

# Lower taxation on business but higher on households

By [Mathieu Plane](#) and Raul Sampognaro

Following the delivery of the Gallois Report in November 2012, the government decided at the beginning of Francois Hollande's five-year term to give priority to reducing the tax burden on business. But since 2015, the President of the Republic seems to have entered a new phase of his term by pursuing the objective of reducing the tax burden on households. This was seen in the elimination of the lowest income tax bracket and the development of a new allowance mechanism that mitigates tax progressivity at the lower levels of income tax. But more broadly, what can be said about the evolution of the compulsory tax burden on households and businesses in 2015 and 2016, as well as over the longer term?

Based on data provided by the INSEE, we have broken down trends in the tax burden since 2001, distinguishing between levies on companies and those on households (Figure). While this is purely an accounting analysis and is not based on the final fiscal impact, it nonetheless gives a view of the breakdown of the tax burden[\[1\]](#). In particular, this exercise seeks to identify the tax burden by the nature of the direct payer, assuming constant wages and prices (excluding tax). This accounting breakdown does not therefore take into account macroeconomic feedback and does not address the distributional and intergenerational impacts [\[2\]](#) of taxation.

For the period from 2001 to 2014, the data is known and recorded. They are *ex post* and incorporate both the effects of the discretionary measures passed but also the impact of fiscal gains and shortfalls that are sensitive to the business cycle. However, for 2015 and 2016, the changes in the tax burden for households and businesses are *ex ante*, that is to

say, they are based solely on the discretionary measures that have an impact in 2015 and 2016 and calculated in the Social, Economic and Financial Report of the 2016 Finance Bill for 2016 [[Rapport économique social et financier du Projet de loi de finances pour 2016](#)]. They therefore do not, for both years, include [potential effects related to variations in tax elasticities that could modify the apparent tax burden rates](#). Furthermore, under the new accounting standards of the European System of Accounts (ESA) tax credits, such as the CICE, are considered here as reductions in the tax burden, and not as a public expenditure. Furthermore, the CICE tax credit is recognized at the tax burden level in terms of actual payments and not on an accrual basis.

Several major points emerge from this analysis of the recent period. First, tax rates rose sharply in the period 2010-2013, representing an increase of 3.7 percentage points of GDP, [with 2.4 points borne by consumers and 1.3 by business](#). Over this period, fiscal austerity was relatively balanced between households and business, with the two experiencing a tax increase that was more or less proportional to their respective weights in the tax burden [\[3\]](#).

However, from 2014 a decoupling arose between the trends in the tax burdens for households and for business, which is continuing in 2015 and 2016. Indeed, in 2014, due to the impact of the CICE tax credit (6.4 billion euros, or 0.3 percent of GDP), the tax burden on business began to decline (by 0.2 GDP point), while the burden on households continued to rise (by 0.4 GDP point), mainly because of the hike in VAT (5.4 billion), the increase in environmental taxes (0.3 billion with the introduction of the carbon tax) and the increase in the contribution to the public electricity service (CSPE) (1.1 billion), together with the increase in social contributions for households (2.4 billion), mainly due to the rise in contribution rates to the general and complementary social security scheme and the gradual alignment of rates for

civil servant with those for private-sector employees.

In 2015, the tax burden on business will fall by 9.7 billion euros (0.5 GDP point) with the implementation of the CICE tax credit (6 billion), the first Responsibility Pact measures (5.9 billion related to the first tranche of reductions in employer social security contributions, an allowance on the C3S tax base and a "*suramortissement*", an additional tax reduction, on investment), while other measures, such as those related to pension reform, are increasing corporate taxation (1.7 billion in total). Conversely, the tax burden on households should increase in 2015 by 4.5 billion (0.2 GDP point), despite the elimination of the lowest income tax bracket (-2.8 billion) and the reduction in self-employed contributions (-1 billion). The hike in the ecological tax (carbon tax and TICPE energy tax) and the CSPE together with the non-renewal in 2015 of the exceptional income tax reductions of 2014 represent an increase in taxation on households of, respectively, 3.7 and 1.3 billion. Other measures, such as those affecting the rates of contributions to general, supplemental and civil servant pension schemes (1.2 billion), along with local taxation (1.2 billion), including the modification of the DMT0 tax ceiling and measures affecting tourist and parking taxes, are also raising taxes on households.

