demand for production factors in France], *Revue de l'OFCE*, no.142.

Still no halt to the rise in unemployment


OFCE Analysis and Forecasting Department

The unemployment data for the month of May once again show a rise in the number of job seekers registering at the Pôle Emploi job centre in Class A, up 16,200. Although this is certainly fewer than in April (26,200), it still leaves no glimpse on the horizon of a reversal in the unemployment curve. This continuous increase in unemployment, despite some initial shoots of recovery, is not surprising. The renewed GDP growth in the first quarter (+0.6% according to the detailed accounts published by the INSEE Thursday morning) has yet to have an impact on employment, which has stagnated. For the moment, companies are taking advantage of the pick-up in activity to absorb [the excess labour they inherited from the crisis](#) (in English see the [post introducing this study](#)). Only once the recovery has proved to be sustainable will an

increase in employment translate into a reduction in unemployment. The time it takes employment to adjust to economic activity, i.e. about three quarters, does not point towards a turnaround in the labour market in the short term.

The last period of growth in France just following the 2008-2009 recession was moreover too brief to lead to a decline in the number of job seekers. With average growth of 0.7% per quarter from Q4 2009 to Q1 2011, the number of unemployed stabilized at best (Figure 1).

Since Q2 2011, growth has fallen to a very low level (0.1% per quarter), and unemployment has started rising again. However, a shift occurred in early 2013, with the monthly increase halved on average thanks to a renewal of the social treatment of unemployment through the creation of about 100,000 subsidized jobs in non-market sectors, as well as through enriching the growth in employment due to the implementation of the CICE tax credit and the Responsibility Pact.



As growth gradually accelerates and the various measures to boost employment begin to kick in, a (slow) improvement will

be seen in the second half of 2015.

The spectacular decline in exits from the Pôle Emploi agency

The 69,600 increase in the number of jobless registered with Pôle Emploi in Class A, B and C in the month of May, which is the worst figure recorded since the depths of the recession in April 2009, is surprising. The number of the unemployed broadly speaking, i.e. including unemployed people but also those working reduced hours, has been affected by unusual changes in the numbers of those exiting the job centre. About 43% of exits from the job centre are attributable to a termination of enrolment due to the non-renewal of the monthly job application for unspecified reasons, but which may be related for example to a resumption of activity, discouragement, temporary unavailability or even simply an oversight.


On average over the last five years, every month there were 200,000 terminations of enrolment due to this failure to renew. Some months, the grounds for termination can vary sharply, temporarily throwing off the unemployment statistics. For example, in August 2013, the “SFR bug” (Figure 2), i.e. a computer failure at the mobile phone operator, prevented many jobseekers from updating their status, which resulted in a sharp rise in the terminations of enrolment (+260,100). Due to the effect of a very high flow of exits from Pôle Emploi, the number of job seekers in Classes A, B and C fell by 43,800 in August 2013. The following month, as the number of terminations of enrolment returned to a level that was close to its long-term average, the unemployment figures logically rose sharply (+56,400 in September 2013), correcting for the effect of the artificial fall in the previous month.

In terms of the figures for May 2015, the phenomenon was the opposite of what happened during the SFR bug in August 2013. In fact, having noticed that the number of job seekers who updated their status following the normal reminder was

significantly lower than usual, Pôle Emploi issued two additional reminders, which led to an unusually low level of terminations of enrolment (+160,600) compared with the historical trend (201,300). This mechanically increased the numbers in class A, B and C, at a rate that Pôle Emploi calculates at between 28,000 and 38,000.

But if next month the number of terminations of enrolment returns to a level close to its long-term average, this would wind up lowering the number of job seekers in class A, B and C without this reduction being the result of any change in the labour market. We must therefore insist on the need for caution in making any month-by-month interpretation of the unemployment data.

Figure 2. Terminations of enrolment at Pôle Emploi in classes A, B and C



Source : Pôle Emploi.

A fall in the unemployment rate according to the ILO: the false good news

By [Bruno Ducoudré](#) and [Eric Heyer](#)

Two days following the announcement by France's unemployment agency Pôle Emploi of an increase in Class A job seeker registrations in April, which comes on top of a first quarter increase, the INSEE statistics agency has published its estimate of the unemployment rate. Under the definition of the International Labour Office (ILO), the unemployment rate in metropolitan France fell by 0.1 point in the first quarter of 2015, meaning 38,000 fewer unemployed than in the fourth quarter of 2014. But according to Pôle emploi, over this same period the number of registered Class A job seekers rose by 12,000. In one case, unemployment is falling; in the other, it is rising: this does not make for a clear diagnosis of what's happening with unemployment at the start of the year.

What accounts for the different diagnoses of the INSEE and Pôle Emploi?

