

Brexit: the November 25th agreement

By [Catherine Mathieu](#) and [Henri Sterdyniak](#)

The United Kingdom will leave the European Union on 29 March 2019 at midnight, two years after the UK government officially announced its wish to leave the EU. Negotiations with the EU-27 officially started in April 2017.

On 8 December 2017, the negotiators for the European Commission and the British government signed a joint report on the three points of the withdrawal agreement that the Commission considered to be a priority^[1]: the rights of citizens, a financial settlement for the separation, and the absence of a border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. The European Council meeting of 14-15 December had accepted the British request for a transitional period, with the end set for 31 December 2020 (so as to coincide with the end of the programming of the current European budget). Thus, from March 2019 to the end of 2020, the United Kingdom will have to respect all the obligations of the single market (including the four freedoms and the competence of the European Court of Justice – CJEU), while no longer having a voice in Brussels. This agreement opened the second phase of negotiations.

These negotiations culminated on 14 November 2018 in a withdrawal agreement^[2] (nearly 600 pages) and a political declaration on future relations between the EU-27 and the United Kingdom, which was finalized on 22 November 22 ^[3] (36 pages). The two texts were approved on 25 November at a special meeting of the European Council ^[4] (all 27 attending), which adopted three declarations on that occasion^[5]. The withdrawal agreement and the political declaration must now be subject to the agreement of the European Parliament, which should not be a problem and, what

is much more difficult, the British Parliament.

The withdrawal agreement corresponds to Article 50 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It is a precise international agreement, which has legal value; it must be enforced by the UK courts, under the authority of the CJEU as far as EU laws are concerned. It takes up the points already settled by the negotiations in December 2017: the rights of British citizens in EU countries and the rights of EU citizens in the UK; and the financial settlement. It has three protocols concerning Ireland, Cyprus and Gibraltar. Any disagreements on the interpretation of the agreement will be managed by a joint committee and, if necessary, by an arbitration tribunal. The latter will have to consult the CJEU if this involves a question that one of the parties considers to be relevant to EU law. In July 2020, a decision could be reached to extend the transition period beyond 31 December 2020: this would require a financial contribution from the UK.

A safeguard clause will be applied to avoid the re-establishment of a physical border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland (the "backstop"): the United Kingdom will remain a member of the Customs Union if no other agreement has been concluded before the end of the transition period, and for an indefinite period, until such an agreement is reached. This agreement must be approved by the joint committee. The Customs Union will cover all goods except fisheries (and aquaculture) products. The United Kingdom will not have the right to apply a trade policy that differs from that of the Union. British products will enter the single market freely, but the UK will align with EU rules on state aid, competition, labour law, social protection, the environment, climate change and taxation. In addition, Northern Ireland will continue to align with single market rules on VAT, excise duties, health rules, etc. Controls could be put in place on products entering Northern Ireland from the rest of the United Kingdom (in particular for agricultural

products), but these controls would be carried out by the UK authorities.

Thus, trapped by the issue of the Irish border, the United Kingdom must forgo for an indefinite period any independent trade policy. It will have to align itself with European regulations in many areas, subject to the threat of recourse to the CJEU.

The 22 November Joint Political Declaration outlines the possible future relations between the UK and the EU-27. On the one hand, it clearly corresponds to the goal of the close, specific and balanced relationship that the British have demanded. On the other hand, the UK is making a number of commitments that rule out any possible strategy of being a “tax and regulatory haven”.

Article 2, for instance, states that the two parties intend to maintain high standards for the protection of worker and consumer rights and the environment. Article 4 affirms respect for the integrity of the single market and the four freedoms for the EU-27, and for the United Kingdom the right to conduct an independent trade policy and to put an end to the free movement of persons.

In general, the Declaration states that both parties will seek to cooperate, to discuss, and to take concerted action; that the United Kingdom will be able to participate in Union programmes in the fields of culture, education, science, innovation, space, defense, etc., under conditions to be negotiated.

Article 17 announces the establishment of an ambitious, wide-ranging, comprehensive and balanced free trade agreement. Articles 20 to 28 proclaim the desire to create a free trade area for goods, through in-depth cooperation on customs and regulatory matters and provisions that will put all participants on an equal footing for open and fair

competition. Customs duties (as well as border checks on rules on origin) will be avoided. The United Kingdom will strive to align with European rules in the relevant areas[\[6\]](#). This kind of cooperation on technical and health standards will allow British products to enter the single market freely. In this context, the Declaration recalls the intention of the EU-27 and the UK to replace the Irish backstop with another device that ensures the integrity of the single market and the absence of a physical border in Ireland.

In terms of services and investment, the two parties are considering broad and ambitious trade liberalization agreements. Regulatory autonomy will be maintained, but this must be “transparent, efficient, compatible to the extent possible”. Cooperation and mutual recognition agreements will be signed on services, in particular telecommunications, transport, business services and internet commerce. The free movement of capital and payments will be guaranteed. In financial matters, equivalence agreements will be negotiated; cooperation will be established in the domain of ☐regulation and supervision. Intellectual property rights will be protected, in particular as regards protected geographical indications. Agreements will be signed on air, sea, and land transport and on energy and public procurement. The parties pledge to cooperate in the fight against climate change and on sustainable development, financial stability, and the fight against trade protectionism. Travel for tourism or scientific, educational or business motives will not be affected. An agreement on fisheries must be signed before 1 July 2020.

Provisions will have to cover state aid and standards on competition, labour law, social protection, the environment, climate change and taxation in order to ensure open and fair competition on a level playing field.

The text provides for coordination bodies at the technical, ministerial and parliamentary levels. Every six months, a high-level conference will review the agreement.

Negotiations will continue on trade so as to ensure compatibility between the integrity of the single market and the Customs Union and the UK's development of an independent trade policy.

On the one hand, the text provides for a close and special partnership, as requested by the United Kingdom; on the other hand, the UK pays for this by its commitment to respect European rules; finally, problematic issues still need to be negotiated, including fishing rights, an independent British trade policy, and avoiding the Irish backstop. On 25 November, the European Council wanted to adopt two declarations. The first emphasizes the importance of reaching an agreement on fisheries before the end of the transitional period and making it possible to maintain the access of EU-27 fishermen to British maritime waters. It also links the extension of the transitional period to compliance by the United Kingdom with its obligations under the Irish protocol. It recalls the conditions that the EU-27 had set on 20 March 2018 for an agreement: "The divergence in external tariffs and internal rules, as well as the absence of common institutions and a common legal system, require checks and balances and controls to safeguard the integrity of the EU single market and the UK market. Unfortunately, this will have negative economic consequences, particularly in the United Kingdom ... A free trade agreement cannot offer the same advantages as the status of a Member State." The second Declaration states that Gibraltar will not be included in the future trade agreement negotiated between the UK and the EU-27; a separate agreement will be necessary and subject to Spain's prior approval. These declarations will not make it easy for Theresa May to win the approval of the UK Parliament.

It is necessary to highlight two points that were barely mentioned in the negotiations. This privileged partnership could serve as a model for relations with other countries. The EU has signed many customs union agreements with its

neighbors, the countries of the European Economic Area (Norway, Iceland, Lichtenstein), as well as Switzerland, Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. Five countries are candidates for entry (Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo and Northern Macedonia). Perhaps these partnerships could be formalized in a third circle around the EU?

Does not the commitment to fair competition impose some level of tax harmonization in the EU-27, particularly with respect to the rates and terms of corporation tax? Was the EU-27 right to support the Irish Republic without some quid pro quo? It is unclear how the EU-27 could accuse the UK of practicing unfair competition when it tolerates the practices of Ireland, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Likewise, the insistence on arrangements that prevent the UK from engaging in unfair tax and social competition contrasts with the EU's laxity both in its relations with third countries and in the control of the internal devaluation policies of certain member countries (e.g. Germany).

On balance, the United Kingdom gets to regain its national sovereignty, to cease being subject to the CJEU, and to no longer need to respect the freedom of establishment of workers from EU countries. In return, it will have no voice in Brussels.

