

# How to reform the reduction on payroll taxes?

By Mathieu Bunel, Céline Emond, Yannick L'Horty

More than 20 billion euros are spent every year by the State to compensate the general exemptions from social security contributions, making this the leading employment policy plank in France, both in terms of the total budget and the numbers concerned – more than one employee out of two benefits from the reduction in contributions. In these times of fiscal pressure and the inexorable upward trend in unemployment, questions are being raised about the sustainability of such a scheme, whose scale, which was unified by the 2003 Fillon reform, consists of a reduction that shrinks as the wage rises, up to the level of 1.6 times the minimum wage (SMIC). At the level of the SMIC, the reduction comes to 26 points (28 points for firms with fewer than 20 employees).

In an article published in the [Revue de l'OFCE \(Varia, no. 126, 2012\)](#), we evaluate the impact of a complete removal of the general exemptions as well as of a number of partial reforms of the thresholds for exemption from social security contributions, using the latest data suited to the analysis. In our estimate, the simple elimination of all general exemptions would lead to the destruction of about 500,000 jobs. We also explore the effects of reorganising the exemption thresholds, by screening a number of possibilities that would affect the various parameters that define the exemption arrangements. In every case, a reduction in the amount of exemptions would have a negative impact on employment, but the extent of the job losses would vary from simple to double depending on the terms of the reform. To ensure the least negative effect would require that the reductions in the exemptions spare the sectors that are most labour-intensive, which means better treatment for the

exemption schedules that are most targeted at low wages. Since the goal is to improve the unemployment figures, it is important to concentrate the exemptions on lower wages, and thus to give a boost to the sectors that are richest in terms of labour.

However, concentrating exemptions too much in the vicinity of the minimum wage would increase the cost to employers of granting wage rises, which would be favourable neither to purchasing power nor to the quality of the jobs that condition future employment. While a new balance can always be sought in order to meet the urgent budget situation, to be sustainable it must be good for today's jobs without neglecting those of the future.

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## **20 billion euros in reductions on employer payroll taxes on low-wages. But will it create jobs?**

By [Eric Heyer](#) and [Mathieu Plane](#)

Every year the State spends nearly 1 percentage point of GDP, *i.e.* 20 billion euros, on general reductions in employer payroll taxes on low wages. It is thus legitimate to ask whether a programme like this is effective. A large number of empirical studies have been conducted to try to assess the impact of this measure on employment, and have concluded that it creates between 400,000 and 800,000 jobs.

As these estimates are performed using sector models, they do

not take into account all the effects resulting from a policy of reduced social contributions on low wages, and in particular the impact of macroeconomic feedback, *i.e.* the effect of income gains, competitiveness gains and the financing of the measure.

In a recent study published in the [Revue de l'OFCE \(Varia, no. 126, 2012\)](#), we have attempted to supplement these evaluations by taking into account all the impacts resulting from a policy of reducing contributions on low wages. To do this, we performed a simulation of this measure using the OFCE's macro-econometric model, *emod.fr*.

We were able to break down the various impacts expected from these reductions on employment costs into two basic categories:

1. An overall "substitution effect", which breaks down into a macroeconomic capital-labour substitution, to which is added what can be called an "assessment effect" linked to the targeting of the measure at low wages;
2. A "volume effect", which can be broken down between rising domestic demand due to lower prices and higher payroll, competitiveness gains due to improved market share internally and externally, and the negative effect of the measure's financing, whether that involves raising the tax burden (*prélèvements obligatoires*) or cutting public spending.

Based on our assessment, summarized in Table 1, the exemptions from employer social contributions on low wages lead to creating 50,000 jobs in the first year and about 500,000 at the end of five years. Of the 503,000 jobs expected within five years, 337,000 would be due to the overall substitution effect, with 107,000 linked to the macroeconomic capital-labour substitution and 230,000 to the "assessment effect" linked to the sharp reduction in labour costs on low wages. In addition, 82,000 jobs are generated by the addition to

household income and 84,000 by competitiveness gains and the positive contribution of foreign trade to the change in GDP. On the other hand, the “volume effect” on employment becomes negative if the measure is financed *ex post*: increasing a representative mix of the fiscal structure reduces the overall impact of the measure by 176,000 jobs at 5 years; reducing a representative mix of the structure of public spending reduces employment by 250,000 at 5 years.

**Table 1. Impact on employment of the exemptions on employer social security contributions on low wages without taking into account the reaction of our trade partners**

1000s

Effect at...	Substitution effect		Volume effect		Total w/o financing	Ex post financing		Total w/ financing
	Capital/Labour	Assessment effect	Domestic demand	Competitiveness		Tax mix	Public spending mix	
...1 year	4	24	13	9	50	-26	-71	24 -21
...5 years	107	230	82	84	503	-176	-250	327 253

Source: OFCE calculations, *e-mod.fr*.

Some of the jobs created come from competitiveness gains related to taking market share from our trading partners due to lower prices of production following the reduction in labour costs. This price-competitiveness mechanism works only if, first, firms pass on the reductions in social contributions in their prices of production, and second, our trading partners are willing to lose market share without a fight. We therefore simulated a polar opposite case in which it is assumed that our trading partners respond to this type of policy by enacting similar measures, which would negate our external gains.