In addition to differences in methodology (a labour survey for the ILO, administrative data for Pôle emploi), note that to be counted as unemployed according to the ILO, three conditions have to be met: a person must be unemployed, available to work and conducting an active job search. Simply registering at the job centre is not sufficient to meet this last condition. So someone who is registered in Class A [\[1\]](#) at Pôle Emploi but is not conducting an active search is not counted as unemployed according to the ILO. The ILO criteria are thus more

restrictive. Historically, the number of unemployed registered at the job centre is higher than that calculated according to the ILO for persons aged 25 and over. Young people under age 25 generally have less incentive to register at the job centre [2].

Table 1. Change in the number of unemployed - first quarter 2015

1000s

Age:	15-24	25-49	50 et +	Total
Jobless as per ILO	8	-19	-26	-38
Registered with Pôle Emploi in Cat. A	-6	6	12	12
Difference	-14	25	38	50

Sources : INSEE, labour survey; Pôle Emploi-Dares.

Except for the under-25s, the unemployment figures from Pôle Emploi are therefore worse than those for the ILO and hence the INSEE (Table 1). The explanation is as follows. In labour market conditions that have worsened considerably, some unemployed people have become discouraged and are no longer actively seeking employment: they are thus no longer counted as unemployed according to the ILO. Yet they are continuing to update their status with the job centre and thus remain registered as unemployed in Class A. This results in an increase in the “halo” of the unemployed, *i.e.* people who want to work and are readily available but are not actively seeking a job. This unemployment “halo” has increased by 71,000 people in one quarter.

In first quarter 2015, the ILO-based unemployment rate fell for the wrong reasons

There are two reasons why the unemployment rate may fall: the first, virtuous reason is that people are exiting unemployment due to an improvement in the labour market; the second, less rosy reason is that some unemployed people are drifting into inactivity. The latest ILO statistics highlight that the 0.1 point fall in the unemployment rate was due entirely to the decline in the labour force participation rate – which measures the percentage of people in the population aged 15 to

64 who are active – and not to a recovery in employment, which, on the contrary, has declined. So the drop in the unemployment rate is due not to a recovery in employment, but to discouragement among unemployed people who are no longer actively seeking work (Table 2).

**Table 2. Breakdown in the change in the ILO participation rate
first quarter 2015**

In points	15-24	25-49	>49	Total	Workforce Q1 2015 (in 1000s)
Employed	0.0	-0.4	0.2	-0.2	25 463
Unemployed	0.1	-0.1	-0.2	-0.1	2 852
Active population	0.1	-0.5	-0.1	-0.3	28 315

Source : INSEE, labour survey.

More specifically, the entry of young people into the labour market at a time when employment is declining is being reflected in a 0.1 point rise in joblessness in this category. Among seniors, the employment rate is continuing to increase (0.2 points) due to the postponement of the effective retirement age. It is true that ILO unemployment is falling among seniors, but the rising numbers in this age group enrolling at the job centre (Table 1) undoubtedly reflects a change in their job search behaviour: more and more of them are no longer making a job search and are now classified in the “halo” of unemployment.

Ultimately, the fall in the ILO-defined unemployment rate, which is marked by both a lack of recovery in employment and discouragement among some of the unemployed, is not such good news.

[\[1\]](#) People registered in Class A have not worked at all, even on reduced hours, unlike those registered in Classes B and C.

[\[2\]](#) To be entitled to unemployment compensation and to receive back-to-work assistance ("ARE"), 122 days of affiliation or 610 hours of work must be shown during the 28 months preceding the end of the job contract.

Unemployment figures: the chill returns in April

By Analysis and Forecasting Department (OFCE-DAP)


While the slowing increase in the number of job seekers registered with France's Pôle Emploi unemployment agency in the first quarter of 2015 could be seen as the premise of the long-awaited downturn in the unemployment curve, the figures released today once again cast doubt on this prospect, at least in the short term. The registration of 26,200 additional people in category A at the agency in April brings the increase in job seekers back to a high rate, well above the average over the last two years (13,400 per month) and far from the virtual stability seen in the first quarter (+3,000 per month).

While the publication of strong figures for first-quarter GDP growth (+ 0.6%) reaffirmed the prospect of a recovery, the jobless numbers are disappointing. Don't forget, however, that employment does not immediately respond to a pick-up in activity; it will take time to reap the benefits for the labour market of the good growth experienced at the year's beginning, when the recovery has proven to be strong, pushing employers to recruit. For now, companies are still digesting the overstaffing inherited from the period of very low growth

between 2011 and 2014. The fall in unemployment that can be foreseen with the recovery will not take place until the second half of 2015. But the acceleration of job centre registrations in April sends a contrary signal.