The business community has welcomed the proposal as it avoids the risks of No Deal and announces a free trade agreement between the UK and the EU that would impose few restrictions on trade.

To date, there is no certainty that the UK parliament will approve the deal proposed by Theresa May and the EU-27 negotiators. Theresa May must find a majority for a compromise deal. She will encounter opposition from Conservative hard Brexiteers who are prepared to leave without an agreement so that the United Kingdom can "regain control", engage in trade negotiations with third countries, get out from under European

regulations, and begin a policy of deregulation that would make the UK a tax and regulatory haven. But the UK is already one of the countries where the regulation of the goods and labor markets is the most flexible. A sharp cut in taxes would imply further cuts in social spending, contrary to the promises of the Conservative Party. And leaving with no deal would erect barriers to the UK's access to the single market for its products and services. Theresa May will clash with the Irish Unionist Party (DUP), which is opposed to any differences in the treatment of Northern Ireland, as well as with Scottish nationalists, who want Scotland to remain in the EU. She will also have to confront the Remainers (Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats) who, buoyed by some recent polls, are calling for a new referendum. While Jeremy Corbyn is not calling into question the result of the referendum, many Labour MPs could vote against the text, even if they are supporters of a soft Brexit, as the Treaty organizes. They hope to provoke early elections that could allow them to return to power. They claim they will resume negotiations after that, making every effort to obtain a better deal for the United Kingdom, which would allow it to enjoy "the same advantages as at present as members of the Customs Union and the Single Market" and to control migration. But the EU-27 has clearly refused any resumption of negotiations, and some Labour forces want a new referendum ... Theresa May's hope is that fear of a No deal will be strong enough to win approval for her compromise.

If, initially, Brexit seemed to weaken the EU, by showing that it was possible for a country leave, the EU has demonstrated its unity in the negotiations. It became clear quickly that leaving the EU was painful and expensive. The EU is a cage, more or less gilded, which it is difficult, if not impossible, to escape.

[\[1\]](#) See: *Joint report from the negotiators of the EU and the*

UK government on progress during phase 1 of negotiations under Article 50 on the UK's orderly withdrawal from the EU, 8 December 2017. See Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak, [“Brexit: Pulling off a success”](#), *OFCE blog*, 6 December 2017.

[2]

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/draft_withdrawal_agreement_0.pdf

[3]

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/37059/20181121-cover-political-declaration.pdf>

[4]

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/37114/25-special-euco-final-conclusions-fr.pdf> et

[5]

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/37137/25-special-euco-statement-fr.pdf>

[6] The vagueness is in the text: “The United Kingdom will consider aligning with Union rules in relevant areas”.

European banking regulation: When there's strength in union

By [Céline Antonin](#), [Sandrine Levasseur](#) and [Vincent Touzé](#)

At a time when America, under the impulse of its new president

Donald Trump, is preparing to put an end to the banking regulation adopted in 2010 by the Obama administration [\[1\]](#), Europe is entering a third year of the Banking Union (Antonin et al., 2017) and is readying to introduce new prudential regulations.

What is the Banking Union?

Since November 2014, the Banking Union has established a unified framework that generally aims to strengthen the financial stability of the euro zone [\[2\]](#). It has three specific objectives:

- To guarantee the robustness and resilience of the banks;
- To avoid the need to use public funds to bail out failing banks;
- To harmonize regulations and ensure better regulation and public supervision.

This Union is the culmination of lengthy efforts at regulatory coordination following the establishment of the free movement of capital in Article 67 of the Treaty of Rome (1957): “During the transitional period and to the extent necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the common market, Member States shall progressively abolish between themselves all restrictions on the movement of capital belonging to persons resident in Member States and any discrimination based on the nationality or the place of residence of the parties or on the place where such capital is invested.”

The Banking Union was born out of the crisis. While the Single European Act of 1986 and the 1988 EU Directive allowed the free movement of capital to take effect in 1990, the financial crisis of 2008 revealed a weakness in Europe’s lack of coordination in the banking sphere.

Indeed, the lessons of the financial crisis are threefold:

- A poorly regulated banking and financial system (the

American case) can be dangerous for the proper functioning of the real economy, in the country but also beyond;

- Regulation and supervision that is limited to a national perspective (the case of European countries) is not effective in a context where capital movements are globalized and numerous financial transactions are conducted outside a country's borders;
- The banking and sovereign debt crises are linked (Antonin and Touzé, 2013b): on the one hand, bailing out banks by using public funds increases the public deficit, which weakens the State, while the problematic sustainability of the public debt weakens the banks that hold these debt securities in their own funds.

The Banking Union provides a legal and institutional framework for the European banking sector, based on three pillars:

(1) The European Central Bank (ECB) is the sole supervisor of the major banking groups;

(2) A centralized system for the regulation of bank failures includes a common bailout fund (the Single Resolution Fund) and prohibits the use of national public funding;

(3) By 2024, and subject to the definitive agreement of all the members of the Banking Union, a common fund must ensure that bank deposits held by European households are guaranteed for up to 100,000 euros, with deposits guaranteed by each State from 2010.

The Banking Union is not fully completed. The adoption of the third pillar is lagging behind due to the difficulties being experienced by the banks in Greece and Italy, which have not been entirely resolved due to the continuing risk of default on existing loans. The European deposit guarantee "will have to wait until sufficient progress has been made to reduce and harmonize banking risks" (Antonin et al., 2017).

Towards stronger regulation and greater financial stability

The Banking Union has come into existence alongside the new Basel III prudential regulations that have been adopted by all Europe's banks since 2014 following a European directive and regulation. The Basel III regulations require banks to maintain a higher level of capital and liquidity by 2019.

The establishment of the Banking Union coupled with the ECB's highly accommodative monetary policy has helped to put an end to the crises in sovereign debt and the European banking sector. The ECB's massive asset purchase programme is helping to improve the balance sheet structure of indebted sectors, which is reducing the risk of a bank default. Today, the Member States, business and households are borrowing at historically low interest rates.

The establishment of a stable, efficient European banking and financial space requires further steps to regulate both a unified European capital market and the banks' financial activities (Antonin et al., 2014).

The main objective of a union of the capital markets is to provide a common regulatory framework to facilitate the financing of European companies by the markets and to channel the abundant savings in the euro area towards long-term investments. This would allow for a more coherent and potentially more demanding level of regulation of the issue of financial securities (equities, bonds, securitization operations).

The Banking Union could also be strengthened by drawing on the 2014 Barnier proposal for a high level of separation of deposit and speculative activities. The ECB's unique supervisory role (pillar 1) enables it to ensure that speculative activities don't disrupt normal business. This supervisory role could be extended to embrace all financial activities, including the infamous credit system of "shadow

banking” that parallels conventional lending. The separation of activities also strengthens the credibility of the common bail-out funds (pillar 2) and guarantee funds (pillar 3). Indeed, it is becoming more difficult for banks to be too big, which reduces the risk of bankruptcies that are costly for savers (internal bailout and limits on common funds).

Defending a European model of banking and financial stability

At a time when the United States is currently abandoning the more stringent regulation of its banks in an effort to boost their short-term profitability, Europe’s Banking Union is a remarkable defensive tool for preserving and strengthening the development of its banks while demanding that they maintain a high level of financial security.

While the US courts are not hesitating to impose heavy fines on European banks [3], and China’s major banks now occupy four out of the top five positions in global finance (Leplâtre and Grandin de l’Eprevier, 2016), a coordinated approach has become crucial for defending and maintaining a stable and efficient European banking model. In this field, a disunited Europe could seem weak even while its surplus savings make it a global financial power. The crisis has of course hurt many European economies, but we must guard against the short-term temptations of an autarkic withdrawal: a European country that isolates itself becomes easy prey in the face of a changing global banking system.

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[1] The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act adopts the Volcker rule “which prohibits banks from ‘playing’ with depositors’ money, which led to a virtual ban on the proprietary speculative activities of banking entities as well as on investments in hedge funds and private equity funds” (Antonin and Touzé, 2013a).