While this does not modify the impact on employment related to the “substitution effect”, this assumption does change the “volume effect” of the measure, eliminating 84,000 jobs from gains in market share and increasing the negative effect of *ex post* financing due to the measure’s multiplier effect on

weaker activities. In total, in the scenario in which the measure is funded *ex post* and does not allow gains in competitiveness, the exemptions on employer social security contributions on low wages would create between 69,000 and 176,000 jobs within five years, depending on how it is financed (Table 2). This result puts the initial figure of 500,000 jobs into perspective.

**Table 2. Impact on employment of exemptions on employer social security contributions on low wages if our trade partners do adopt a similar policy**

1000s

Effect at...	Substitution effect		Volume effect		Total w/o financing	Ex post financing		Total w/ financing
	Capital/Labour	Assessment effect	Domestic demand	Competitiveness		Tax mix	Public spending mix	
...1 year	4	24	13	0	41	-35	-79	6 -38
...5 years	107	230	82	0	419	-244	-350	175 69

Source: OFCE calculations, *e-mod.fr*.

## The death throes of the “Confederation of Europe”?

By [Jacques Le Cacheux](#)

Will the institutions that the European Union has developed – from the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, which created it and defined the roadmap that led to the launch of the euro in 1999, to the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, which took up the main articles of the constitutional treaty that the French and Dutch had refused to ratify in referendums in 2005 – be sufficient to resolve the crisis facing the EU today? After

five years of economic stagnation and nearly four years of persistent pressure on national debts, it had seemed that fears about the sustainability of the European Monetary Union had been appeased by the determination shown in early autumn 2012 by Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, to ensure the future of Europe's single currency at any cost. But the results of the recent general elections in Italy have once again unsettled the European sovereign debt markets and revived speculation, while the euro zone has plunged back into a recession even as the wounds of the previous one lay still unhealed.

How much longer will we be content with mere expedients? Would it not be better to make a real institutional revolution, like the one undertaken between 1788 and 1790 by the framers of the Constitution of the United States of America, as they faced an acute crisis in the public debt of the Confederation and the confederated states? In his Nobel Lecture, which the OFCE has just published in [French](#), Thomas Sargent invites us to consider this through an economic and financial reading of this critical episode in the institutional history of the United States, and through a parallel with the current situation of the euro zone that some may find audacious, but which is certainly enlightening.

There are of course many differences between the situation of the former British colonies ten years after independence and the Member States of the European Monetary Union. But how is it possible not to see certain similarities, such as the inability to find a collective solution to the national public debt crises or the inanity of the agreement in February 2012 on the future EU budget? *Mutatis mutandis*, it is a question of fiscal federalism, as well as political, in one case as in the other.

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# In honour of Robert Castel

[Hélène Périvier](#), Bruno Palier, Bernard Gazier

It is with great sadness that we have learned of the death of Robert Castel. He left his mark on French sociology and on the social sciences more generally with his analysis of wage society and the way it's changing. In his work *les métamorphoses de la question sociale*, he highlighted the emancipatory power of "wage society", which has endowed workers with "social property". This concept facilitates an understanding of the challenges related to the acquisition of social rights in certain market economies. He preferred the term *Etat social*, the welfare state, to the commonly used term *Etat providence*, the provident state, as he saw in the latter the notion of ☐☐a welfare state that had just dropped out of the sky, whereas it is the fruit of battles and negotiations and has been built over a long period of time. The flexibilisation of the labour market, the weakening of social rights and the casualisation of labour have, in his opinion, all been leading to the phenomenon of disaffiliation, as some individuals are simply beyond the reach of the welfare state's protections.

We had the good fortune of collaborating with him on a project to redesign a new generation of social rights. Always ready to share and to learn from many-sided discussions, we also discovered a man of great humility, someone who listened to the contributions of others, but also to their criticisms – including to the feminists who pointed out his silence on the sexual division of labour. He accepted and recognized the relevance of their observations. During our discussions, he showed his concern about developments in our economic and social organization, which are shunting aside those who are

most vulnerable: young people, especially those living in the most disadvantaged neighbourhoods, who are starting life with little educational preparation. He proclaimed equality as a founding principle of our social contract, but he also thought of equality as equality of opportunity. He argued for “solidarism”, as did Léon Bourgeois in his time.

In a world scarred by crisis and increasingly violent inequalities, Robert Castel was present in the public debate, and brought a long-term perspective to the failings of our social systems, as well as to the principles that could guide reform. His absence will affect the quality of this debate. While we can still benefit from the great contributions of his work, we will miss his always relevant interventions, his intellectual honesty, and his kindness to all. More than a researcher, we have lost a thinker, and a friend.

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# France, Germany: The nonworking poor

By [Guillaume Allègre](#)

*“The ways of thinking society, managing it and quantifying it are indissolubly linked”*

[Alain Desrosières](#), 1940-2013


The subject of working poverty emerged in Europe in public debate and academic discussion in the early 2000s, in parallel with the implementation of policies to “make work pay”. European guidelines on employment have explicitly mentioned



the need to reduce working poverty since 2003, and Eurostat set up an indicator on the working poor in 2005 ([Bardone and Guio](#)). In France, policies to make work pay have taken the particular form of earned income supplements ([PPE](#), then [RSA](#)). In Germany, a series of reforms of the labour market and social welfare (the Hartz Laws) were introduced in the early 2000s with the aim of activating the unemployed. Critics of the German reforms often highlight the proliferation of atypical forms of employment ([Alber and Heisig, 2011](#)): the recourse to part-time, low-wage work and mini-jobs without social protection. In France as in Germany, this focus on workers has masked a less well-known aspect of the changing face of poverty: among working-age people, it is poverty among the unemployed (the “inactive” in France, the “unemployed” in Germany) that has been on the rise since the late 1990s.