The situation seems to be generally worsening among all sections of job seekers: men, women, and all age categories. The number of unemployed under age 25 has been rising again the last months (9,500 people). But changes like these are often volatile, and should be treated with caution: they come in counterpoint to an equivalent fall in numbers during the first two months of 2015. Over a one-year period, the increase was only 11,900, and the interruption in the rise in youth unemployment since April 2013 signalled success for the jobs policy targeted at this group (see the figure). The announcement by the Minister of Labour of the creation of 100,000 additional subsidized jobs reflects the government's perhaps belated determination to beef up this programme at a time when the economic outlook is improving.

Figure. Young people under age 25 enrolled in category A at France's Pôle Emploi agency



Sources : DARES, Pôle Emploi, OFCE calculations.

The “Ricardian effect”: to be taken with caution!


By David Ben Dahan and [Eric Heyer](#)

Is the deterioration in the public finances influencing households' consumption behaviour? [A recent INSEE study](#) tries to answer this with an econometric estimate of the determinants of the savings rates using yearly data from 1971 to 2011. Based on the results of the study, the authors attribute recent changes in the French households' rate of consumption to fiscal policy and the state of the public finances. Their model thus concludes that there is a significant “Ricardian” effect: having noted the worsening state of the public finances during the crisis, households are anticipating future tax hikes, leading them to up their savings during the recent period. Note that this effect is only temporary: the results of the INSEE's econometrics indicate that while this has reined in consumer spending in the short term, the effect will fade quickly and disappear in the long term. Households are therefore “Ricardian” ... but only in the short term!

This oxymoron may be due to the fact that the standard determinants of consumption, *i.e.* inflation, interest rates and the unemployment rate, do not have any effect over the period studied by the INSEE. Hence for the INSEE, French households are forming rational short-term expectations, but without building up any “precautionary savings” against the risks associated with a deterioration in the labour market. However, in a recession, since a deterioration in the public finances goes hand in hand with a consequent rise in unemployment, the “Ricardian effect” and “precautionary

savings” are in competition, making it difficult to distinguish them (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Change in the savings rate, the public deficit and the unemployment rate between 2008 and 2011



Source: INSEE.

It should be noted in this regard that the stability of the parameters estimated by the INSEE is not guaranteed over the period 1970-2011: the non-significance of the unemployment rate is resolved once the estimation period begins later, after 1975, and this variable becomes highly significant from 1978. This is why we have reproduced the INSEE’s analysis by starting the estimate in 1978. The results from modelling the rate of household consumption using an error correction model (ECM), based on three different specifications presented in Table 1, can be summarized as follows:

1. As with the INSEE’s results, there is no significant “Ricardian effect” in the long term over the period 1978-2011. In the short term, this effect is marginally significant (at 10% in equation 1);
2. When we integrate the unemployment rate into the analysis, the effect is significant in the short and long term (equations 2 and 3);
3. When placed in parallel with precautionary savings, the “Ricardian effect” loses its short-term explanatory power (equation 2).

Table1. Summary of the results of estimates of the determinants of the household consumption rate

Périod:1978-011

	Equation 1	Equation 2	Equation 3
Long-term effect			
Adjustment coefficient	-0,003*** (-5,18)	-0,004*** (-5,37)	-0,004*** (-6,66)
Precautionary savings		Yes	Yes
Unemployment rate (%)		-0,98*** (-3,32)	-0,78*** (-3,67)
Ricardian effect		Non	
Structural primary public balance (% GDI)		0,16 (0,91)	
Short-term dynamic			
Precautionary savings		Yes	Yes
Unemployment rate (%)		-0,04** (-2,04)	-0,05*** (-3,37)
Ricardian effect	Oui	No	
Structural primary public balance (% GDI)	0,12* (1,94)	-0,02** (-2,47)	
Statistical diagnosis			
R ²	0,98	0,98	0,99
SSR	0,0005	0,0004	0,0003
SSE	0,005	0,0045	0,0038
LM	0,018 (p>0,98)	0,32 (p>0,73)	0,55 (p>0,58)
Jarque-Berra	0,70 (p>0,70)	1,06 (p>0,59)	1,19 (p>0,55)
Arch	0,14 (p>0,71)	0,66 (p>0,42)	0,11 (p>0,73)

Notes:

The household consumption rate is the ratio between household consumption and the household's gross disposable income (GDI).

***, **, * signify that the coefficients are significant at respectively 1%, 5% and 10%.

Student's t is given in parenthesis.

The short-term dynamic is not reproduced in full in the table. Only the "Ricardian effects" and the "precautionary savings" are reproduced here.

The three specifications have satisfactory statistical properties. The LM tests lead to the rejection of the hypothesis of autocorrelation of the residues of the equation. These residues are homoscedastic with respect to the White test and the ARCH test. The functional form of the equation is validated by the Reset test. Finally, according to the Jarque-Bera test, the residues of the equation follow a normal law

Our estimates show that the increase in the deficits is not leading to a reduction in consumption and that the increase in the savings rate observed between 2008 and 2011 can be explained by "precautionary savings" due to the dramatic worsening in the job market.

