

# Working hours and economic performance: What lessons can be drawn from the Coe-Rexecode report?

By [Eric Heyer](#) and [Mathieu Plane](#)

Do people work less in France than in the rest of Europe? Is France the only country to have reduced working hours in the last decade? Is the 35-hour work week really dragging down the French economy? The report published on 11 January by the [Coe-Rexecode](#) Institute provides fresh material for answering these questions.

We have produced [a note on the main conclusions of the report](#), which can be summarized as follows:

## **1. People work fewer hours in France than in the rest of Europe.**

- TRUE for full-time employees,
- FALSE for part-time employees,
- FALSE for non-salaried employees,
- UNDETERMINED for the total.

## **2. Working hours have fallen more in France than in Germany over the last 10 years.**

- FALSE

## **3. “The shorter work week has failed to meet the goal of job creation and work-sharing” in France.**

- FALSE

## **4. “The shorter work week has undermined per capita purchasing power” in France.**

- FALSE
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# Estonia: a new model for the euro zone?

By [Sandrine Levasseur](#)

In the wake of the Swedish and German models, should Europe now adopt the Estonian model? Despite Estonia's *success story*, the answer is no. Here's why.

Estonia has been a source of continuous surprise in recent years. First, it wrong-footed those who, in the autumn of 2008, thought the country had no alternative but to abandon its [currency board](#) and massively devalue its currency. However, Estonia chose a different path, as it strengthened its monetary anchor by adopting the euro on 1<sup>st</sup> January 2011. The winter of 2008 saw another surprise when the country decided on a significant reduction in civil servant salaries in the hope of creating a "demonstration effect" for the private sector, particularly for businesses exposed to international competition. The government's objective was clearly to help the economy to become more competitive. This strategy, called an "internal devaluation", worked in the sense that the total wage bill actually declined, with wage losses that could reach up to 10% to 15% at the peak of the crisis. Surprisingly, this decline in wages, which affected every sector of the economy, was relatively well accepted by the population. It was met by only a few strikes and demonstrations, even when the government decided to introduce more flexibility into the labour market (easier redundancy procedures, lifting administrative authorization for the

reduction of working time, etc.). Finally, [the ultimate surprise](#) was undoubtedly GDP growth of around 8% in 2011, a fall in the unemployment rate to less than 11%, and a trade deficit of only 2% of GDP (versus 16% before the crisis). Estonia's public debt was contained at 15.5% of GDP, and for 2011 the country even recorded a budget surplus of 0.3% of GDP! This is the stuff of dreams for the other euro zone countries!

Despite all this, the strategy adopted by Estonia cannot be turned into a model for the other euro zone countries. In fact, Estonia's success story is due to a convergence of favourable factors, with two conditions being critical:

1. A strategy of lowering wages makes it possible to become more competitive relative to a country's main partners only if it is conducted in isolation. If in Europe, particularly in the euro zone, every country were to lower its wage bill, the result would simply be sluggish domestic demand, with no positive impact on the countries' exports. To date, among the members of the euro zone, only Estonia and Ireland (two "small" countries) have played the card of lowering wages in the context of the crisis. We can scarcely imagine the impact on the euro zone if Germany or France ("large" countries) had drastically lowered wages at the height of the crisis. In addition to weak demand, this would have inevitably led to a trade war between the countries, which ultimately would not have benefited anyone.

2. A strategy of lowering wages is good for the country that implements it only so long as its major trading partners are on a trajectory of growth. In this regard, the upturn in Sweden and Finland partly explains Estonia's good export performance. In 2011, GDP increased by 4.1% in Sweden and 3% in Finland (against "only" 1.6% in the euro zone). We might expect that exports from Estonia would have been less dynamic (+33% in 2011!) if the growth rate of its two major trading partners had been lower, since between them Finland and Sweden

represent 33% of Estonia's export markets.

But does this mean that a slowdown in activity in [Sweden](#) and [Finland](#) – as can be anticipated for 2012 or 2013 – would negate the efforts made by Estonia's workers in terms of pay concessions? In other words, with respect to the long-term prospects of Estonia's economy, has the reduction in wages been in vain? The answer is no, it hasn't. In Estonia (as well as in the other Baltic states), the decline in wages was in fact necessary to offset the strong wage hikes granted before the crisis, which were largely disconnected from any gains in productivity. The loss of competitiveness of the Estonian economy that resulted could be seen in the winter of 2007, when GDP decelerated significantly and the trade deficit reached an abysmal level. By the spring of 2008, it had become clear that the growth model of Estonia (and of the other Baltic states), based on the equation "consumption + credit + greatly expanded construction", was [unsustainable](#) and that "adjustments" were inevitable in order to reorient the economy towards exports.