[2] The Banking Union is compulsory for euro area countries and optional for the other countries.

[\[3\]](#) Recent events have shown that US justice can prove to be extremely severe as large fines are imposed on European banks: 8.9 billion dollars for BNP Paribas in 2014, and 5.3 billion for Credit Suisse and 7.2 billion for Deutsche Bank in 2016.

Europe's competition policy – or extending the domain of integration

By [Sarah Guillou](#)

The principle of “fair competition” was set out in the general principles of the Preamble to the Treaty of the European Communities (TEC) in 1957, as was the commitment that the Member States will enact policies to ensure this fairness. Competition policy – overseen by the Competition Directorate – is the benchmark policy for market regulation, but also for industrial strategy and, more recently, for fiscal regulation.

The need for a competition policy flows directly out of Europe's project to establish a common market, and numerous attempts at industrial policy have come to grief on the altar of Articles 81 to 89 of the TEC (and now Articles 101 to 109 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), which establish the framework for competition. In practice, the two policies are clearly complementary in the European Union, and the space granted to the former develops thanks to the set of exceptions to the latter.

Competition as a general framework in the European Union

As a foundation of the common market, respect for and controls on market competition is a general principle underlying all European policy. More fundamentally, competition can be considered a *constitutional* principle of the European Union. It makes it possible to define the European space, the common space whose existence depends on controls on competition between States. Europe's competition law is therefore developed first of all to control economic competition between the States. The aim is to prevent the States from adopting policies that create benefits for companies in their own territory and discriminate against companies from other States.

Within the European Commission, the Competition Directorate therefore has a significant role and responsibility. Supervision of competition is exercised through the control of mergers and cartels on the one hand, and the control of State aid on the other. To monitor cartels or any other abuse of a dominant position, competition law is exercised *ex post* to protect consumers and competitors from predatory behavior and abusive pricing. Control over concentration developed generally from the second half of the 1980s, in synch with the increase in the size of mergers and the opportunities for European rapprochements, which resulted from the success of the single market. Moreover, mergers and acquisitions are increasingly the subject of negotiations between the companies involved and the European Commission and conclude with a transfer of activity. For example, the acquisition of Alstom's energy division by General Electric in 2015 was accompanied by the sale of part of the gas turbine business to the Italian company Ansaldo Energia. This control has given the Commission an active role in the structuring of the market, which amounts to a super power, but since the 1990s, fewer than 1% of notifications concerning concentrations have led to a veto by the Commission.

European supervision of aid has been relatively continuous

since it presupposes a permanent exercise of supervision of “undistorted competition” in the European area. It is a tool both to control any distortions of competition created by a Member State granting advantages to its companies and to fight against a race to “who grants most” in terms of subsidies. Thus, Article 87 (1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community states that State aid is considered to be incompatible with the common market, and Article 88 gives the Commission a mandate to monitor such aid. But Article 87 also specifies the criteria the Commission uses to investigate aid.

Business subsidies are subject to the Commission’s authorization if they exceed 200,000 euros over three years and they are not included in the set of exemptions decided by the EU. The majority of aid investigated is authorized (almost 95%). As for France, the percentage of aid disallowed out of the amount granted is in line with the European average. There have of course been some noteworthy decisions, such as when EDF was required to repay 1.4 billion euros in 2015 following tax assistance dating back to 1997. But the Commission also recently allowed the French State to acquire an interest in the capital of PSA Peugeot Citroën (2015). Similarly, the Commission authorized the public-private partnership underpinning the construction of the Hinkley Point nuclear power plant in Great Britain.

Some recent developments in the exercise of this control should be noted. The regulation of State aid has been used to examine the provisions of tax agreements negotiated by companies with certain governments such as Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. By favouring some companies to the detriment of their competitors, these tax agreements create not only distortions in competition but also competition between States to attract the profits and jobs of the large multinationals. For example, in October 2016, the Commissioner for Competition, Margarethe Vestager, described the tax agreement that Apple had received in Ireland as unauthorized

State aid, and accordingly required the Irish government to recover 13 billion euros from Apple. This use of the regulatory power over State aid constitutes a turning point in competition policy, in that it recalls that the object of competition policy is to ensure that competition between States does not go against the notion of "a common market."

Industrial policy is expressed in the exceptions to competition policy

Note that while competition policy is well defined at European level, there are many meanings of industrial policy in Europe, almost as many as there are members. This makes it more difficult to find policy compromises prior to the definition of such a policy. Moreover, the institutional logic and the economic logic are not the same. As already noted, competition policy has a strong institutional anchorage, which is not the case with industrial policy. Even though the European Coal and Steel Community was at the origin of the European Community, industrial policy is not at the heart of the European project. Moreover, the economic logic is different: competition policy is defined with reference to space (the relevant market), whereas industrial policy can be understood only by integrating the life cycle of companies and industries, and therefore in reference to each country's industrial history. In a shared sense, industrial policy can be defined as policy that is aimed at orienting an economy's sectoral and / or technological specialization. It is therefore easy to grasp the dependence of industrial policy on national preferences. The tool favoured by the States to express this policy is aid to companies, whether directly or indirectly.

State aid is classified according to 15 objectives, ranging from "preservation of the heritage" to aid for "research and development and innovation". For the EU as a whole, the three categories that are largest as a percentage of total aid are: environmental protection (including aid for energy savings), regional aid, and aid for R&D and innovation. The amounts

involved are far from negligible: in 2014, for example, 15 billion euros for France and 39 billion for Germany. A higher amount of aid in 2014 was due largely to an increase in aid for renewable energy as a result of the adoption in 2014 of revisions on the rules on this type of aid. Germany is the country that contributed the most to this increase. Support for renewable energies is indeed at the heart of its industrial policy.

European industrial policy develops as exemptions to the application of control on aid and hence to competition policy. These exemptions are set out in the general regulations on exemptions by category. There are many Block Exemptions, which revolve around the following five themes: innovation and R&D, sustainable development, the competitiveness of EU industry, job creation, and social and regional cohesion. It can be seen in this set of exemptions that supervision is also the expression of Europe's policy choices on orienting public aid, and thence directing public resources towards uses that are in line with these choices. These choices are the result of a relative consensus on the future of the European economy which shapes industrial policy. The largest categories of aid are research and development and environmental protection. In a word, the European economy will be technological and sustainable. This is a policy of orientation and not a policy of resources, and it takes shape within the overarching framework of the policy on competition.

What future for Europe's competition policy?

It seems that, given the primacy of competition policy and its foundational role for Europe's union, competition policy is the conductor of microeconomic policy. It has, up to now, proved capable of adapting. Thus, in compliance with the European project, economic constraints and societal orientations have led to changes in the definition of exemptions on the control of aid, which have allowed for the expression of industrial policy. Similarly, it has seized upon

the fiscal hyper-differentiation between certain States, which sharply contravened European integration and the common market.

Competition policy must not be weakened in authority or scale, but it must retain its capacity to adapt both to industrial orientations and to the deployments of Member States' strategies on competition with each other. It is also an essential counter-power to the growing strength of the multinationals, and governments must support it in this sense rather than becoming the mouthpieces of their national champions.

Brexit: What are the lessons for Europe?

By [Catherine Mathieu](#) and [Henri Sterdyniak](#)

The British vote to leave the European Union is aggravating the political crisis in Europe and in many European countries. Leaving the EU has become a possible alternative for the peoples of Europe, which may encourage parties advocating national sovereignty. The United Kingdom's departure automatically increases the weight of the Franco-German couple, which could destabilize Europe. If Scotland leaves the UK to join the EU, independence movements in other regions (Catalonia, Corsica, etc.) could seek a similar outcome. But the fragility of Europe also stems from the failure of the strategy of "fiscal discipline / structural reforms".