This result also confirms the analysis made in other OFCE studies concerning the importance of the multipliers during economic downturns.

Should we be celebrating the fall in unemployment at end 2013?

By [Bruno Ducoudré](#) and [Eric Heyer](#)

Every quarter, the INSEE publishes the unemployment rate as defined by the International Labour Office (ILO): for the fourth quarter of 2013, it **fell** 0.1 point in France, meaning 41,000 fewer unemployed. Likewise, every month the number of jobseekers registered with the Pôle Emploi job centre is reported: during the fourth quarter of 2013, this source indicated that the number of registered jobseekers in category A **rose** by 23,000. In one case unemployment is down, in the other it is up – this does not lead to a clear diagnosis about where unemployment is heading at year end.

What explains the difference in diagnosis between the INSEE and Pôle emploi?

Besides differences related to methodology (an employment survey for the ILO, an administrative source for Pôle emploi), it should not be forgotten that, according to the ILO, a person must meet three conditions to be counted as unemployed: being unemployed, being available for work and performing an active job search. Simply being registered at Pôle emploi is not sufficient to fulfil this last condition. So people registered as category A at Pôle emploi who are not actively seeking work are not counted as unemployed according to the ILO. The ILO criteria are thus more restrictive. Historically, [for those aged 25 and over, the number of unemployed registered at Pôle emploi is greater than the number according](#)

[to the ILO criteria](#). For those under age 25, registering with Pôle emploi [\[1\]](#) is in general not as worthwhile, except during a period of active social treatment of unemployment, as was the case during the last quarter of 2013: people who wanted to benefit from a subsidized job had to be registered at the job centre.

Table 1. Change in the number of unemployed from Q3 to Q4 2013

1000s

Age	15-24	25-49	50 +	Total
Unemployed (ILO criteria)	-33	3	-11	-41
Registered at Pôle emploi Cat. A	-7	10	20	23
Difference	26	7	31	64

Sources: INSEE, Emploi survey, Pôle emploi DARES.

As shown in Table 1, regardless of the age group, the situation seems less favourable using the Pôle emploi figures than according to the ILO criteria: when confronted with more than 2 years of unemployment, a certain number of discouraged jobseekers stop their active job search and are thus no longer recognized as such within the meaning of the ILO, yet continue to update their status at the job centre, and therefore remain listed in Category A.

Is the reduction in the unemployment rate calculated by ILO criteria good news?

The unemployment rate can fall for two reasons: the first one, virtuous in nature, is as a result of escaping unemployment due to improvements in the labour market; the second, less encouraging, is due to jobless people becoming discouraged and drifting into inactivity. The latest statistics from the ILO emphasize that the 0.1 point fall in the unemployment rate can be explained in full by the fall in the participation rate – which measures the percentage of the work force in the population aged 15 to 64 – and not by a resumption of employment that has remained stable. The decline in the unemployment rate is thus not due to a recovery in employment, but to discouraged jobless people who quit actively seeking

employment (Table 2).

**Table 2. Breakdown of the change in the labour force participation rate
(ILO criteria) Q4 2013**

In points

Age	15-24	25-49	>49 ans	Total *	Labour force Q4 2013 (1000s)
Employed	0,3	-0,2	0,2	0	25 547
Unemployed	-0,5	0	-0,1	-0,1	2 784
Labour force	-0,1	-0,1	0,2	-0,1	28 331

*The employment rate, the unemployment rate and the labour force participation rate are average rates weighted for the number of individuals in each age group. The 25-49 age group is the largest, representing about 60% of the total.

Source: INSEE, Emploi survey.

Looking more closely, the employment policy pursued by the government – “jobs for the future”, CUI “unique integration contracts” – has had a positive impact on youth employment; the employment rate rose by 0.3 percentage point during the last quarter of 2013. Among seniors, the employment rate is still continuing to rise (+0.2 percentage point) due to the decline in the actual age of retirement. ILO-defined unemployment is of course falling among seniors, but the sharp rise in enrolment at the job centre in this age group (Table 1) undoubtedly reflects a change in their job search behaviour: more and more seniors are no longer looking for work. They are now included in the “halo” of unemployment, which is continuing to rise.

Ultimately, the fall in the ILO-defined unemployment rate, which is characterized by the absence of a recovery in employment and the discouragement of jobseekers, is not such good news.

[\[1\]](#) To have the right to unemployment compensation and receive assistance for a return to work, it is necessary to prove a 122 day contribution period or 610 hours of work during the 28 months preceding the end of the job contract.

What minimum wage for Germany?