A detailed analysis of the adjustments made in the Estonian labour market during the economic crisis (see [here](#)) helps to measure the impact on business competitiveness of the pay cuts, the reduction in working time and the massive layoffs. Overall, the [real effective exchange rate](#) (measured by the unit labour costs of Estonia relative to those of its trading partners) has depreciated by some 23% since 2009. The loss of purchasing power suffered by Estonia's workers is estimated at 9% (in real terms) since 2009, or even at 20% of the gains in purchasing power obtained in 2004-2008. Among the institutional and societal factors that led Estonians to accept the wage cuts and a more flexible labour market, the absence of strong union representation seems to be an important explanatory factor. For example, in Estonia, fewer than 10% of employees are covered by collective bargaining agreements (against 67% in France). The other key explanatory

factor seems to have been the desire to join the euro zone. In these difficult times for the single currency, if this willingness seems surprising, it is nevertheless still [relevant for a certain number of EU countries](#) that have not yet adopted the euro.

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## **“Buy French”: From the slogan to the reality**

By [Jean-Luc Gaffard](#), [Sarah Guillou](#), [Lionel Nesta](#)

The current election campaign is lending weight to simplistic proposals like the slogan “buy French”, which evokes the need for France to re-industrialize. And to accomplish this, what could be simpler than to convince the population to buy native products designated with a special label? This is also more politically correct than advocating a straightforward return to protectionism. Employment is expected to benefit, along with the balance of trade. But if we look more closely, not only is it difficult to identify the geographical origin of products, but even if that were possible, any preference that these products might enjoy could well wind up in job losses. This solution for dealing with the need for re-industrialization ultimately reflects a refusal to get to the bottom of the problem.

Can we really define what it means to “buy French”? Does it mean buying the products of French companies? What about buying products made in France by foreign companies instead of buying products made abroad by French companies? These simple questions show that it is not so easy to pin down what is “Made in France”. One major difficulty is that the final

goods produced in a country usually incorporate intermediate goods manufactured abroad. It may even happen that the components of a final product are manufactured by a competitor in another country. The iPhone is emblematic of this [fragmentation](#). Should we refrain from purchasing intermediate goods from low-wage countries even though this makes it possible to produce final goods at a lower cost and boost exports by being more competitive on price? Those who think so should no longer be touting German industry as an example, since everyone knows about the growing share of imported inputs in the production of the final goods Germany exports (OECD, *Measuring Globalisation: OECD Economic Globalisation Indicators 2010*, p. 212).

Imagine, nevertheless, domestic consumers who are able to identify products with a high labour content and are ready to make sacrifices out of a spirit of economic patriotism. Don't the polls tell us that over two-thirds of consumers would be willing to pay more for French goods? While there are doubts about whether they would actually do this, it would be risky to ignore the opportunity cost of such a choice. Buying more expensive products simply because they are French reduces purchasing power. Other goods and services would not be purchased or would be bought for less abroad. The balance sheet for employment is far from certain.

Should this exercise in economic patriotism actually materialize, it would be a way that consumers form attachments to certain types of products, in this case based on their place of manufacture, which would in turn reduce the intensity of competition. This could lead the companies concerned to cut back on their efforts to become more competitive on price and other factors. Why, indeed, should they shell out for expensive and risky investments when have a guaranteed customer base? It's a safe bet that they will not do this much, if at all. The national economy would then be locked in a low technology trap, doomed to slower growth, obviously with

damaging consequences for employment in the medium and long term. This would also deprive the economy of the means to innovate and improve the competitiveness of its products.

Finally, it is likely that the willingness to buy French products would benefit products that replace goods made elsewhere in Europe rather than goods made in developing countries, either because the latter are no longer manufactured at all in France or because the price differences with French products would still be prohibitive. Ultimately it would not be possible to avoid further shifts in production to low-wage countries, with the consequent job losses. Furthermore, from a European perspective the non-cooperative character of this kind of measure could lead our European partners to adopt reciprocal measures, which would be detrimental to exports and employment.

The slogan “buy French” masks a refusal to see that the downturn is a global phenomenon which calls for a comprehensive response at the European level, and a refusal to consider a proactive industrial policy that takes into account the realities of supply as well as demand.