The departure of the United Kingdom, a fierce advocate of economic liberalism and opponent of any increase in the European budget and in the powers of Europe's institutions, as

well as of a social Europe, could change the dynamics of the debate in Europe, but some East European countries, the Netherlands and Germany have always had the same position as the UK. The departure will not, by itself, cause a shift in European policy. On the other hand, the liberalization of services and the financial sector, which the UK has been pushing for, could be slowed. The British Commissioner, Jonathan Hill, head of financial services and capital markets, should be promptly replaced. This will raise the sensitive issue of British EU officials, who in any case can no longer occupy positions of responsibility.

This will also open up a period of economic and financial uncertainty. The reaction of the financial markets, which do not like uncertainty and are in any case volatile, should not be accorded an excessive importance. The pound sterling has of course rapidly depreciated by 10% against the euro, but it was probably overvalued, as evidenced by the British current account deficit of around 6.5% of GDP in 2015.

According to Article 50 of the European Constitution, any country that decides to leave the EU should negotiate a withdrawal agreement, which sets the exit date^[1]. Otherwise, after two years the country is automatically outside the Union. The negotiations will be delicate, and must of necessity deal with all the issues. During this period, the UK will remain in the EU. European countries will have to choose between two attitudes. An understanding attitude would be to sign a free trade agreement quickly, with the goal of maintaining trade and financial relations with the UK as a privileged partner of Europe. This would minimize the economic consequences of Brexit for both the EU and the UK. However, it seems difficult to see how the UK could simultaneously enjoy both complete freedom for its own economic organization and full access to Europe's markets. The UK should not enjoy more favourable conditions than those of the current members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA – Norway, Iceland and

Liechtenstein) and Switzerland; like them, it should undoubtedly integrate the single market legislation (in particular the free movement of persons) and contribute to the EU budget. The issue of standards, such as the European passport for financial institutions (this is now granted to the EFTA countries, but not to Switzerland), etc., would be posed very quickly. The UK may have to choose whether to comply with European standards on which it will not have a say or to be subject to regulatory barriers. The negotiations will of course be open-ended. The UK could argue for a Europe that is more open to countries outside the EU. But how much weight will it have once it's out?

A tough attitude intended to punish London so as to set an example and deter future candidates from leaving would instead require the UK to renegotiate all trade treaties from scratch (i.e. from WTO rules) so as to encourage multinational companies to relocate their factories and headquarters to mainland Europe and close British banks' access to the European market in order to push them to repatriate euro zone banking and financial activity to Paris or Frankfurt. But it would be difficult for Europe, a supporter of the free movement of goods, services, people and business, to start erecting barriers against the UK. The euro zone has a current account surplus of 130 billion euros with the UK: does it want to call this into question? European companies that export to the UK would oppose this. Industrial cooperation agreements (Airbus, arms, energy, etc.) could only be challenged with difficulty. A priori it would seem unlikely that London would erect tariff barriers against European products, unless in retaliation. Conversely, London could play the card of setting up tax and regulatory havens, particularly in financial matters. It could not, however, avoid international constraints (agreements such as at COP21, on the fight against tax avoidance, on the international exchange of tax and banking information, etc.). The risk would be to start a costly game of mutual reprisals (one that it would be

difficult for Europe, divided between countries with different interests, to lead).

Upon leaving the European Union, the United Kingdom, a net contributor to the EU, would a priori save about 9 billion euros per year, or 0.35% of its GDP. However, the EFTA countries and Switzerland contribute to the EU budget as part of the single market. Again, everything depends on the negotiations. It would seem that the savings for the UK will be only about 4.5 billion euros, which the other Member countries will have to make up (at a cost of around 0.5 billion euros for France).

Given the uncertainty of the negotiations (and of exchange rate trends), all assessments of Brexit's impact on other EU countries can only be very tentative. Moreover, this will necessarily have only a second-order impact on the EU countries: if tariff or non-tariff barriers reduce French exports of cars to the UK and of British cars to France, French manufacturers can supply their national markets while facing less competition and can also turn to third countries. It is nevertheless useful to have an order of magnitude: in 2015, exports from France (from the EU) to the UK represented 1.45% of GDP (respectively 2.2%); exports from the UK to the EU represented 7.1% of British GDP. A priori, an equivalent impact on UK / EU trade will have 3.2 times less impact on the EU than on the UK.

According to the OECD [\[21\]](#), the fall in EU GDP will come to 0.8% by 2023 (against 2.5% for the UK), whereas remaining in the EU, participating in the deepening of the single market and signing free trade agreements with the rest of the world would lead to a rise in GDP for all EU countries. But how credible is this last assertion, given the euro zone's current poor performance and the cost for the economic and social cohesion of European countries of opening the borders? But if Europe is functioning poorly, then leaving should improve market prospects. The UK's foreign trade would suffer a contraction,

which would hurt its long-term productivity, but despite its openness the British economy's productivity is already weak. The OECD does not raise the question of principle: should a country give up its political sovereignty to benefit from the potential positive effects of trade liberalization?

According to the Bertelsmann Foundation[\[3\]](#), the reduction in EU GDP (excluding the UK) in 2030 would range from 0.10% in the case of a soft exit (the UK having a status similar to that of Norway) to 0.36% in the worst case (the UK having to renegotiate all its trade treaties); France would be little affected (-0.06% to -0.27%), but Ireland, Belgium and Luxembourg more so. The study multiplied these figures by five to incorporate medium-term dynamics, with the reduction in foreign trade expected to have adverse effects on productivity.

Euler-Hermes also reported very weak figures for the EU countries: a fall of 0.4% in GDP with a free trade agreement and of 0.6% without an agreement. The impact would be greater for the Netherlands, Ireland and Belgium.

Europe needs to rebound, with or without the United Kingdom...

Europe must learn the lessons from the British crisis, which follows on the debt crisis of the southern European countries, the Greek crisis, and austerity, as well as from the migrant crisis. It will not be easy. There is a need to rethink both the content of EU policies and their institutional framework. Is the EU up to the challenge?

The imbalances between EU Member countries grew from 1999 to 2007. Since 2010, the euro zone has not been able to develop a coordinated strategy enabling it to restore a satisfactory level of employment and reduce the imbalances between Member states. The economic performance of many euro zone countries has been poor, and downright catastrophic in southern Europe. The strategy implemented in the euro zone since 1999, and

strengthened since 2010 – “fiscal discipline / structural reforms” – has hardly produced satisfactory results socially or economically. On the contrary, it gives people the feeling of being dispossessed of any democratic power. This is especially true for countries that benefited from assistance from the Troika (Greece, Portugal, Ireland) or the European Central Bank (Italy, Spain). The Juncker plan that was intended to boost investment in Europe marked a turning point in 2015, but it remains timid and poorly taken up: it was not accompanied by a review of macroeconomic and structural policy. There are important disagreements in Europe both between nations and between political and social forces. In the current situation, Europe needs a strong economic strategy, but it has not been possible to agree on one collectively in today's Europe.

There are two fundamental reasons for this morass. The first concerns all the developed countries. Globalization is creating a deeper and deeper divide between those who benefit from it and those who lose^[4]. Inequalities in income and status are widening. Stable, well-paid jobs are disappearing. The working classes are the direct victims of competition from low-wage countries (Asian countries and former Soviet bloc countries). They are being asked to accept cuts in wages, social benefits, and employment rights. In this situation, the elite and the ruling classes can be open-spirited, globalist and pro-European, while the people are protectionist and nationalist. This same phenomenon underlies the rise of France's National Front, Germany's AFD, UKIP, and in the US the Republican Donald Trump.

Europe is currently operated according to a liberal, technocratic federalism, which seeks to impose on people policies and reforms that they are refusing, sometimes for reasons that are legitimate, sometimes questionable, and sometimes contradictory. The fact is that Europe in its current state is undermining solidarity and national cohesion

and preventing countries from choosing a specific strategy. The return to national sovereignty is a general temptation.