Figure 1 shows the change in the poverty rate for individuals between 1996 and 2010, calculated at the threshold of 60% of the median living standard, according to their employment status. Two points stand out. First, poverty primarily affects the unemployed: their poverty rate was about 35% over this period. Second, economically inactive people over age 15, who are neither students nor retired (called “other inactive”), *i.e.* the “discouraged unemployed” and men and women (especially women!) in the home, are the group most affected by the rise in poverty. Their poverty rate was 23% in 1996, but hit 32% in 2010. At the same time, poverty among people in work fell from 9% to 8%. As a result, while the economically active with jobs accounted for 25% of the poor in 1996 and “other inactive” 12%, the latter’s share of the poor rose to 17% in 2010 while the share of the active declined to 22%. The weight of the working poor among all poor people is tending to decrease, while the weight of the inactive is rising.

Figure 1 : Poverty rates according to activity status, France




Source : Insee-DGI, Enquêtes Revenus fiscaux et sociaux rétrospectives 1996 à 2004 ; Insee-DGFIP-Cnaf-Cnav-CCMSA, Enquêtes Revenus fiscaux et sociaux 2005 à 2010.

As for Germany, the analysis of poverty rates by employment status is fraught with discrepancies attributable to the sources, in particular with regard to changes in the poverty level among the unemployed, which according to Eurostat (EU-SILC survey) is much higher than in the national SOEP survey (see Figure 2). Despite the statistical uncertainties, it is still clear that poverty affects the unemployed above all, and that their poverty rate has risen substantially: from 30% to 56% between 1998 and 2010, according to the SOEP survey, which is generally considered more reliable than the SILC ([Hauser, 2008](#)). While poverty is increasing for all categories of the population ([see Heyer, 2012](#)), it is among the unemployed that it is most pronounced.

The increase in poverty among the jobless is the result of certain provisions of the Hartz IV laws, which are less well known than those establishing mini-jobs (Hartz II). Prior to this legislation, the jobless could receive unemployment benefits for a maximum period of 32 months, after which they could receive means-tested unemployment assistance for an indefinite period ([Ochel, 2005](#)). But unlike the ASS benefit [i] in France, the amount of this assistance depended on the net income at the last job and provided a relatively generous replacement rate (53% of net income for people without

children). This system was replaced starting in 2005 by a much less generous compensation, based on the goal of employment activation. Unemployment benefit (*Arbeitslosengeld I* – ALG I) was limited to 12 months for unemployed people under age 55, and the grounds for penalties were expanded. Following this period, unemployment assistance (*Arbeitslosengeld II* – ALG II) is greatly reduced and essentially serves only as an ultimate safety net: the amount for a single person is limited to 345 euros per month, while the penalties have also been expanded and toughened [ii]. Germany's strategy to promote employment hence uses two levers: reducing income support for the unemployed, and penalties. While this policy may have contributed to lowering unemployment (see [Chagny, 2008](#), for a discussion of the controversial impact of this reform), by its very design it has had a significant impact with regard to poverty among the unemployed.

Figure 2 : Poverty rates according to employment status and source, Germany



Source : Eurostat (SILC) ; DIW (SOEP).

One paradox that needs to be examined is the only small change since the early 2000s (at least according to the SOEP survey) of the poverty rate among people in work. Indeed, during this period, the proportion of low-wage workers rose and the recourse to part-time work increased sharply, without a substantial rise in the poverty rate for people in work. In 2010, 4.9 million people (12% of people in work) held a mini-

job for which they cannot receive more than 400 euros per month in earned income ([Alber and Heisig, 2011](#)). There has also been the growth of part-time work with social protection (from 3.9 million jobs in 2000 to 5.3 million in 2010). We would expect therefore to see an increase in working poverty. But this is being countered by two factors: the development of opportunities for cumulation with unemployment benefits (the third lever of the employment activation policy), and family solidarity. Indeed, part-time and low-wage jobs are predominantly held by women, who account for two-thirds of workers on low annual incomes [iii]. The income of their spouse, when they have one, often enables them to avoid poverty, as the income of all household members is aggregated to determine the standard of living and poverty. In this respect, to paraphrase [Meulders and O'Dorchai](#), the household is a fig-leaf concealing women's low incomes. Lone mothers, on the other hand, are especially affected by poverty: the poverty rate is about 40% among single-parent families.

From the perspective of the indicators, the use of the category "working poor" thus poses several problems. First, the category hides the role of unemployment and inactivity as determinants of poverty; by its very name, it highlights one important determinant of working poverty ("work doesn't pay") in relation to other determinants ("small number of hours worked" or "heavy family responsibilities"). Public policies based on this approach thus run the risk of limiting the population targeted by the fight against poverty (in France, people on unemployment benefit are excluded from the RSA-activité [income supplement for the working poor]) and of focusing on strengthening financial incentives for returning to work in order to stimulate the supply of labour, even though the high level of unemployment is related to the demand-side rationing of labour. Second, the category is blind to gender inequality: women are more often poor and constitute the majority of low-wage workers, but they are less likely to be working poor! ([Ponthieux, 2004](#)) If all that we manage well

is what we measure, it is necessary that the measure be easily interpreted by policy makers. Reducing inequalities in living standards (between households) and in earned income (between individuals) are two legitimate public policy goals (as explained [here](#) [in French]), which need to be measured separately, just as these two goals require the use of specific instruments.