By Odile Chagny and Sabine Le Bayon

The campaign for the parliamentary elections taking place on 22 September in Germany has engendered a broad debate among all political forces about the consolidation of the welfare state. The SPD programme highlights the concept of social justice, while in its programme the CDU has taken up several of the SPD's main themes in the field of social welfare. The role of the welfare state has never been more central to a general election campaign since 2002. Despite this, the concern is not to move towards expanding the welfare state but the need for better quality in the welfare state, by correcting some of the negative consequences of Agenda 2010 [\[1\]](#). The fight against poverty at more advanced ages (through a revaluation of family benefits for older mothers and the introduction of a contributory minimum), the re-regulation of certain types of work (temporary) and the need to strengthen the minimum wage are all clearly reflected in the programmes of both the CDU and the SPD. Even the FDP, traditionally hostile to any notion of a minimum wage, has incorporated in its election platform the need for "adequate pay, even at the bottom of the wage scale". However, behind this apparent unity, the way such a minimum wage would work varies greatly between the parties.

The weakening of the collective bargaining system

In a country where there is no statutory national minimum wage, pay scales are negotiated at the regional or national level by the social partners in each business sector. But the

decline in the share of employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement (53% in 2012 in the old Länder, 36% in the new Länder, against, respectively, 70% and 56% in 1996), the weakening of the trade unions and the development of atypical forms of employment, particularly since the Hartz reforms, have led to an increase in the proportion of people earning a low wage, which is calling into question the protective role of the collective bargaining system for an entire segment of the population. In 2010, the share of low-wage workers [\[2\]](#) was 22.2% in Germany and 6.1% in France. The majority of the 8.1 million employees concerned ([Kalina and Weinkopf, 2013](#)) work full-time (45%), one-quarter occupy part-time jobs subject to social security contributions, and 30% are employed in “mini-jobs”. The range of workers earning a low wage (less than 9.14 euros [\[3\]](#)) is broad: 1.8 million receive less than 5 euros per hour, 2.6 million between 5 and 7 euros, and 2.5 million between 7 and 8.50 euros.

The debate over the introduction of a statutory minimum wage dates back to the 1990s. For a long time, however, this was confined to a few sectors, construction in particular, based on a rationale of dealing with wage competition from businesses in the new Member States of the European Union, who sent their employees to Germany under pay conditions that were much below those provided for by collective bargaining. It was not until the mid-2000s that the first joint trade union call for a national minimum hourly wage (7.5 euros per hour) was finally made by the DGB (the German confederation of trade unions) and that concerns over income support gradually came to outweigh concerns over wage dumping. This level was upgraded to 8.5 euros as of May 2010.

SPD and CDU/CSU/FDP: Two different visions of the minimum wage

While all the major parties put forward a desire to establish a minimum wage, there is not much consensus about the practical arrangements.

The SPD is proposing the introduction of a statutory minimum wage of 8.5 euros per hour (gross), which would apply to all employees, regardless of the minimum wage agreed for any particular sector. The point is, as was noted by the SPD candidate, Peer Steinbrück, during a debate he had with Angela Merkel in early September, to put an end to the “patchwork of minimum wages that exists from sector to sector and region to region”. Some 6.9 million people would see their hourly wage revalued ([Kalina and Weinkopf, 2013](#)) by 30% on average and by over 80% for the 1.8 million employees earning less than 5 euros per hour. About one-fifth of employees would be affected, more than half of whom have a “normal” job (subject to social security contributions). This would result in large-scale shocks both to income (for households) and to competitiveness (for companies), and would pose a real challenge to the low-wage economy that now characterizes certain sectors (agriculture, food, retail, hotel and catering, security and cleaning, etc.).

Because of this, the issue of the minimum wage is inseparable from the future of “mini-jobs”, the 7 million posts that pay less than 450 euros per month (400 euros prior to April 2013), which are exempt from employee social charges and income tax and which give virtually no access to social rights. In the case of the introduction of a national minimum wage of 8.5 euros per hour, these employees would represent nearly 40% of those whose wages would be revalued.

It should not be forgotten that one of the key measures of the first SPD-Green government led by Schröder was in 1999 to severely restrict the growth of “mini-jobs”, which were charged with 1) promoting the casualization of employment by replacing normal jobs that are subject to social charges, and 2) not offering social security coverage. Three years later, the Hartz Commission proposed facilitating the recourse to mini-jobs so as to develop sectors with low-skilled work.