Furthermore, Europe is not a country. There are significant differences in interests, situations, institutions and ideologies between peoples, which render progress difficult. Because of the differences in national situations, many arrangements (the single monetary policy, the free movement of capital and people) pose problems. Rules that had no real economic foundation were introduced in the Stability Pact and the Budgetary Treaty: these did not come into question after the financial crisis. In many countries, the ruling classes, political leaders and senior civil servants have chosen to minimize these problems, so as not to upset European construction. Crucial issues concerning the harmonization of taxes, social welfare, wages and regulations have been deliberately forgotten. How can convergence towards a social Europe and a fiscal Europe be achieved between countries whose peoples are attached to structurally different systems? Given the difficulties of monetary Europe, who would wish for a budgetary Europe, which would take Europe further from democracy?

In the UK-EU Agreement of 19 February, the UK has recalled the principles of subsidiarity. It is understandable that countries concerned about national sovereignty are annoyed (if not more) by the EU's relentless intrusions into areas that fall under national jurisdiction, where European intervention does not bring added value. It is also understandable that these countries refuse to constantly justify their economic policies and their economic, social or legal rules to Brussels when these have no impact on the other Member states. The UK noted that the issues of justice, security and individual liberties are still subject to national competence. Europe needs to take this feeling of exasperation into account. After the British departure, it needs to decide between two strategies: to strengthen Europe at the risk of further

fuelling people's sense of being powerless, or to scale down the ambition of European construction.

The departure of the United Kingdom, the de facto distancing of some Central European countries (Poland, Hungary) and the reticence of Denmark and Sweden could lead to an explicit switch to a two-tiered EU. Many national or European intellectuals and politicians think that this crisis could provide just such an opportunity. Europe would be explicitly divided into three groupings. The first would bring together the countries of the euro zone, which would all agree to new transfers of sovereignty and to build a stronger budgetary, fiscal, social and political union. A second grouping would bring together the European countries that do not wish to participate in such a union. The last grouping would include countries linked to Europe through a free trade agreement (currently Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland, and later the UK and other countries).

Such a project would, however, pose many problems. Europe's institutions would have to be split between euro zone institutions operating on a federal basis (which need to be made more democratic) and EU institutions continuing to operate in the Union manner of the Member states. Many countries currently outside the euro zone are opposed to this kind of change, which they feel would marginalize them as "second-class" members. The functioning of Europe would become even more complicated if there were both a European Parliament and a euro zone Parliament, euro zone commissioners, euro zone and EU financial transfers, and so on. This is already the case for instance with the European Banking Agency and the European Central Bank. Many questions would have to be decided two or three times (once in the euro zone, again at the EU level, and again for the free trade area).

Depending on the issue, the Member country could choose its grouping, and things would quickly head towards an à la carte union. This is hardly compatible with the democratization of

Europe, as soon there would be a Parliament for every question.

The members of the third grouping would then be in an even more difficult situation, with the obligation to comply with regulations over which they had no power. Should our partner countries be placed in the dilemma of either accepting heavy losses of sovereignty (in political and social matters) or being denied the benefits of free trade?

There is clearly no agreement between the peoples of Europe, even within the euro zone, on moving towards a federal Europe, with all the convergences that this would imply. In the recent period, the five Council Presidents and the Commission proposed new steps towards European federalism: creating a European Budget Committee, establishing independent Competitiveness Councils, conditioning the granting of Structural Funds on respect for budgetary discipline and the implementation of structural reforms, establishing a European Treasury and a euro zone minister of finance, moving towards a financial union, and partially unifying the unemployment insurance systems. These developments would reinforce the technocratic bodies to the detriment of democratically elected governments. It would be unpleasant if these were implemented, as is already partially the case, without the people being consulted.

Furthermore, no one knows how to proceed with convergence on tax and social matters. Upwards or downwards? Some proposals call for a political union in which decisions are taken democratically by a euro zone government and parliament. But can anyone imagine a federal authority, even a democratic one, that is able to take into account national specificities in a Europe composed of heterogeneous countries? What about decisions concerning the French pension system taken by a European Parliament? Or a finance minister for the zone imposing spending cuts on Member countries (as the Troika did in Greece)? Or automatic standards on public deficits? In our

opinion, given the current disparity in Europe, economic policies must be coordinated between countries, not decided by a central authority.

Europe needs to reflect on its future. Using the current crisis to move forward towards an “ever closer union” without more thought would be dangerous. Europe must live with a contradiction: the national sovereignties that peoples are attached to have to be respected as much as possible, while Europe must implement a strong and consistent macroeconomic and social strategy. Europe has no meaning in itself, but only in so far as it implements the project of defending a specific model of society, developing it to integrate the ecological transition, eradicating mass unemployment, and solving the imbalances within Europe in a concerted and united manner. But there is no agreement within Europe on the strategy needed to achieve these goals. Europe, which has been unable to generally lead the Member countries out of recession or to implement a coherent strategy to deal with globalization, has become unpopular. Only after a successful change of policies will it regain the support of the peoples and be able to make institutional progress.

[\[1\]](#) See in particular the report of the French Senate by Albéric de Montgolfier: *Les conséquences économiques et budgétaires d’une éventuelle sortie du Royaume-Uni de l’Union Européenne* [The economic and budgetary consequences of a future withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union], June 2016.

[\[2\]](#) OECD, 2016, *The Economic Consequences of Brexit: A Taxing Decision*, April. Note that to treat leaving the euro as a tax increase does not make economic sense and represents a communication that is unworthy of the OECD.

[\[3\]](#) *Brexit – potential economic consequences if the UK exits the EU*, Policy Brief, 2015/05.

[4] See, for example, Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2014, “Le prix de l’inégalité”, *Les Liens qui libèrent*, Paris.

Financialisation and financial crisis: vulnerability and traumatic shock

By Jérôme Creel, Paul Hubert, Fabien Labondance

Since the mini-crash that took place in the Shanghai stock market in August, financial instability has resurfaced in the markets and the media and, once again, the link with financialisation has been evoked. The Chinese crisis resulted from a combination of real estate and stock market bubbles that were fed by the abundant savings of a middle class in search of high-yield investments. It feels like we’ve gone back almost ten years when what is considered the excessive financialisation of the US economy – with abundant savings from the emerging countries enabling the build-up of widespread US consumer debt – is treated as the cause of the financial instability and crisis that was triggered in the summer of 2007.


Is there really a link between, on the one side, increasing indebtedness and the great variety of financial investments, and on the other, volatile stock prices and a deterioration in the quality of bank loans? And if there is, what is the direction of the dynamics: from financialisation to financial

instability, from financial instability to financialisation, or both at once? A rise in indebtedness could well lead to increasingly risky lending to agents who would not be able to repay them, which would then lead to a financial crisis: this is one possible case. The occurrence of a crisis would change the behaviour of households and firms, causing them to reduce debt: this is the second case, in which financial instability reduces the financialisation of the economy. Depending on which is the case, the public policies needed differ. In the first, we need to monitor the degree of the economy's financialisation and target, for example, a maximum ratio of bank credit to GDP in order to prevent the rise and bursting of speculative bubbles. In the second case, there are two possibilities: to treat the causes, and thus to monitor the quality of loans to households and business so as to ensure the proper allocation of capital in the economy; or to treat the consequences by supporting productive investment to annihilate any rationing of credit.

In the course of the debate on the links between financialisation and financial instability, and on the consequences to be drawn in terms of public policy, the European situation is interesting for two reasons: the European Union has set up a system for monitoring external imbalances, including financial ones, from 2011, and a banking union since 2014. In a recent [working paper](#), we look at this debate for several groups of countries in the European Union over the period 1998-2012.

At first glance, the relationship between these two concepts is not easy to demonstrate, as can be seen in the graph below. It shows a scatter plot that for each year and for each European country gives the levels of financialisation (approximated here by the share of credits / GDP) and of financial instability (approximated here by non-performing loans). The correlation between these variables is -0.23.

Figure. Financialisation and financial instability



Note: Non-performing loans, or bad debt, expressed as a percentage of total loans granted by banks.
Credit/GDP: total amount of bank credit expressed as a percentage of GDP.