This is not just a matter of looking the other way. France is undergoing a deindustrialization process that threatens its capacity for growth. But who can deny that this phenomenon has accelerated with the crisis and that this acceleration is set to increase [as the general austerity measures and restrictions on bank credit further undermine domestic and European demand](#) for consumer durables? Unless we are willing to accept that an entire segment of industry in France and elsewhere in Europe is destroyed, with no hope of ever returning, and with as a consequence still greater disparities between countries and sharper conflicts of interest, it is clearly urgent to support this kind of demand.

Is this kind of support “the solution”? Of course not: propping up demand will not be enough, as an industrial policy

aimed at strengthening the supply side is also needed. The point is not to protect domestic production nor to promote the conquest of foreign markets through competition on taxation or social charges, but to stimulate investments designed to produce new goods and services, which is the only way to create stable jobs. Rather than try to rely on dubious slogans, the goal should be [to consolidate production that has the advantage of being high quality in terms of design, safety and reliability](#), and which corresponds to what French and European consumers genuinely want.

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## What employment policy during a crisis?

By Marion Cochard

After a lull of only a year, unemployment figures started to rise again in April 2011. We are seeing a replay of the dynamics of the 2008 recession: a hiring freeze and the non-renewal of temporary and fixed-term ("CDD") contracts, with redundancies to follow later in the year. The reason, of course, is the current economic downturn, which is hitting while French business margins are still in bad shape after the shock of 2008-2009, particularly in industry. The weakened companies no longer have the strength to cushion the fall as they did four years ago. The French economy is thus expected to slide into recession in the fourth quarter of 2011, and we foresee a fall in activity of 0.2% in 2012. Given that annual growth of 1.1% is needed to kick-off job creation, the



resumption of job losses seems inevitable. If we add the existence of a growing workforce to this bleak picture, the number of unemployed will surpass the 3 million threshold by year end.

On the eve of a tense social summit, what are the options for cushioning the impact of the crisis on the labor market? Given the urgency of the situation, the government has two main levers that are responsive and inexpensive: partial unemployment and subsidized jobs in the non-profit sector.

Partial unemployment can cushion the economic hardships faced by business and retain skills in the companies. There is substantial room to expand its use. By way of comparison, in 2009 maximum compensation for partial unemployment was extended to 24 months in Germany, versus 12 months in France. In addition, the greater level of state coverage in Germany partly explains how extensively it is taken up there: partial unemployment affected 1.5 million people at the peak of the crisis, but only 266,000 in France. Nor does this put much of a burden on public finances, as the 610 million euros disbursed by the States on partial unemployment in 2009 were offset by savings on unemployment benefits and the preservation of human capital.

But partial unemployment benefits workers in stable industrial jobs above all, while the brunt of the crisis is being borne by those in precarious employment and young people. These are the sections of the population targeted by subsidized employment. Again, the government has some leeway, because 70,000 subsidized non-profit contracts were eliminated since end 2010 and 300,000 since the early 2000s, and it is also not a very expensive scheme. The creation of 200,000 jobs would for instance cost the state 1 billion euros – contrast this with the shortfall of 4.5 billion euros due to the tax exemption of overtime, which, furthermore, is inconsistent with the logic of partial unemployment. These programs are targeted at those among the unemployed who are most isolated

from the labor market – the long-term unemployed and unskilled – and would lower their risk of dropping out of the labor market.

However, even though these tools should be used immediately, they are still just stop-gaps. Partial unemployment remains confined to 80% of industry and designed for short-term use. If today's dire economic situation continues, we know that this approach will only delay layoffs. Similarly, subsidized jobs are not intended to be long-term. These are low-paid part-time jobs intended to deal with reintegration into the labor market, and not a long-term approach.

The biggest challenge is really a correct diagnosis of the current economic situation. By focusing negotiations on the issue of partial unemployment and subsidized jobs, the government seems to be betting on a quick recovery. Yet it is precisely the combined effect of austerity plans throughout Europe that will weigh on growth in the years to come. Furthermore, the policy of reducing public deficits, which will cost 1.4 percentage point of growth in France in 2012, is expected to continue at least into 2013. It is difficult in these circumstances to expect to pull out of the stagnant situation quickly enough to avoid the looming social catastrophe. Unless there are plans for a new permanent reduction in working hours and the creation of public sector jobs, the best employment policy remains growth. It is thus the issue of macro-economic governance that is posed above all today in France and throughout the euro zone.