From the standpoint of public policy, the change in poverty based on employment status in France and Germany emphasizes that an effective fight against poverty requires addressing all forms of poverty. For the working-age population, in economies where dual-earner couples have become the norm, this means putting in place policies on full-time work and full employment policies that do not foster atypical forms of work. This requires, from a macroeconomic point of view, growth or job-sharing (and the associated income-sharing) and, from a microeconomic point of view, meeting needs with respect in particular to childcare, training and transport. While these policies are costly, more economical measures, such as strengthening financial incentives, have failed to demonstrate that they can actually reduce overall poverty.

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[i] The *Allocation de solidarité spécifique* (ASS), means-tested benefits paid to unemployed persons whose right to unemployment benefits has expired.

[ii] In total, 1.5 million penalties were applied in 2009, for 2.8 million on jobless benefits, compared with 360,000 in 2004, for 4 million on jobless benefits (according to [Alber and Heisig, 2011](#), Tables 6-8, pp. 24-30).

[iii] Set at the threshold of two-thirds of median salary.

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# An homage to Alain Desrosières, statistician, sociologist, historian and philosopher of statistics

By [Françoise Milewski](#) and [Henri Sterdyniak](#)

Alain Desrosières has passed away, at the age of 72. An administrator at the INSEE, he had been editor of the journal *Économie et statistique*, then head of the Department of social studies, before working on the comparative analysis of Europe's statistical systems.

He was the troubled conscience of official statistics in France.

Alain's many books and articles traced the birth and growth of statistics. His articles discuss their scientific and social foundations. They highlight the links between statistical standards and the production of statistics, between the history of economic policy and statistical methods and categories, in the face of the trend to "naturalize" them. "The ways of thinking society, managing it and quantifying it are inseparable", he declared. Statistics cannot be separated from its use, and it evolves with changes in public policy. And so, for instance, he raised questions about "the quality of quantity".

Alain passionately lived and studied the contradictions of statistics, a tool for knowledge and a tool for governing. Are statistics in the service of democracy, helping society to better understand itself, or of the State, helping it to

better achieve its goals? And this State, which organizes and finances the statistical system, itself has two faces: the welfare state, an instrument of resistance to market forces, as well as a State in the service of a social formation shaped by capitalism.

Statistics measures and classifies. But is it a neutral scientific discipline, or does it express the vision that society has of itself at a given point, especially since it must rely on administrative sources that are themselves not neutral? Should it base itself on people's everyday experience, or, on the contrary, challenge this in the name of science?

Can we account for different societies using the same categories? Alain has devoted great attention to the statistical harmonization that the European Union implies, with its risk of negating differences between societies.

He questioned the policy on indicators implemented by the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) and France's organic law on budget bills (LOLF). Policies define indicators that statisticians are supposed to measure, and then set targets for these indicators. But this practice is dangerous, as these indicators become the focus of the analysis even as the policies aim to improve the indicators, which tends to cause them to lose their significance.

Below we reproduce some snippets from his articles, as an invitation to read them in their entirety. The myth of the data that is indisputable because impartial, the unconditional respect in the face of indicators that, because quantified are thus indisputable, regardless of the methods, standards and conventions underpinning their calculation – all these are a constant threat for the social sciences, particularly economics. And for society.

Alain Desrosières took part in numerous meetings of

statisticians in order to give his colleagues food for thought about their practices and their methods (see in particular the conference of 30 March 2011: "[Official statistics as a unique public good](#)", Workshop 3). He developed fertile links between statistical practice and sociologists, in particular Pierre Bourdieu and Bruno Latour.

He showed the influence of nomenclatures on the constitution of statistical information and, through that, on the structuring of society (*Les Catégories socioprofessionnelles*, co-authored by Laurent Thévenot, La Découverte, Repères collection, 1988).

Alain leaves us a number of major works: *La politique des grands nombres, histoire de la raison statistique* (Editions La Découverte, Paris, 1993) and *L'argument statistique*, in two volumes: I: *Pour une sociologie historique de la quantification*, and II: *Gouverner par les nombres* (Les Presses des Mines ParisTech, Sciences sociales collection, Paris, 2008).

He leaves us his most recent work: "[Est-il bon, est-il méchant ? Le rôle du nombre dans le gouvernement de la cité néolibérale](#)" (*Nouvelles perspectives en sciences sociales*, volume 7, no. 2, May 2012).

Alain set an example as a modest but demanding intellectual who sought to put his professional experience and scientific efforts in the service of democracy.