Source : Creel et al. (2015) based on GFDD databases.

We test the two typical cases discussed above. We call the first case the vulnerability effect. As financialisation develops, it engenders a sort of euphoria that leads to granting loans that are increasingly risky, which fosters financial instability. This hypothesis derives from the work of Minsky (1995) [\[11\]](#). We simultaneously test the potentially negative relationship between financial instability and financialisation, which we call the trauma effect. The very occurrence of financial instability as well as its impact encourages economic agents to take less risk and to shed debt. Our estimates show that the link between financial instability and financialisation is not uni-directional. Contrary to what is suggested by the simple correlation coefficient, the sign of the relationship is not the same when looking at the effect of one variable on the other, and vice versa. Both the vulnerability and the trauma effect have been at work in the European countries. A macro-prudential policy intended to

monitor the policy on granting bank loans, in terms of their volume and quality, therefore does indeed seem necessary in Europe.

We also tested the possibility that these effects are non-linear, that is to say, that they depend on reference values. The vulnerability hypothesis depends both on the level of financialisation (the higher it is, the stronger the relationship) and on time. This last point shows us that the positive relationship between financialisation and financial instability shows up at the moment of crisis for countries that are already heavily financialised. Finally, in the countries on the EU periphery [\[2\]](#), long-term interest rates and inflation rates greatly influence the financial instability variable. Consequently, it seems that for these countries there is a need for strong coordination between banking supervision and macroeconomic surveillance.

[\[1\]](#) Minsky H. P. (1995), "Sources of Financial Fragility: Financial Factors in the Economics of Capitalism", paper prepared for the conference, *Coping with Financial Fragility: A Global Perspective*, 7-9 September 1994, Maastricht, available at Hyman P. Minsky Archive. Paper 69.

[\[2\]](#) This group consists of Spain, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Portugal and the countries from the Eastern enlargements in 2004 and 2007. The establishment of this group is explained in the working paper.

Who has the best playing field for tax competition: the United States or the European Union?

By [Sarah Guillou](#)

Two recent events demonstrate the differences in the American and European views on tax competition. First was the case of Boeing, which the European Union (EU) has brought before the World Trade Organization (WTO). The EU is challenging the tax incentives offered by the State of Washington to the American aircraft maker. Then there is the European Commission's investigation of Luxembourg's tax provisions that benefit Amazon, the Internet retailer. Boeing and Amazon both make massive use of tax competition. While this is widespread and accepted in the United States, it is being increasingly questioned in the EU, and even excluded by law if it is classified as illegal State aid.

In the Boeing affair, in December 2014 the EU filed a request for [consultations](#) with the WTO regarding the tax subsidies paid by the State of Washington for the manufacture of the new Boeing 777X. This aid would amount to 8.7 billion dollars for assembly in the State. This programme was set up in November 2013 by the State of Washington, and the governor has now decided to extend it until 2040! The incentives are conditioned on the use of local products, i.e. the aid is linked "to local content requirements ". However, these requirements are contrary to the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. We are not going to discuss here the EU's complaint, which is awaiting a response from the US, and which is part of an ongoing dispute between Boeing and EADS about their respective public subsidies. This case,

however, offers an opportunity to take a look at the intensity of tax competition that exists between the various States in the US.

While the US, like the EU, is concerned with non-discrimination, which is set out in the doctrine of the Commerce Clause of the US Constitution, in practice it has been difficult for case law, which performs an *a posteriori* control, to provide a definition of discrimination that makes it possible to prevent discriminatory regulations. The result has been that the American States are free to offer subsidies and tax breaks to companies, or sometimes specific companies, to attract investment and jobs. Recall that in Europe, controls on State aid are performed *a priori* and that granting subsidies to any specific companies is totally excluded (see [Guillou, 2014, OFCE blog](#)). In the US, Boeing is a major player in this tax competition.

An American research center "[goodjobsfirst](#)", which tracks the aid and subsidies granted to companies by public institutions, showed that a mere 965 companies received 75% of all aid. It is Boeing that receives the most aid. This comes mainly from two States, Washington and South Carolina, with numerous subsidies (130 agreements) from all over the United States. The combination of all the aid brought to light amounts to 13 billion dollars. Boeing comes far ahead of all other companies, as second-place Alcoa receives less than half as much (5.6 billion dollars). Another [study](#) found that 22 States competed to host the production of the new 777X airliner, but Boeing ultimately decided to stay in the Seattle area and entered a 16-year tax agreement with the State of Washington that is estimated to be worth more than 8.7 billion dollars, the largest tax break in the United States. Business lobbying is much more common in the United States than in Europe, which explains much of the competition between States to attract business. While the United States has complained of foreign tax competition (especially vis-à-vis Ireland), it accepts

this completely on its own territory. This is not the prevailing position in the EU, of course, as the EU is not fiscally integrated.

Indeed, in Europe, tax harmonization is not yet on the agenda. But tax competition is being increasingly debated. This has not been in vain, as this pushed Ireland to abandon its “double Irish” system that allowed certain companies located in Ireland to be taxed in tax havens. Companies taking part in this tax scheme began the process of withdrawal in January 2015. While differentiated taxation is still accepted in Europe, excessive tax competition has been considered intolerable in the common market. When companies’ tax optimization strategies come together with national strategies to attract jobs and investment, the ingenuity of the tax authorities becomes a threat to the common market. What is most worrying is the legitimization of the avoidance of common tax rules.

European controls on State aid act as a powerful guardian over the use of public resources and on non-discrimination in the European market. These controls could well become an instrument in the fight against tax “loopholes”, vulnerabilities in the tax system that result in significant losses of public resources. The case against Luxembourg concerns its system of “tax rulings”. The tax ruling is a procedure whereby a State negotiates with a company about its future tax status. This procedure, which has been called the “marketing of State sovereignty”, is widespread in Luxembourg and was brought to light by a recent investigative report published in November 2014 (*Le Monde*), which shows that Luxembourg is not the only country to use these “tax rulings”.

Luxembourg attracts a large number of multinational firms that choose the location of their European headquarters based on tax optimization. It is the EU country with the lowest percentage of GDP (the production of residents) out of GNP (domestic production): this figure was only 64% in 2013,

against just over 100% for France and Germany. In other words, Luxembourg lost more than one-third of its national income once the payment of income to resident foreign companies was taken into account (net of income received). This reveals the fiscal opportunism of the numerous multinationals located in Luxembourg, for which the local market is clearly not a target.

In this case, Luxembourg has granted Amazon a valuation of its transfer pricing that the European Commission (EC) considers overestimated, which thus leads to underestimating the tax base (see the recently released [EC decision](#)).

Transfer prices are the prices of the goods and services traded between subsidiaries of the same corporation. These exchanges should theoretically be valued at market prices, that is to say, the price that would be paid by a company that is not a subsidiary of the corporation. The way these prices are decided may change the amount of a subsidiary's purchases and revenues, and thus its profits. The logic of the corporation is to minimize profits where tax rates are high and shift them to where rates are low. It is not so much the price of goods that are manipulated as the price of intangible assets such as patents, copyrights or other intellectual property (trademarks, logos, etc.). Multinationals that hold intangible capital, such as the giants of the Silicon Valley, are the ones that most commonly engage in this type of manipulation.

One way to prevent the manipulation of transfer pricing in Europe would be to make it obligatory to calculate a common consolidated corporate tax base. This is the purpose of the [draft CCCTB directive](#) from 2011, which is still under discussion. Trade-offs between the various European countries would be pointless, as the tax base would be consolidated and then distributed among the member States based on a formula that takes into account fixed assets, labour and sales. The States would retain control of their tax rate on corporations.

It is expected that this common base scheme would be optional. It is not certain that this would suffice to get the directive passed, as in fiscal matters this demands a unanimous vote whereas, for the moment, there is a great deal of disagreement.