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# In defense of France's "family quotient"

By [Henri Sterdyniak](#)

At the start of 2012, some Socialist Party leaders have renewed the claim that the "family quotient" tax-splitting system is unfair because it does not benefit poor families who do not pay taxes, and benefits rich families more than it does poor families. This reveals some misunderstanding about how the tax and social welfare system works.

Can we replace the family quotient by a flat benefit of 607 euros per child, as suggested by some Socialist leaders, drawing on the work of the Treasury? The only justification for this level of 607 euros is an accounting device, *i.e.* the total current cost of the family quotient uniformly distributed per child. But this cost stems precisely from the existence of the quotient. A tax credit with no guarantee of indexation would see a quick fall in its relative purchasing power, just like the family allowance (*allocation familiale* – AF).

With a credit like this, taking children into account for taxation purposes would lose all sense. As shown in Table 1, families with children would be overtaxed relative to childless couples with the same income (per consumption unit before tax), and their after-tax income would be lower. The Constitutional Council would undoubtedly censor such a provision.

France is the only country to practice a family quotient system. Each family is assigned a number of tax parts or shares, *P*, based on its composition; the shares correspond roughly to the family's number of consumption units (CU), as these are defined by the OECD and INSEE; the tax system

assumes that each family member has a standard of living equivalent to that of a single earner with revenue  $R/P$ ; the family is then taxed like  $P$  single earners with income  $R/P$ .

The degree of redistribution assured by the tax system is determined by the tax schedule, which defines the progressivity of the tax system; it is the same for all categories of households.

The family quotient (QF) is thus a logical and necessary component of a progressive tax system. It does not provide any specific support or benefit to families; it merely guarantees a fair distribution of the tax burden among families of different sizes but with an equivalent standard of living. The QF *does not* constitute an arbitrary support to families, which would increase with income, and which would obviously be unjustifiable.

Let's take an example. The Durand family has two children, and pays 3358 euros less than the Dupont family in income tax (Table 1). Is this a tax benefit of 3358 euros? No, because the Durands are less well off than the Duponts; they have 2000 euros per tax share instead of 3000. On the other hand, the Durands pay as much per share in income tax as the Martins, who have the same standard of living. The Durands therefore do not benefit from any tax advantage.

The family quotient takes into account household size; while doing this is certainly open for debate, one cannot treat a tax system that does not take into account household size as the norm and then conclude that any deviation from this norm constitutes a *benefit*. There is no reason to levy the same income tax on the childless Duponts and the two-child Durands, who, while they have the same level of pay, do not enjoy the same standard of living.

Table 1. Family size and income taxation in euro

		Monthly wages / by tax share	Annual income taxation	Disposable income by consumption unit
Dupont	Couple	6 000/ 3000	8 472	2 526
Martin	Couple	4 000/ 2000	3 409	1 858
Durand	Couple + 2 children	6 000/ 2000	5 114	1858
Durand*	Couple + 2 children	6 000/ 2000	7 258	1798

\* with a uniform tax credit.  
Source: author calculations.

In addition, capping the family quotient [\[1\]](#) takes into account that the highest portion of income is not used for the consumption of the children.

Society can choose whether to grant social benefits, but it has no right to question the principle of the fairness of family-based taxation: each family should be taxed according to its standard of living. Undermining this principle would be unconstitutional, and contrary to the Declaration of the Rights of Man, which states that “the common taxation ... should be apportioned equally among all citizens according to their capacity to pay”. The law guarantees the right of couples to marry, to build families, and to pool their resources. Income tax must be family-based and should assess the ability to pay of families with different compositions. Furthermore, should France’s Constitutional Council be trusted to put a halt to any challenge to the family quotient? [\[2\]](#)

The only criticism of the family quotient system that is socially and intellectually acceptable must therefore focus on its modalities, and not on the basic principle. Do the tax shares correspond well to consumption units (taking into account the need for simplicity)? Is the level of the cap on the family quotient appropriate? If the legislature feels that it is unable to compare the living standards of families of different sizes, then it should renounce a progressive system of taxation.

Family policy includes a great variety of instruments [\[3\]](#). Means-tested benefits (RSA, the “complément familial”, housing

benefit, ARS) are intended to ensure a satisfactory standard of living to the poorest families. For other families, universal benefits should partially offset the cost of the child. The tax system cannot offer more help to poor families than simply not taxing them. It must be fair to others. It is absurd to blame the family quotient for not benefitting the poorest families: they benefit fully from not being taxed, and means-tested benefits help those who are not taxable.