Numerous studies have recently revealed blatant violations of

labour law (lack of compliance with regulations on sick leave, on paid holidays, etc.) and unacceptably low hourly wages in these jobs (Bäcker and Neuffer 2012 [\[4\]](#), [Bundesministerium für Familie, 2012](#)). It is therefore not surprising that all the major parties (except the FDP) have included in their election manifestoes a commitment to reforming “mini-jobs”. But whereas the CDU is only targeting violations of labour law, the SPD programme goes further. The introduction of a minimum wage of 8.5 euros (gross) per hour would in effect limit companies’ interest in making use of “mini-jobs”. Furthermore, given the monthly ceiling on the maximum payment for “mini-jobs”, setting a wage of 8.5 euros per hour would amount to introducing a time limit on these jobs of about 13 hours per week. This would not be far from the limit of 15 hours per week that was suppressed by Hartz Law II in 2003 ... as part of Agenda 2010 [\[5\]](#). More generally, the entire political economy underlying these jobs would be called into question, as their rationale is to provide extra compensation that is exempt from social security contributions for employees in sectors with low minimum wages.

The CDU proposal on the minimum wage aims both at facilitating the extension of existing agreements (that is to say, to reform the process by which a collective agreement becomes mandatory for all the companies in the sector in question) and at requiring sectors without a collective agreement to set a minimum wage. A desire to secure protection against wage competition from companies that do not adhere to collective agreements and from East European companies who post their employees in Germany [\[6\]](#) has led several sectors to resort to these extension procedures in recent years. However, while an extension like this is virtually automatic in France, this is far from the case in Germany, even though the procedure was simplified in 2009. The CDU therefore proposes a “least burdensome approach”, that is to say, government intervention only in cases where the social partners have failed. The aim is to deal with situations where there is an “agreement

vacuum” and allow a maximum number of employees to be paid according to collectively agreed minimum wages, while enabling the social partners to fix the level, since the CDU believes that minimum wage differentials help to take into account the diversity of regional and sectoral situations.

The CDU, which is unlikely to be able to govern alone in the next Parliament, has not gone farther than this for the time being, pending the outcome of the elections. Depending on which party it will govern with, the decisions about how low wages are regulated can differ greatly.

Here it is worth summarizing the numerous limitations of the current arrangements for the State’s extension procedure, which set the context for the CDU’s proposal:

- – When the same sector has a number of different collective bargaining agreements, the extension procedure becomes more difficult, as it is necessary to determine which one is most representative and which ones could be controversial. This is what happened in the postal sector, where two competing collective bargaining agreements co-existed: one covering employees of Deutsche Post, the former monopoly in the sector, and the other covering employees of competitors for whom minimum wages were much lower. The government decided to extend the agreement signed in Deutsche Post to the entire sector, but the competitors complained, and the extension procedure was overturned by the Berlin Court [\[7\]](#).
- – Negotiations on a sector’s minimum wages are renewed regularly (every six months or every one or more years). But when renegotiation fails, several months may elapse during which no minimum is in effect, and employers have sometimes seized the opportunity to hire employees at wages that are 30% below the previous minimum. This is what happened for instance in late 2009 in the industrial cleaning business ([Bosch and Weinkopf 2012](#)).

- – The minimum in a sector can vary greatly, and some of them do not protect workers against the risk of poverty. Thus, according to data from the [WSI-Tarifarchiv \(March 2013\)](#), 11% of collective agreements in late 2012 provided for a minimum of less than 8.50 euros, the threshold proposed by the SPD as the statutory minimum wage, which is below the threshold for a “low wage” (9.14 euros).

The impact of the proposals of the various parties on changes in employment is difficult to estimate from studies conducted recently in Germany ([Bosch and Weinkopf 2012](#)), if only because the studies have focused on the introduction of minimum wages in isolated sectors, covering only a limited proportion of employees. This would not be comparable to the introduction of an industry-wide minimum wage that affected at least a quarter of employees, that was not differentiated, or even with the generalization of collectively agreed minimums. The goal is now for the maximum of employees to receive a “decent” income, even if the level of the latter differs depending on the programme. It is also to curtail certain atypical forms of employment. Notably, in a number of sectors the studies conducted show that the introduction of a minimum wage leads to a change in the structure of employment, with fewer “mini-jobs” and more “normal” jobs (subject to social security contributions), due to the regular checks conducted to ensure compliance with the minimum wages in the companies. Whatever the election results, the measures adopted will in any case point in the direction of correcting the most egregious injustices in terms of compensation, especially with respect to “mini-jobs”.

[\[1\]](#) Agenda 2010 includes all of the reforms implemented in Germany by the SPD-Green coalition between 2003 and 2005, which focused on labour market reform (called the Hartz reforms) (for more on this, see e.g. [Hege 2012](#), [Chagny 2008](#)).

[\[2\]](#) These are employees receiving less than 2/3 of the median gross hourly wage.

[\[3\]](#) In 2011, the median gross hourly wage in Germany was 13.7 euros.

[\[4\]](#) “Von der Sonderregelung zur Beschäftigungsnorm : Minijobs im deutschen Sozialstaat” [On special employment standards: Mini-jobs in the German welfare state], WSI Mitteilungen 1/2012.