On the other side of the Atlantic, the United States has a consolidated tax base system at the national level and a common federal tax rate on corporations. But local taxes, which can vary between 1% and 12%, are generally deductible from the federal tax calculation. The issue of transfer pricing between subsidiaries in different States may therefore also arise. And this is especially so, given that the local tax rate on profits is subtracted from the various tax credits awarded to certain companies.

The outcome of the investigation into Luxembourg and Amazon will be important for the future of the CCCTB Directive, in particular the version that affects only digital businesses. If the day has not yet come when the EU rules that “banking secrecy is a disguised form of subsidy” (G. Zucman, [The hidden wealth of nations](#)), the investigation into Amazon indicates that the EU is beginning to put some limits on tax competition that could soon make American taxpayers jealous.

Croatia under the Excessive Deficit Procedure: which

measures should be implemented?

By [Sandrine Levasseur](#)

How to put public finances on a good track when (almost) all measures regarding spending cuts and tax increases have been already exhausted? Croatia's government has been seeking to solve this tricky problem since mid-November when [an excessive deficit procedure \(EDP\) was launched](#) against the country. Let us explain what an EDP means: the public deficit of Croatia currently exceeds 3% of GDP; the breach is neither exceptional nor temporary; consequently, the government of Croatia has to curb its public deficit in a lasting way.

On 28 January 2014, the EU Council will propose (1) the time limits within which Croatia must reduce its deficit below 3% of GDP and (2) the average annual amounts of deficit reduction during the period. Yet, (3) the EU council will invite *formally* the government of Croatia to propose concrete measures towards reducing the deficit-to-GDP ratio below 3%.

The problem facing the government of Croatia is not straightforward since the proposed measures should not further depress the economy. Currently, only modest signs of recovery are in sight in Croatia, and its unemployment rate stands at a high level (16.5%). The country is among the poorest EU members: its GDP per capita is 62% of that of the EU-28.

Briefing Paper n° 6 aims at proposing a list of measures that an EU country under EDP such as Croatia could envisage. For each measure, we present the main arguments "in favor of" it and "against" it in general terms. Then, we discuss the relevance of every measure for Croatia. Note that our list of measures is suitable for both advanced and less advanced EU countries. More generally, our list could be used for any

country facing public finance problems and looking for solutions.

Three measures (out of seven) seem to us particularly relevant in the case of Croatia:

- the use of service concession contracts;
- the privatization of some state-owned enterprises;
- the improvement of tax collection and compliance.

The first two measures are related to the need to restructure state-owned enterprises that are inefficient due to poor management. In particular, state-owned enterprises which are neither natural monopolies nor of strategic importance (*i.e.* in the tourism and agriculture sectors) should be privatized. Privatization of other state-owned enterprises should be envisaged more carefully, but not excluded. Croatia is the first country to join the EU with such a high share of state-owned enterprises (25%), and the slow pace of privatization has hindered growth. More privatizations will result in (long-run) gains even if causing (short-run) pains, in particular layoffs among the workforce. Service concession contracts are another way of restructuring the state-owned sectors. The impact on public finances is different, though. Services concession contracts provide a regular source of revenues for the government (through receipts of concession fees) and/or of savings (through lower payments of government subsidies). By contrast, immediate and potentially large amounts of cash can be obtained from the proceeds of privatization.

Recommending a restructuring of state-owned enterprises in Croatia is not a novelty. The [International Monetary Fund](#), the [World Bank](#) and the European Commission have repeatedly stated that the pace of privatization or service concessions should be accelerated to raise the efficiency of the economy. Currently, the government of Croatia is actively engaged in accelerating such a process, in particular for service

concessions. A few recent concessions include [Zagreb's airport](#) and [Rijeka's port](#), while [motorways](#) and [Brijuni's island](#) have also been proposed to bidders.

Croatia's citizens do not always support the restructuring process. To obtain greater public acceptance of privatization and service concessions, communication should be improved and intensified. In particular, the budgetary authorities should explain *what* they are doing, *why* they are doing it, and what the long-run benefits of their actions will be. Otherwise, the restructuring of state-owned enterprises will be perceived as a gift to the private sector. Last but not least, the process of privatization and service concessions should be more controlled to prevent misguided choices, abuse or conflicts of interest. That also means fighting corruption.

The improvement of tax collection is the third measure that we advocate to curb Croatia's public deficit. According to the [Institute of Public Finance](#), the cumulated uncollected tax revenues in Croatia would amount to HRK 40bn, which represents more than twice the projected public deficit for 2014 (HRK 19.3bn). Should the government be capable of collecting at least a portion, it would give a little breathing room to the public finances. In Croatia, increasing the tax collection means several interrelated things: fighting the grey economy (since unreported incomes are untaxed incomes) and prosecuting tax fraud (otherwise, rules and procedures are useless). Again, tighter control means fighting corruption.

By contrast, other measures such as wage cuts in the public sector or low corporate tax rates do not appear suitable to put the public finances of Croatia on track.

Further details can be found at <http://www.ofce.sciences-po.fr/pdf/briefings/2014/briefing6.pdf>.

On cosmopolitan currency

By [Maxime Parodi](#), sociologist at the OFCE

A cosmopolitan currency is a currency common to many nations and explicitly based on a form of co-sovereignty (for a more in-depth analysis, see [OFCE working paper 2013-09, June 2013](#)). A currency like this is possible only by accepting a monetary policy and fiscal and taxation policies that are based on shared motivations, where each is responsible for the monetary commitments it makes and co-responsible for the ability of all to pursue a suitable economic policy. To be lasting, this currency requires sustained attention to macroeconomic divergences between the partners and the difficulties that each is encountering; it requires open dialogue about the reasons for these divergences and difficulties; it requires a determination to propose possible remedies over the short, medium and long term; and finally, it requires everyone to cooperate voluntarily, so long that is as they have the ability to do so.

Of all the classical sociologists, Simmel alone could have envisaged such a currency. Indeed, he was the only one to study socialization itself, to seek to understand society in the making, whereas Durkheim always started from an already established society, from an individual who was always already socialized, and Weber started from people always already constituted, “completed”, without at the same time considering them as subjects likely to influence each other and make society deliberately. Yet a cosmopolitan union is precisely a union that is always trying to make itself; it is never definitively established. This type of union is weak by nature, but at the same time it only ever appears in contexts where it is objectively necessary for its citizens. Such a

union is constantly renewed, constantly re-worked, because there is an objective terrain of neighbouring or overlapping interests, and everyone therefore considers it desirable to come to the best resolution of the neighbourhood's problems. Thus, in the name of the union, it becomes possible to resolve certain conflicts fairly and to develop tighter bonds.

From this perspective, the act of adopting a common currency is not a trivial matter in a cosmopolitan union. All of a sudden, everyone is committed to respecting their monetary promises to their neighbours. This is obviously a major change, which has immediate and foreseeable consequences: the transaction costs between partners disappear, and in particular there is no longer any risk associated with holding a foreign currency, as the currency is now common and politically guaranteed. But there are also less immediate, more hidden consequences. For instance, this common commitment often calls into question the economic culture of the nations concerned, by obliging them to explain some of the ways they operate: governments in the habit of solving their problems by inflation or a currency devaluation must now tell their citizens that it is necessary to raise taxes or spend less; banks that are "too big to fail" must now draw up wills instead of relying on the implicit guarantees of the citizens, and so forth. Finally, the cosmopolitan currency creates a new relationship between the partners, which in principle leads them to be concerned about their neighbours. In fact, the partners have made a commitment not only to keep their promises to everyone else, but also that each is able to uphold its own commitments (since trust is not divisible).

The cosmopolitan currency also introduces a kind of solidarity within the union. One must now be concerned about whether one's neighbour has the ability to meet its monetary commitments. This implies guaranteeing the latter a capacity for debt and / or a flow of investment into its territory. But unlike solidarity within a nation, this guarantee is more

moral than legal: it is not entirely engraved in stone in the union, but must be discussed case by case. The risk of moral hazard is thus avoided.