Table 2 shows the disposable income per consumption unit of a married employed couple according to the number of children, relative to the income per consumption unit of a childless couple. Using the OECD-INSEE CUs, it appears that for low-income levels families with children have roughly the same standard of living as couples without children. By contrast, beyond an earnings level of twice the minimum wage, families with children always have a standard of living much lower than that of childless couples. Shouldn't we take into account that having three or more children often forces women to limit their work hours or even stop work? It is the middle classes who experience the greatest loss of purchasing power when raising children. Do we need a reform that would reduce their relative position still further?

Table 2. Living standard of a family according to the number of children and employment status relatively to a couple without children

In euro per month by CU in 2009

Adult 1	MI	MW	MW	MW	2 MW	3 MW	6 MW
Adult 2	Inactive	Inactive	½ MW	MW	1 MW	2 MW	4 MW
1 child	99.9	99.4	89.9	85.0	84.9	85.5	85.2
2 children	102.6	97.5	87.1	79.9	77.1	76.2	75.7
3 children	105.8	98.4	93.6	84.0	75.7	70.6	70.5

MI: minimum income; MW: minimum wage.  
Source: author's calculations.

The standard of living of the family falls as the number of children rises. Having children is thus never a tax shelter, even at high income levels. So if a reform of family policy is needed, it would involve increasing the level of child benefit for all, and not the questioning of the family quotient system.

Overall, redistribution is greater for families than for couples without children: the ratio of disposable income between a couple who earns 10 times the minimum wage and a couple who earns the minimum wage is 6.2 if they have no children; 4.8 if they have two children; and 4.4 if they have three. The existence of the family quotient does not reduce the progressivity of the tax and social welfare system for large families (Table 3).

Table 3. Income distribution is more equal between families

	10*minimum wage/ minimum income	10*minimum wage/ 1*minimum wage
0 child	9.2	6.2
1 child	7.8	5.3
2 children	6.8	4.8
3 children	6.0	4.4
4 children	5.7	4.2

Source: author's calculations.

Consider a family with two children in which the man earns the minimum wage and the wife doesn't work. Every month the family receives 174 euros in family benefits (AF + ARS), 309 euros for the RSA and 361 euros in housing benefit. Their disposable income is 1916 euros on a pre-tax income of 1107 euros; even taking into account VAT, their net tax rate is negative (-44%). Without children, the family would have only 83 euros for the PPE and 172 euros in housing benefit. Each child thus "brings in" 295 euros. Income is 912 euros per CU, compared with 885 euros per month if there were no children. Family policy thus bears the full cost of the children, and the parents suffer no loss of purchasing power due to the presence of the children.

Now consider a large wealthy family with two children where the man earns 6 times the minimum wage and the woman 4 times. Every month this family receives 126 euros in family benefits and pays 1732 euros in income tax. Their disposable income is 7396 euros on a pre-tax income of 10,851 euros; taking into account VAT, their tax rate is a positive 44%. The French system therefore obliges wealthy families to contribute, while

financing poor families. Without children, the wealthy family would pay 389 euros more tax per month. Its income per CU is 4402 euros per month, compared with 5819 euros if there were no children. The parents suffer a 24.4% loss in their living standard due to the presence of the children.

Finally, note that this wealthy family receives 126 euros per month for the AF, benefits from a 389 euro reduction in income tax, and pays 737 euros per month in family contributions. Unlike the poor family, it would benefit from the complete elimination of the family policy.

It would certainly be desirable to increase the living standards of the poorest families: the poverty rate for children under age 18 remains high, at 17.7% in 2009, versus 13.5% for the population as a whole. But this effort should be financed by all taxpayers, and not specifically by families.

No political party is proposing strong measures for families: a major upgrade in family benefits, especially the “complément familial” or the “child” component of the RSA; the allocation of the “child” component of the RSA to the children of the unemployed; or the indexation of family benefits and the RSA on wages, and not on prices.

Worse, in 2011, the government, which now poses as a defender of family policy, decided not to index family benefits on inflation, with a consequent 1% loss of purchasing power, while the purchasing power of retirees was maintained. Children do not vote ...