[\[5\]](#) Not to mention the fact that as a result it would be necessary to completely revamp the support for low-wage workers provided by exemptions on employee social charges.

[\[6\]](#) When companies from a Member State send their workers to another State, they are required to meet the minimum standards (working time, wages). The posting of workers has been governed by a 1996 EU Directive. These postings, which are growing in number, are posing a number of problems (social dumping, unfair competition, deterioration in working conditions) ([Metis 2013](#)).

[\[7\]](#) For further information, see: [“Vrais et faux enjeux de la controverse sur les salaires minima légaux en RFA”](#) [True and false issues in the controversy over the statutory minimum wage in the RFA], Karl Brenke, *Regards sur l'économie allemande*, no. 94, 2009.

A fiscal policy to promote

structural reform – lessons from the German case

By [Eric Heyer](#)

“France should copy Germany’s reforms to thrive”, Gerhard Schröder entitled [an opinion piece in the Financial Times on 5 June 2013](#). As for the European Commission (EC), its latest annual recommendations to the Member states, released on 29 May, seem to take a step back from its strategy of a rapid and synchronized return to balancing the public finances, which has been in place since 2010. The EU executive’s priority now seems to be implementation of structural reforms of the labour and services markets in the euro zone countries. These countries will of course continue to consolidate their public finances, but the EC has given them an extra year or two to do this. While, for example, France will further consolidate its accounts over the coming two years (the fiscal effort demanded of the French government by the EC comes to 0.8 percent of GDP, or 16 billion euros per year), it has been given another two years to bring its deficit below 3% of GDP (2015 instead

Tableau. New fiscal targets after postponement

		2013	2014	2015	2016
France	Government deficit (% of GDP)	3,9	3,6	2,8	
	Fiscal impulse (GDP points)	-1,3	-0,8	-0,8	
Spain	Government deficit (% of GDP)	6,5	5,8	4,2	2,8
	Fiscal impulse (GDP points)	-1,1	-0,8	-0,8	-1,2
Netherlands	Government deficit (% of GDP)	3,6	2,8		
	Fiscal impulse (GDP points)	-0,6	-0,7		

Source: European Commission.

of 2013).

This change in course – or at least in tone – by the EC, which had emphasized the enactment of extreme austerity reforms, should be welcomed. However, it is important to consider whether the new environment, in particular the fiscal situation, will be favourable enough to ensure that the structural reforms are effective. An examination of the economic context in which Germany introduced its reforms in

the early 2000s, which became a benchmark for the countries of southern Europe, provides some important lessons. While the purpose here is not to go into these reforms in depth, it is nevertheless useful to remember that they were enacted while the German economy had a substantial trade deficit (-1.8 percent of GDP in 2000 against a surplus of 1.4 percent for France at that same time) and was considered a “low achiever” in Europe. These reforms led to a significant reduction in the share of wages in value added, boosting the margins of German business, and helped to quickly restore the competitiveness of the German economy: by 2005, Germany was once again generating a large trade surplus while France ran a deficit for the first time since 1991. The non-cooperative character of the the euro zone ([OFCE, 2006](#)) and the steep increases in Germany in poverty – ([Heyer, 2012](#)) and Figure 1 – and in wealth inequality ([de Grauwe et Yi, 2013](#)) were the hidden fruit of this strategy. Europe’s “low achievers” today are the southern European countries, and the pressure to take steps to boost competitiveness has shifted from Germany to France, Italy and Spain. Despite this parallel, the question remains: is the economic environment similar today? Figures 1 and 2 summarize the economic situation in Germany at the time the structural reforms were implemented. Two main points stand out:

1. These reforms were carried out **in a context of strong global growth**: the world experienced average growth of over 4.7% per year in 2003-2006 (Figure 1). By comparison, the figure for growth is likely to be less than 3% over the next two years;
2. In addition, the fiscal situation of the German economy in the early 2000s was not good: in 2001, the general government deficit for Germany exceeded 3%, and came close to 4% in 2002, the year before the enactment of the first Hartz reform. Government debt then exceeded the threshold of 60% of GDP allowed by the Maastricht Treaty for the first time. Despite this poor fiscal

performance – with public debt approaching 70% in 2005 – it is interesting to note that the German government continued to maintain a highly expansionary fiscal policy for as long as the reforms had not been completed: in the period 2003-2006, the fiscal impulse was positive at on average 0.7 GDP point each year (Figure 2). Thus, during this period **the German government supported its structural reforms with a highly accommodative fiscal policy.**

Figure 1. Growth, unemployment rate and poverty rate in Germany





Figure 2. State of deficit and fiscal policy in Germany



Thus not only was the structural reform of the labour market

conducted under Schröder implemented in a very favourable economic environment (strong global growth and a strategy that differed from the other European countries), but it was also accompanied by a particularly accommodative fiscal policy, given in particular the poor state of Germany's public finances. This situation differs greatly from contemporary conditions:

1. Global growth is likely to be under 3% over the coming two years;
2. The EC is asking a large number of European countries to implement the same structural reforms simultaneously, which in a highly integrated euro zone limits their effectiveness; and
3. Despite the extra time being granted for deficit reduction, fiscal policy will remain very tight: as is indicated in Table 1, the fiscal impulses for France and Spain will still be very negative (-0.8 GDP point per year) as the structural reforms in these countries are being implemented.