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A few short excerpts from his writings:

"How can the contradiction be resolved between the ethos of the statisticians and taking feedback into account, even when it seems to them just an annoying obstacle to their mission, which they conceive of as 'providing unbiased reflections of reality'? It is not possible to isolate a moment of



measurement that is independent of its uses, in particular the conventions that are the first step in quantification. The training of statisticians needs to be decompartmentalized and supplemented with the study of history, political science, the sociology of statistics, econometrics, probability, accounting and management. This program, inspired by the achievements of *Sciences Studies* (Pestre, 2006), could facilitate the inclusion of quantitative tools in social debates, without winding up in either *a priori* rejection or unconditional, naïve respect for 'facts that are indisputable because quantified'."

[Est-il bon, est-il méchant ? Le rôle du nombre dans la cité néolibérale](#). Conclusion of a presentation to the seminar *L'Informazione Prima Dell'Informazione. Conoscenza E Scelte Pubbliche*, Milan Bicocca, 27 May 2010, *Nouvelles perspectives en sciences sociales*, volume 7, no. 2, May 2012.

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"Quantification has become a sign of objectivity, rigor and impartiality that is mobilized in a variety of situations, from political debate to scientific demonstration, and including business indicators and the measurement of public opinion. However, quantification, in its various statistical formats, is not content merely to provide a reflection of the world, but also creates new ways of thinking, representing, expressing and acting on it, through the power of its models and its procedures, its broad dissemination and its use in argumentation. This book shows how 'statistical argument' is historically constructed, and what the cognitive and social effects of quantification systems are today."

[Pour une sociologie historique de la quantification](#), Volume 1 of *L'argument statistique* (Les Presses des Mines Paris-tech, Sciences sociaux collection, Paris, 2008), back cover.

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“Governments of men use and abuse the ‘argument of statistics’. With the emergence of a neo-liberal state, public policy is increasingly relying on quantitative indicators that provide evaluations of the performance of different policy actions. The various ‘winners’ are broadcast widely (often under the Anglo-American rubric of ‘benchmarking’), ranking high schools, universities, even nations. This rite of quantification, far from providing a neutral image of phenomena, transforms and performs them. This book offers specific case studies, surveys of family budgets, planning commissions, local statistics and national accounts, analyzing the production of official statistics and their use by the public authorities. And it will be seen how statistics has imposed itself as both an evidentiary tool in the empirical sciences and a tool of government, in accordance with the intuition that Foucault had already presented in the 1970s under the name of ‘governmentality’.”

[Gouverner par les nombres](#), Volume 2 of *L’argument statistique* (Les Presses des Mines Paris-tech, Sciences sociales collection, Paris, 2008), back cover.

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“Major crises are of course times when statistics are mobilized intensively to express the gravity of the situation. But they are also times of great debate, during which the role of the state in the regulation and control of the economy is completely rethought. To each of these crises corresponds the emergence of new ways of quantifying the social world. New models of action imply new variables and new systems of observation.

Economic and political history from the 1880s to the present day has offered at least three (if not four) examples of such configurations, combining ways of thinking society, ways of acting on it, and statistics adapted to the times. The crisis of the 1880s prompted the great statistics on labour and

employment. The crisis of 1929 was the source of Keynesian macroeconomic policies and national accounts. The crisis of the 1970s was thought about in the neoliberal categories of microeconomics, and led to state reforms focusing in particular on performance indicators. Finally, the two crises of the 2000s, ecological and then financial, will perhaps give rise to radically new ways of thinking and quantifying public action. A review of the way that a few somewhat older crises were experienced, and their impact on the use of official statistics, may be useful for thinking about the magnitude of the changes that may result from these two recent crises.”

[“Crises économiques et statistiques, de 1880 à 2010”](#), *ParisTech Review*, 30 August 2010.

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# Why France is right to abandon the 3% public déficit target by 2013


By [Mathieu Plane](#)

Given the statements by the Minister of Economy and Finance, the government seems to have reached a decision to abandon the goal of a deficit of 3% of GDP by 2013. In addition to the change of tack in the policy announced up to now, which was to bring the deficit down to 3% by 2013 “whatever the cost”, we can legitimately conclude that France is right to abandon this goal, and we offer several arguments for this. While in this post we do not review [the economic consequences of the fiscal policy being undertaken in France and the euro zone](#), which has been dictated by nominal targets for the deficit that do not take into account the way it breaks down structurally /

cyclically and that have a dangerously pro-cyclical character, we nevertheless present several arguments that the European Commission may find of value:

1 – According to the latest figures from the European Commission on 22 February 2013<sup>[1]</sup>, of the euro zone countries making the greatest fiscal adjustment in 2013 from a structural viewpoint, France, with 1.4 GDP points, comes behind only Spain (3.4) and Greece (2.6). For the 2010-2013 period, the reduction in France's structural deficit represents 4.2 GDP points, which makes France the euro zone country which, alongside Spain (4.6 GDP points), has carried out the largest budget cutbacks of the major countries in the zone, ahead of Italy (3.3 GDP points), the Netherlands (2.6) and of course Germany (1.2) (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Change in the structural deficit of the euro zone countries\*



\* For reasons of scale, we have not put Greece in the figure. Over the 2010-2013 period, Greece's structural fiscal adjustment came to 16.9 GDP points, including 2.6 in 2013.

Sources: European Commission, OFCE calculations.