I find it difficult to believe that large families, and even families with two children, especially middle-class families with children, those where the parents (especially the mothers) juggle their schedules in order to look after their children while still working, are profiting unfairly from the current system. Is it really necessary to propose a reform that increases the tax burden on families, especially large



families?

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[1] The advantage provided by the family quotient is currently capped at 2585 euros per half a tax share. This level is justified. A child represents on average 0.35 CU (0.3 in the range 0 to 15 year old, and 0.5 above). This ceiling corresponds to a zero-rating of 35% of median income. See H. Sterdyniak: "Faut-il remettre en cause la politique familiale française?" [*Should French family policy be called into question?*], *Revue de l'OFCE*, no. 16, January 2011.

[2] As it has already intervened to require that the Prime pour l'emploi benefit takes into account family composition.

[3] See Sterdyniak (2011), *op.cit.*

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## AAA, AA+: much Ado About nothing?

by [Jérôme Creel](#)

The loss of France's AAA rating on Friday the 13<sup>th</sup> of January 2012 was a historic event. It poses three questions: should the austerity measures announced in autumn 2011 be strengthened? Why has Germany been singled out? And what is to be done now?

The loss of the AAA rating on French government bonds is not surprising – far from it. The sovereign debt crisis that has shaken the euro zone for over two years, starting in the

autumn of 2009, was not managed properly because it occurred during a recession, at a time when all the EU Member States had their eyes glued to their own economic difficulties. In the absence of a concerted response that included immediate solidarity and mutual guarantees by the euro zone Member States of the zone's entire public debt, with the support of the European Central Bank (cf. Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak, [here](#)), the foreseeable contagion occurred. The objective public finance mistakes committed by successive Greek governments followed by the vagaries of the Irish banks have now led to a systemic crisis in Europe.

By implementing austerity measures simultaneously, Europe's governments have magnified the economic difficulties: economic stagnation and even recession are now on the agenda for the euro zone (cf. Xavier Timbeau *et al.*, [here](#)). A downgrade of debt ratings in the euro zone was thus to be expected. It does, however, raise three questions.

1. Should the austerity measures be strengthened? In a commentary on the supplementary 7 billion euro French austerity plan announced in November 2011, Mathieu Plane (see in French [here](#)) pointed out that the race for the AAA rating had already been lost. The impact of this austerity plan on economic growth was objectively inconsistent with the fiscal consolidation target – and Standard & Poor's was surely not unaware of this argument.
2. Why did S&P single out Germany and Slovakia, the only economies in the euro zone not downgraded on Friday 13 January? While their commercial links are undeniable (cf. Sandrine Levasseur, 2010, [here](#)), which could justify their comparable treatment, the main markets for both of these economies, and particularly Germany, lie in the euro zone. Slowing growth in the euro zone outside Germany will not leave the other side of the Rhine unaffected (cf. Sabine Le Bayon, in French [here](#)).

It is difficult to see how the contagion of the crisis could stop at the borders of Germany and Slovakia. The recent take-up of German government 6-month bonds at a negative interest rate could even be interpreted to reflect extreme distrust of Germany's commercial banks. In any case, its economy, situated in the euro zone, is no less fragile than that of France.

3. What should be done now in France? The loss of the AAA rating reflects a negative outlook both for the state of public finances and for economic growth. While Germany has not been downgraded, it is possible that this is because S&P takes a positive view of its non-cooperative strategy in the past. From this perspective, the principle of a social VAT measure can be considered a way to help France catch up with Germany in terms of competitiveness, as Jacques Le Cacheux points out ([here](#)): if the Germans did it, why can't we? This would help boost tax revenue by increasing the competitive advantage of businesses established in France. If such a measure were to be adopted, Germany and France would be on equal footing. The two countries could then sensibly consider a cooperative policy for a recovery in Europe. Some possible focuses include: industrial policy (cf. Sarah Guillou and Lionel Nesta, in French [here](#)); social policy; an ambitious climate and energy policy (cf. Eloi Laurent, [here](#)); and a financial policy that includes a common tax on financial transactions, with the revenue raised being used to ensure that the taxpayer would never again need to bail out the private banks, which would free up additional maneuvering room for the first three policies. The policy outlines would of course need to be defined, but it is crucial to recognize that policy action is urgently needed.
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# “Social VAT”: Is it anti-social?

by [Jacques Le Cacheux](#)

The prospect of a “social” value added tax, which was raised anew by the President of France on December 31 during his New Year speech, is once again provoking controversy. While the French employers association, the MEDEF, has included this measure in a series of proposed tax changes designed to restore France’s competitiveness, the Left is mostly opposed. It views the “social VAT” as an oxymoron, an antisocial measure that is designed to cut the purchasing power of consumers and hits the poorest among them disproportionately and unfairly. But what exactly are we talking about? And from the viewpoint of taxes on consumption, what is the situation in France relative to its main European partners?