So while the pressure to boost the competitiveness of the countries of southern Europe is similar to that facing Germany in the early 2000s, the external environment is less favourable and there is greater pressure to reduce the public debt. On this last point, the German example teaches us that it is difficult to juggle structural reforms to boost business competitiveness with efforts to reduce the public debt.

France: the rise in cyclical

unemployment continues

By Bruno Ducoudré

The Great Recession, which began in 2008, has resulted in a continuous and inexorable rise in unemployment in France, by 3.1 percentage points between the low point reached in the first quarter of 2008 (7.1% in mainland France) and the peak in the fourth quarter of 2012. The unemployment rate is now close to the record levels reached in the late 1990s. This rise can be broken down into a change in the rate of cyclical unemployment due to the lack of economic growth, and a change in the rate of structural unemployment. The latter gives information on the extent of the output gap, which is crucial for measuring the structural deficit. Consequently, any choice about the fiscal policy to be adopted to re-balance the public finances needs an analysis of the nature of the additional unemployment generated by the crisis. In other words, has the crisis mainly resulted in cyclical unemployment or structural unemployment?

A study of the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU)^[1] offers one way of analysing whether the unemployment is structural or cyclical. Based on an estimate of the wage-price spiral, we propose [in the OFCE's 2013-2014 forecasts for the French economy](#) taking a look at the level of the equilibrium rate of unemployment (ERU) using a recursive estimate of the NAIRU since 1995 in order to identify the share of cyclical unemployment.

Table. Estimates of the equilibrium rate of unemployment

In %

Périod	2000-2012	2000-2007	2008-2012
NAIRU	7,2	6,8	7,7

Note : Hypotheses on exogenous factors: values observed on average over the periods 2000-2007 and 2008-2012. The productivity trend equals 1.1.


Source : OFCE calculations.

First, our estimate of the ERU takes good account of the lack

of real inflationary pressures since 1995. Indeed, the actual unemployment rate is consistently higher than the ERU over this period (Figure 1). However, between 1995 and 2012 underlying inflation varies between 0 and 2%. It reaches 2% in 2002 and 2008, times when the actual unemployment rate is closer to the ERU, although this does not reflect the real inflationary pressures. In 2012, the increase in the unemployment rate led to a wider gap with the equilibrium rate of unemployment and was accompanied by a slowdown in underlying inflation, which fell below 1% by the end of the year.

Second, the NAIRU is estimated at 7.2% on average over the years 2000-2012, with an average inflation rate of 1.9% over the period. Inflation rose to an average 7.7% over the period 2008-2012 (Table 1) and to 7.8% in 2012 (Figure 1).


Figure 1. Unemployment rate and estimated NAIRU



Sources : INSEE, OFCE calculations.

Third, these estimates also indicate that the NAIRU has increased by 0.9 percentage points since the onset of the crisis. This explains at most 30% of the rise in the unemployment rate since 2008, with the remainder coming from an increase in cyclical unemployment. The cyclical component of unemployment would therefore represent 2.1 percentage points of unemployment in 2012. This change in the gap between

the actual unemployment rate and the equilibrium rate of unemployment is also consistent with underlying inflation, which has been declining since 2009. Given our forecast of unemployment, this gap will increase by 1.5 percentage points, to a level of 3.6% in 2014 on an annual average.



Estimates of the equilibrium rate of unemployment thus indicate that the gap with the actual unemployment rate has widened during the crisis. The share of cyclical unemployment has increased, with the rise in cyclical unemployment accounting for about 70% of the rise in the unemployment rate since 2008. This confirms our diagnosis of a high **output gap** for the French economy in 2012, a gap that will continue to widen in 2014 under the combined impact of fiscal austerity and a high fiscal multiplier.

This text draws on the analysis of the economic situation and the forecast for 2013-2014, which is available [in French] on the [OFCE site](#).

[1] The NAIRU is the rate of unemployment at which the inflation rate remains stable. Above it, inflation slows, which eventually makes possible an increase in employment and

a reduction in unemployment. Below it, the dynamic is reversed, leading to higher inflation, a fall in employment and a return of unemployment to its equilibrium level.