2 – In 2007, before the crisis, according to the European Commission France had a structural public deficit of -4.4 GDP points, compared with an average of -2.1 for the euro zone and -0.9 for Germany. In 2013, this came to -1.9 GDP points in France, -1.3 for the euro zone, and +0.4 for Germany, which represents an improvement of the structural deficit of 2.5 GDP points for France since the start of the crisis, *i.e.* three times the average for the euro zone and twice that for Germany (Table 1). Leaving aside public investment, France's structural public deficit in 2013 was positive and higher than the euro zone average (1.2 GDP point in France, versus 0.8 for the euro zone average and 1.9 for Germany). Note that France is spending 3.1 GDP points on public investment in 2013 (0.2 GDP point less than in 2007), against a euro zone average of only 2 points (0.6 point less than in 2007) and 1.5 in Germany (equivalent to 2007). However, public investment, which has a positive impact on potential growth, and which also increases public assets, while not changing the public administration's financial situation, can reasonably be excluded from the calculation of the structural public deficit.

**Table. Public deficit and structural deficit with and without public investment**


In GDP points	Public balance				Structural public balance				SPB w/o public investment			
	FRA	DEU	EZ	FRA-EZ diff.	FRA	DEU	ZE	FRA-EZ diff.	FRA	DEU	EZ	FRA-EZ diff.
<b>2007</b>	-2.8	0.2	-0.7	<b>-2.1</b>	-4.4	-0.9	-2.1	<b>-2.3</b>	-1.1	0.6	0.5	<b>-1.6</b>
<b>2013</b>	-3.7	-0.2	-2.8	<b>-0.9</b>	-1.9	0.4	-1.3	<b>-0.6</b>	1.2	1.9	0.8	<b>0.4</b>
<b>Change 2007-2013</b>	-0.9	-0.4	-2.1	<b>1.2</b>	2.5	1.3	0.8	<b>1.6</b>	2.3	1.3	0.3	<b>2.1</b>

Sources : European Commission, OFCE calculations.

3 – In 2013, the public deficit, even at 3.7% of GDP according to the European Commission, is once again at a level close to that of 2008, similar to that of 2005, and below that of 2004 and of the entire 1992-1996 period. The public deficit figure expected for 2013 corresponds to the average over the past

thirty years, and thus no longer seems so exceptional, which is easing the pressure that France could experience on the financial markets. In contrast, according to the European Commission the unemployment rate in France in 2013 will reach 10.7% of the workforce, which is very close to its historic peak in 1997 (Figure 2). With an unemployment rate in 2013 that is 1.3 percentage points higher than the average over the last thirty years, an exceptional situation now characterizes the labour market more than it does the government deficit. While new austerity measures would help to reduce the deficit, however painfully, due to the [high value of the fiscal multiplier in the short term](#) they will lead on the other hand to going well beyond our historic unemployment peak. Indeed, as we showed in our [latest forecast in October 2012](#), if France really tries to meet its budget commitment for 2013 “whatever the cost”, this will require a new fiscal tightening of over 20 billion euros, in addition to the [36 billion euros already planned](#). This would lead to a recession, with GDP down -1.2% and 360,000 job losses (instead of expected growth of 0% and the loss of about 160,000 jobs), with the unemployment rate reaching 11.7% of the labour force by late 2013.

Figure 2. Public deficit and unemployment rate



Source: European Commission.

To restore its public accounts since 2010, France has undertaken a historic fiscal effort, well beyond the average of its European partners, which has cost it in terms of growth and employment. Adding another layer of austerity in 2013 to the already historic build-up of austerity would lead us this year straight into a recession and an unprecedented worsening in the labour market. If there is a choice, are a few tenths of a point in the public deficit worth such a sacrifice? Nothing is less certain. It is thus essential to put off the goal of reducing the deficit to 3% of GDP to at least 2014.

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[1] We have a different evaluation of the level of the structural deficit. For example, for 2013 we evaluate the improvement in France's structural public deficit at 1.8 GDP points, but in order not to prejudice the analysis we are

using the figures provided by the Commission.

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# The taxation of family benefits – is this the right debate?

By [Hélène Périvier](#) and François de Singly

*Debate on the taxation of the family allowance has begun once again. Faced with a deficit in the government's family accounts of about 2.5 billion euros in 2012, the idea of taxing the allowance has resurfaced as a way to refill coffers that have emptied, in particular as a result of the economic crisis. The debate often pits an accounting logic that aims to make up the deficits quickly against the logic of a conservative family policy. This post offers a broader perspective that goes beyond this binary approach to the issue.*

## **From family accounts that were balanced...**

In the current period, dealing with the budget involves squaring a circle: less tax revenue and greater social spending because of the economic crisis. The temptation is to solve this equation by reducing social spending to make up for declining revenues. It is in this context that the proposal to subject the family allowance to income tax has resurfaced.

During economic crises, the automatic stabilizer role played



by social welfare, including family policy, is fundamental. It limits the effects of the crisis on the living standards of those who are most at risk, and therefore also helps to contain the rise in inequality. By supporting household income, it prevents a collapse of economic activity. During the kind of economic downturn we are experiencing today, cutting social spending is not desirable and can be [counter-productive macroeconomically](#).