The proposal to establish a social VAT represents, in fact, a combination of two measures: raising the VAT rate and allocating the additional revenue obtained to finance social welfare, while lowering – in principle by the same amount – social contributions. The way that these two operations are conducted can differ greatly: the rise in VAT could involve the standard rate (currently 19.6%), the reduced rate (currently 5.5%, but recently increased to 7% for a range of products and services), the creation of an intermediate rate, a switch to the standard rate of certain products or services currently at the reduced rate, etc., while the reduction in social contributions could cover employer contributions or employee contributions, be uniform or targeted on low wages, etc. Many policy choices are available, with distributional impacts that are not identical.

France now has one of the lowest rates of implicit taxation on consumption in the European Union (Eurostat). Its standard VAT

rate was reduced to 19.6% in 2000 after having been raised to 20.6% in 1995 to help ensure compliance with the Maastricht criteria, as the recession of 1993 had pushed the budget deficit significantly higher. This rate is now slightly lower than the rate applied by most of our partners, particularly as the deterioration of public finances has recently prompted several European countries to raise their standard rate of VAT. The reduced rate, at 5.5%, was, until the increase decided in December 2011 on certain products and services, the lowest in the EU.

What can we expect from a social VAT? Let's consider in turn the effects on competitiveness and then on purchasing power, while distinguishing the two aspects of the operation. A VAT hike has a positive impact on the competitiveness of French business, because it increases the price of imports without burdening exports, which are subject to the VAT of the destination country. In this respect, a VAT increase is equivalent to a devaluation. In so far as most of France's trade is conducted with our European partners within the European single market, this could be deemed a non-cooperative policy. Fine, but if all our partners were to use this type of "internal euro zone devaluation" – recall that in 2007 Germany increased its standard VAT rate from 16% to 19% – and we didn't, this would actually amount to a real appreciation of the "French euro". It would undoubtedly be better to aim for improved fiscal coordination in Europe, and to work for more uniform rates. But current circumstances are hardly favourable for that, and the threat of a VAT increase may be one way to encourage our main partner to show more cooperation on this issue.

Allocating the revenue raised to reduce social contributions will, in turn, have an additional positive impact on competitiveness only if it leads to a real reduction in the cost of labour to firms located in France. This would be the case if the reduction targeted employer contributions, but not

if it were on employee contributions.

Can we expect a positive effect on employment? Yes, at a minimum thanks to the impact on competitiveness, but this would be small, unless we were to imagine a massive increase in VAT rates. The effect of lowering labour charges is less clear, because the employers' social contributions are already zero or low on low wages, which, according to the available studies, is precisely the category of employees for which demand is sensitive to cost.

Isn't the decline in the purchasing power of French households likely to reduce domestic consumption and cancel out these potential gains? In part perhaps, but it's far from certain. Indeed, the rise in VAT is unlikely to be fully and immediately reflected in selling prices: in the case of Germany in 2007, the price increase was relatively small and spread over time –meaning that the margins of producers and distributors absorbed part of the increase, thus reducing the positive impact on business somewhat. In France, [empirical work on the increase in 1995](#) shows that it too was not fully and immediately reflected in prices; and, although one cannot expect symmetrical results, it's worth recalling that the cut in VAT in the restaurant business was not passed on much in prices.

Would the rise in VAT be “antisocial” because it winds up hitting the poorest households disproportionately? No! Don't forget that the minimum income, the minimum wage (SMIC) and pensions are indexed to the consumer price index. So unless these indexes were somehow frozen – which the government has just done for some benefits – the purchasing power of low-income households would not be affected, and only employees earning above the minimum wage, together with earnings on savings, would suffer a decline in purchasing power, if consumer prices were to reflect the rise in VAT. It should also be noted that, if there is a positive impact on employment, some unemployed workers would find jobs and total

payroll would increase, meaning that the depressive impact on consumption often cited by opponents of this measure would only be minor, or even non-existent.