The euro seems to be the paradigmatic case of a cosmopolitan currency. It is even the only case in history where cosmopolitanism actually laid the basis for a currency. This unprecedented feature also poses difficulties by upsetting national economic cultures. Since the beginning of the monetary crisis in 2008, everyone is discovering how Europe's vertical institutions (European Commission, European Central Bank) address problems and respond to them. A culture of the euro, even a jurisprudence, is thereby forged. This is, incidentally, why the European Council should consider the impact of its decisions on this emerging culture: is the euro zone in the process of adopting a custom of "immediate returns"? Is this a doctrine born of distrust? If a cosmopolitan currency is possible, it is nevertheless necessary to accept both sides – the co-responsibility no less than the responsibility.

Croatia in the European Union: an entry without fanfare

By [Céline Antonin](#) and [Sandrine Levasseur](#)

On 1 July 2013, ten years after filing its application to join the European Union, Croatia will officially become the 28th member state of the EU and the second member country from

former Yugoslavia. Given the country's size (0.33% of the GDP of the EU-28) and the political consensus on its membership, Croatia's accession should pass relatively unnoticed. However, there are challenges posed by its entry. Indeed, at a time when the European Union is going through the worst crisis in its history, legitimate questions can be raised about whether Croatia is joining prematurely, particularly as it is experiencing its fifth successive year of recession. The latest [OFCE Note \(no. 27, 26 June 2013\)](#) reviews two of the country's main weaknesses: first, a lack of competitiveness, and second, a level of corruption that is still far too high to guarantee steady and sustainable growth.

With 4.3 million inhabitants, Croatia initially experienced a period of strong economic growth up to 2008, based on the strength of its tourist industry and on consumption that was largely underpinned by lending from foreign capital. The crisis revealed, yet again, the limitations of this development model and highlighted the country's structural weaknesses: a high level of dependence on foreign capital, the vulnerability of a system of (quasi) fixed exchange rates, an unfavourable environment for investment and wide-scale tax evasion.

Even though negotiations thankfully addressed some of these problems, others are still unresolved. For instance, with respect to the economy, the domestic market is still not open enough to competition, with the result that the country suffers from a lack of competitiveness. At the legal level, the progress made in the fight against corruption, tax evasion and the underground economy has been woefully inadequate, depriving the country of the foundations for robust growth. Following on the heels of Romania and Bulgaria, the entry of Croatia may unfortunately endorse the idea that curbing corruption is not a prerequisite for joining the EU. In view of the repeated institutional crises that have hit the European Union since 2009 and widespread Euroscepticism, it is

now urgent for the EU to makes its priority deepening rather than widening.

A carbon tax at Europe's borders: Fasten your seat belts!

By [Éloi Laurent](#) and [Jacques Le Cacheux](#)


How can the current deadlock in international climate negotiations be resolved? By an optimal mix of incentives and constraints. In the case that currently opposes the European Union and the international air carriers, the EU is legitimately bringing this winning combination to bear by imposing what amounts to a carbon tax on its borders. It is brandishing a constraint, the threat of financial penalties, to encourage an industry-wide agreement that is long overdue among the airlines to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.

The ongoing face-off with the carriers of several major countries, which, with the more or less open support of their governments, are contesting the application of these new regulations on GHG emissions from planes flying into or out of the EU is, from this perspective, a crucial test. It is an issue with considerable symbolic value, as it represents a first: all the airlines serving airports in the EU are subject to the new measure, regardless of their nationality. On March

9th, European officials reaffirmed their determination to maintain this regulation, so long as a satisfactory solution has not been proposed by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). However, 26 of the 36 member states of the ICAO Board, including China, the United States and Russia, have expressed their opposition to the new European requirement, advising their airlines not to comply. And the Chinese government is now threatening to block or outright cancel orders for 45 Airbus aircraft, including 10 A380 super-jumbos, if the European measure is not repealed.

Air emissions up sharply

GHG emissions attributable to air transport account for only about 3% of global and European emissions (about 12% of total emissions from transport in the EU). But despite the progress made by aircraft manufacturers in energy intensity, these emissions, which are still modest compared to road transport, have been experiencing explosive growth over the last 20 years, and are rising much faster than those in all other sectors, including shipping (see chart). They must be controlled.



In addition, in most countries, in particular in the EU, airline fuel is not subject to the usual taxation applied to oil products, which obviously distorts competition with other modes of transport.

A robust legal framework

The [new European regulations](#), which took effect on 1 January 2012, require all airlines serving any EU airport to acquire emission permits in an amount corresponding to 15% of the CO₂ emissions generated by each trip to or from that airport. The measure is non-discriminatory, since it affects all airlines flying into or out of European air space, whatever their nationality or legal residence. This requirement, which is grounded in environmental protection, is therefore fully consistent with the Charter of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

The measure is also of course in compliance with European treaties as well as with the various provisions of international law in the field of civil aviation, as is reiterated in the [judgment of 21 December 2011](#) by the Court of Justice of the European Union, in a case brought by several US carriers challenging its legality. The legal framework for this new provision is thus robust.

Towards the death of air transportation?

The airlines and the governments of the countries that are major emitters of greenhouse gases and that are hostile to this measure justify their outright opposition by arguing its poor timing, given the current economic climate of low growth and rising fuel costs, and its excessive cost, *i.e.* that the resulting rise in passenger air fares would be likely to further depress an already fragile industry.

In reality, the measure is largely symbolic and the cost is almost insignificant. Judge for yourself: according to the [Air France calculator approved by the French environmental agency, the ADEME](#), emissions per passenger amount to just over one tonne of CO₂ for a Paris-New York return trip, and approximately 1.4 tonnes for Paris-Beijing. The current price of a tonne of carbon on the European carbon market on which

companies must buy emissions permits, the ETS, is just under 8 euros. The additional cost per ticket thus amounts, respectively to 2 euros for Paris-New York and 1.7 euros for Paris-Beijing! (estimates using [the ICAO calculator](#) are even lower).

Towards a trade war?

Given the current state of the legislation, the threats to cancel Airbus orders or similar retaliatory trade measures are obviously out of proportion to the economic impact of the tax on the European skies. To fear that this might trigger a “trade war” is also to forget that such a war has already been declared in industry, particularly in the aviation sector (with the multiplication of [more or less disguised subsidies, including in Europe](#), and with the use of [exchange rates as a veritable weapon of industrial policy](#)). Furthermore, agreements or cancellations of orders in this sector are in any case very often influenced by the political context, sometimes for dubious reasons (as in the case of diplomatic reconciliation with relatively distasteful regimes). In this case the cause, the defence of the integrity of Europe’s climate policy, is legitimate.

The various threats and blackmail attempts being taken up by the pressure groups targeted, in this case air passengers, are intended to sway governments for obtaining short-sighted gains. They are targeting particular countries, foremost among them Germany and Poland, which are currently dragging their feet in accepting the EU Commission’s proposal to accelerate the pace of European emissions reduction by raising the goal of emissions reduction for 2020 from 20% to 30% (compared to 1990 levels). As is their right, on the climate issue Germany and Poland have been following an approach that is in accordance, respectively, with a growth strategy based on exports and an energy strategy based on coal. In both cases, these are national decisions that should not take precedence over the European approach. From the perspective of Europe’s

interests, there is therefore no valid reason to yield to these pressures even if some member states become involved.

By confirming its determination, the EU can provide proof that leadership by example on the climate can go beyond simply setting a moral example and lead to actual changes in economic behaviour. The EU can ensure that everyone sees that, despite the impasse at the global level, a regional climate strategy can still be effective. If its approach is confirmed, the success of the European strategy, which consists of encouraging cooperative strategies under the threat of credible sanctions, would point towards a way to break the deadlock on climate negotiations.

The European Union will, in the coming weeks, be passing through a zone of turbulence (yet another) on the issue of its border carbon tax. It would be legally absurd and politically very costly to make a U-turn now: instead, let's fasten our seat belts and wait calmly for the stop light to change.