However, it is not absurd to try to balance the budget for family expenditure over the medium and long term, as this ensures that public action to support families will be sustainable. The deficit in the family accounts comes to 2.5 billion euros. But this is mainly because of the crisis and the consequent reduction in revenues, and is thus cyclical. Mechanically, with legislation unchanged, the family accounts should balance again within a few years if economic growth returns (these assumptions are based on [an annual growth rate of 2% from 2014](#)). Although a debt would still exist due to the accumulation of deficits in 2012 and the following years [\[1\]](#), this could be gradually eliminated using the surpluses generated after the return to equilibrium. But the outlook changes if there is no return to growth or if recovery takes longer than expected, in which case questions about the family budget allocation could be raised with regard to its redistribution or its level. The CNAF pays more than 12 billion euros for the family allowance [\[2\]](#), regardless of the parents' income. Families with two children receive 127 euros per month for the two children and 163 euros for each additional child. These family benefits are not taxed. Taxing them would reduce the amount of post-tax benefits paid to families, progressively in line with income. This would generate additional tax revenue of approximately 800 million euros. It might seem fairer if families with higher incomes bore more of the burden of budget cutbacks than families on lower incomes. But this issue is more complex than it appears.

The taxation of family benefits might seem to be a way to make up for the loss in the progressivity of the tax system that has occurred over the years, which is mainly due to lower marginal rates in the income tax system, and thereby make things more equitable. But this answer is only a race to the bottom socially, a headlong rush by our welfare state that would lead to reducing its scope of action.

Taxing the family allowance reduces the level of transfers from households without children to families with children, *i.e.* it violates the principle of horizontal equity. Of course, it also helps in particular to increase the level of transfers from the best-off families with children to those less well-off. But to strengthen the overall degree of vertical redistribution (that is to say, to increase the level of transfers from the richest households to the poorest), the tax system has to be made more progressive, which is what was done with the latest fiscal adjustments ([introduction of a 45% tax bracket in particular](#)). In this context, the universality of family allowances could then be maintained, which has the advantage of consolidating the support of high-income households for the principle of the welfare state: they pay more taxes, but they receive the same amount of family benefits when they have children.

The taxation of the family allowance is not simply an adjustment in family policy, it also affects its values — and in particular the principle of horizontal equity. While it may be necessary to rethink the objectives of family policy, which are now outdated in many respects, as we show in the next section, the current period is probably not the best for conducting this debate, because the urgency of the situation and the desire to find more room for fiscal manoeuvring would lead to the adoption of a short-term vision, whereas family policy is intrinsically long-term policy.

**...to a balanced family policy**

Nevertheless, this debate on the relevance of taxing the family allowance should not lead to policy paralysis. The principles of current family policy were established based on the way society was viewed over 70 years ago. Although adjustments have been made, the principles remain. Yesterday's objectives do not reflect tomorrow's challenges. It is thus essential to renegotiate the foundations of family policy. How should the welfare state's family activities be reoriented? What compass should be followed? This is the question we need to answer.

One of the goals of contemporary family policy is to prop up the birth-rate. State support increases with the birth order of the child, for example, by granting an additional one-half personal allowance on taxation per child, starting from the third child. When considering how to redeploy spending on family policy, removing the one-half personal allowance should be a top priority for proposals to rebalance the accounts. Similarly, the family allowance is paid only from the second child. France is one of the only countries in Europe not to grant an allowance from the first child. But the dynamic fertility rate found in France is not the result of pro-childbirth family policies like this; instead, it has more to do with the support given for working women with children: kindergarten, extracurricular childcare, care in early childhood, as well as support for mothers in the workforce (rather than stigmatizing this, as is the case in Germany). Family policy needs to be reoriented towards an objective that respects the rights of every child regardless of their birth order. It should focus on the social citizenship of the individual (that is to say, a more individually-based method of acquiring social rights) from birth to death (while taking into account longer life spans).

A renovated family policy would reflect the principle of equality between children and equality between women and men, including in particular an overhaul of early childhood

support, a massive increase in childcare and changes in the system of parental leave. The cost of dealing with early childhood support would be about [an additional 5 billion euros per year](#). Furthermore, the latest publication of the OECD, [Education at a Glance 2012](#), shows that in France children's academic success is strongly correlated with the level of the parents' education. Finally, the [level of child poverty is disturbing](#). These are all major challenges we must meet.

The rise of partnerships outside marriage but also of divorces (and separations more generally) and family recompositions are a sign of greater individual freedom with regard to life choices. This constitutes a progressive step in the way our society functions. But separations are often accompanied by a decline in living standards and often are not financially possible for individuals on low incomes. In addition, the economic consequences when the couple breaks down hit women harder than men. [\[3\] Single-parent families](#), most often mothers with the children in their care, are more exposed to poverty than other households. A family policy that is more in line with these new living arrangements, and which would accompany changes in the family structure over the life cycle, needs to be considered.

It is necessary to redefine the content and contours of our future family policy, but the desire to balance the family accounts cannot be the sole engine driving this process. We must stop thinking about this kind of change in a narrow way, as we need to reform the very foundations of the system based on new needs and on the principles of justice and solidarity that underpin our social welfare state.

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[\[1\]](#) In 2011, the debt in the family accounts was transferred to the Caisse d'amortissement de la dette sociale (CADES), ([Organic Law 2010-1380 – in French](#)).

[2] Which represents about 15% of the total amount of benefits paid out of the family accounts.

[3] Jeandidier Bruno and Cécile Bourreau-Dubois, 2005, “Les conséquences microéconomiques de la disunion”, In Joël M.-E. and Wittwer J., *Economie du vieillissement. Age et protection sociale*, Ed. L’Harmattan,, Vol. 2, pp. 335-351.