In short, “social VAT” should be neither put on a pedestal nor dragged through the dirt. As with any tax reform, we should certainly not expect a panacea against unemployment, or even a massive shift in our external accounts, even though it should help to improve our external price-competitiveness. But rebalancing our tax burden to focus more on consumption and less on the cost of labour is a worthy goal. In the context of globalization, taxing consumption is a good way to provide resources for the public purse, and VAT, a French innovation that has been adopted by almost every country, is a convenient way of doing this and of applying, without explicitly saying so, a form of protectionism through the de-taxation of exports. VAT is not, on the other hand, a good instrument for redistribution, since the use of a reduced rate on consumer products ultimately benefits the better-off as much or more than it does the poor. Most of our European partners have understood this, as they either do not have a reduced rate (as in Denmark) or have one that is substantially higher than ours (often 10% or 12%). It would be desirable to make the French tax system fairer, but this requires the use of instruments that have the greatest and best-targeted potential for redistribution: direct taxes – income tax, CSG-type wealth taxes, property tax – or social transfers, or even certain government expenditures (education, health). What is missing in the proposed “social VAT” is making it part of a comprehensive fiscal reform that restores consistency and justice to the system of taxes and social contributions as a whole.

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# Monetary policy: Open-Market Operations or Open-Mouth Operations?

By [Paul Hubert](#)

Can the communications of a central banker influence agents' expectations in the same way as they change interest rates? To believe Ben Bernanke, the answer is yes.

In a [speech on 18 October 2011](#), Ben Bernanke, governor of the US central bank, highlighted his interest in finding new tools to help businesses and consumers anticipate the future direction of monetary policy. Thus we learn that the bank's Federal Open Market Committee ([FOMC](#)) is exploring ways to make its macroeconomic forecasts more transparent. Indeed, if the publication of the forecasts influences the formation of private expectations about the future, then this could be treated as another tool of monetary policy.

It is worth pointing out that the impact of communicating the central bank's forecasts depends on the bank's credibility. Any impact that the publication of the forecasts has on the economy is neither binding nor mechanical, but rather is channelled through the confidence that businesses and consumers place in the statements of the central bank. So if a statement is credible, then the action announced may not be needed any more or its amplitude may be reduced. The mechanism is straightforward: publishing the forecast changes private expectations, which in turn modifies decision-making and therefore the economic variables. Ben Bernanke's determination to implement what he calls "[forward policy guidance](#)" and the emphasis he is giving to the importance of the central bank's forecasts suggest that the Fed is seeking to use its forecasts as another instrument to implement its monetary policy more



effectively.

Based on the inflation expectations of private agents collected through quarterly surveys called the Survey of Professional Forecasters (available [here](#)), it appears that the FOMC inflation forecasts, published twice yearly since 1979, have a persistent positive effect on private expectations (see the [working document](#)). Expectations rise by 0.7 percentage point when the Fed increases its forecast by one percentage point. Two interpretations of this effect could be offered: by raising its forecast, the Fed influences expectations and in a certain sense creates 0.7 percentage point of inflation. The effectiveness of such an announcement would therefore be questionable. In contrast, it is conceivable that an increase of 1 percentage point of inflation will occur and that by announcing it, the Fed sends a signal to private agents. They then expect a response from the Fed to counter the increase, and so reduce their expectation of the increase. The Fed's communication would therefore have succeeded in preventing a 0.3 percentage point increase in future inflation, meaning that the announcement has been effective.

This last mechanism, called "Open-Mouth Operations" in an [article](#) published in 2000 dealing with the central bank of New Zealand, would therefore act as a complement to the bank's [open market operations](#) that are intended to modify the central bank's key rates so as to influence the economy.

In order to shed light on the reasons why private expectations have increased, it would help to characterize the mechanisms underlying the influence of the FOMC forecasts. If the FOMC forecasts are a good leading indicator of the Fed's future key rates, they provide information about future decisions. It appears from this study that an increase in the FOMC forecasts signals that there will be an increase in the Fed's key rates 18 to 24 months later.

Furthermore, the FOMC forecasts do not have the same impact as

the bank's key rates on macroeconomic variables, nor do they respond in the same way to macroeconomic shocks: the responses of key rates to macroeconomic shocks are substantial and rapid in comparison with the responses of the forecasts. This suggests that the FOMC forecasts are an *a priori* instrument intended to implement monetary policy over the long term, whereas the key rates are an *a posteriori* instrument that responds to shocks to the economy, and thus to the short-term cycle.