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# And what if Italy’s elections turned out to be an opportunity for Europe ?

By [Franscesco Saraceno](#)

The whole of Europe is currently fretting about the election results in Italy. The Centre-Left coalition won a narrow majority – because of an [electoral law](#) that everyone denounces, but no one seems to have the knowledge or ability to change – which gives it an absolute majority only in the Chamber of Deputies. Due to the way bonuses are attributed for majorities won on a regional basis, no coalition in the Senate has a majority. With its system of “perfect bicameralism”, Italy now finds itself in a situation where there is no possibility of forming a government with a political majority. This note explores one possible scenario for the coming few weeks and its economic consequences for Italy and Europe.

Aside from the spectacular political resurrection of Silvio Berlusconi, whose stated goal from the beginning was to prevent the victory of the Left rather than to secure a

majority, the two startling results of this poll are on the one hand the defeat of the incumbent Prime Minister, Mario Monti, and on the other the progress of the Five Star (*Cinque Stelle*) movement of the former comedian Beppe Grillo, who now heads the leading party in the Chamber of Deputies.

The defeat of Mario Monti is a stinging repudiation of austerity policies that Italy's citizens view as imposed by Europe and Germany. In Monday's [New York Times](#), Paul Krugman called Monti a "proconsul installed by Germany to enforce fiscal austerity on an already ailing economy". Called in November 2011 to the bedside of a country left prostrate by the Berlusconi government, Monti has failed to offer anything other than austerity policies which, unsurprisingly, [did not deliver the growth promised](#). The support the former European Commissioner initially enjoyed slowly eroded as the memory of the problems marking the end of the Berlusconi era faded, and especially as Italy sank deeper and deeper into economic crisis. Mario Monti undoubtedly expected to play a decisive role in the formation of a majority in the Senate, and thus to be able to negotiate his reappointment as Prime Minister. But his gamble failed, and he is now condemned to numerical insignificance.

Beppe Grillo, in contrast, rode to a remarkable success on a tidal wave that now makes him key to the formation of a new government. Thanks to a masterful campaign conducted in the media as well as the street, his movement is the leading party in the Chamber and in the Senate in several regions. He managed to capture the exasperation of the Italians against the "political caste", and he brought almost nine million voters into a campaign that tapped into right-wing populism (e.g. on several occasions he made remarks on immigration and the euro that are not reflected in his programme). He has also played on key concerns of the traditional Left, such as the rejection of austerity, environmental issues, the reduction of working hours, a national minimum income scheme, the

regulation of conflicts of interest, limited terms for elected officials with no cumulation of mandates, and the ineligibility of those sentenced by the courts.

What will happen in the coming weeks? All Europe is wondering, and the initial reactions of the markets seem to betray nervousness about future developments. For institutional reasons, a new election in the very near term is not an option. President Giorgio Napolitano, who is at the end of his term, cannot dissolve Parliament; invoking this option would mean waiting until May for his successor (who is chosen by the MPs elected yesterday). Moreover, it is not certain that the Parliament chosen in any new elections would lead to a political majority.

The majority electoral law gives the Democratic Party an absolute majority of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, which makes it indispensable to the formation of a new government. This means there are only two possible scenarios: firstly, a broad coalition between Left and Right (with or without Mario Monti's party). This seems unlikely, firstly, because of the ideological divide between the two parties, which has been aggravated by the return of Silvio Berlusconi; and secondly, because it would be perceived by the voters as ignoring the outcome of the election, which saw the two major parties lose over 11 million votes since the 2008 election.

The second solution would be a minority government of the Centre-Left, which could seek out votes from Beppe Grillo's MPs on a programme that was limited in scope and duration. In this case it would be worth considering what possibilities might exist for a convergence between the Five Star movement (whose programme can be downloaded [here](#) [in Italian]) and the Pierluigi Bersani coalition. There would certainly be a consensus on some very popular measures for dealing with the ongoing political crisis (abolition of the provinces, limits on the terms and multiple mandates of parliamentarians, ineligibility, reducing the cost of the political machinery,

etc.), and for fixing some of the most vexing problems from the two decades of Berlusconi (reforms on conflicts of interest and corruption, judicial reform).

The environmentalist wing of the Centre-Left could also find convergences on incentives for energy efficiency and on investment in renewable energy.

In economics, some of Beppe Grillo's key measures could also see a convergence with the Centre-Left, for example on the adoption of a national minimum income scheme or minimum wage, themes which, as has been shown in the [French debate](#), are not necessarily populist or unrealistic.

It would be difficult to agree on any convergence between the Centre-Left and Beppe Grillo within the framework of the current fiscal consolidation, so it's worth repeating that a prerequisite for this would be calling into question the austerity policy repudiated by the voters. This would inevitably pose problems for the Democratic Party which, like the Socialist Party in France, has gone in for austerity. Negotiations with the Five Star movement would imply abandoning the ambiguous position that the Democratic Party has long held on austerity. This would in turn have an impact throughout Europe. In the coming few weeks, Europe's leaders may be faced either with the lack of a government in the third-largest economy in the euro zone or with a government that is likely to turn its back on austerity. Europe could then be forced to rethink its own economic strategies, and some countries that have been tightening up only reluctantly (like France?) could seize the opportunity to call into question the model of growth through austerity.