**Table. Measures affecting household and corporate tax burdens - 2015 and 2016**

In billion euros

	2015	2016
<b>HOUSEHOLDS</b>		
Income tax cut for low-income households	-2,8	-2,0
Ecology taxes + TICPE + CSPE	3,7	2,7
Change in VAT	0,5	-0,2
Local taxes	1,3	1,1
Elimination of PPE working tax credit		2,0
Old-age and CSA community autonomy tax	0,5	0,8
Other changes to social security contributions	0,8	0,1
Other measures	1,9	0,2
Reduction in self-employed contributions (Responsibility Pact)	-1,0	
Fight against tax fraud and avoidance	-0,4	-0,6
<b>Total of measures affecting household tax burden</b>	<b>4,5</b>	<b>4,1</b>
<b>Total excluding fight against tax fraud and avoidance</b>	<b>4,9</b>	<b>4,7</b>
<b>BUSINESS</b>		
CICE tax credit	-6,0	-0,3
C3S allowance (Responsibility Pact)	-1,0	-1,0
Elimination of exceptional IS corporate income tax (Responsibility Pact)		-2,3
Tax reduction on investments	-4,5	-3,5
Other measures affecting social security contributions	-0,4	-0,2
Other social contributions measures	1,1	1,0
Other measures	0,9	0,9
Fight against tax fraud and avoidance	0,2	-0,5
<b>Total of measures affecting corporate tax burden</b>	<b>-9,7</b>	<b>-5,9</b>
<b>Total excluding fight against tax fraud and avoidance</b>	<b>-9,9</b>	<b>-5,4</b>

Sources: PLF (Finance Act) 2016; OFCE calculations.

In 2016, the tax burden on business will fall by 5.9 billion (0.3 GDP point), mainly due to the second phase of the Responsibility Pact. Reductions in employer social security contributions on wages lying between 1.6 and 3.5 times the SMIC minimum wage (3.1 billion), the elimination of the corporate income tax (IS) surcharge (2.3 billion), the second allowance on the C3S tax base (1 billion), the implementation of the CICE tax credit (0.3 billion) and the additional tax reduction on investment (0.2 billion) have been only partially offset by tax increases on business, mainly with the hike on pension contribution rates (0.6 billion). However, as in previous years, the tax burden on households will increase in 2016 by 4.1 billion (0.2 GDP point), despite a further reduction in income tax (2 billion). The main measures increasing household taxation are similar to those in 2015, including environmental taxation, with the hike in the carbon


tax (1.7 billion) and the CSPE tax (1.1 billion), measures on financing pensions (0.8 billion), and the expected increase in local taxation (1.1 billion). Note that the elimination of the PPE working tax credit in 2016 will mechanically lead to an increase in the household tax burden of 2 billion<sup>[4]</sup>, but this will be offset by an equivalent amount for the new Prime d'activité working tax credit.

Ultimately, over the period 2010-2016, the household tax burden will increase by 66 billion euros (3.1 GDP points) and the burden on business by 8 billion (0.4 GDP point). The household tax burden will reach a historic high in 2016, at 28.2% of GDP. Conversely, the corporate tax burden in 2016 will amount to 16.4% of GDP, less than before the 2008 crisis. And in 2017, the last phase of the Responsibility Pact (with the complete elimination of the C3S tax and the reduction of IS corporate tax rates) and the expected CICE-related reimbursements should lead to cutting corporate taxation by about 10 billion euros, bringing the corporate tax burden down to the lowest point since the early 2000s.

The need to finance measures both to enhance corporate competitiveness and to reduce the structural deficit is placing the entire burden of the fiscal adjustment on households. Thus, the reduction in income tax in 2015 and 2016 will not offset the rise in other tax measures, most of which were approved in Finance Acts prior to 2015, and seems low in relation to the tax shock that has hit households since 2010. However, how these recent tax changes affect growth and the consequent impact on inequality will depend on the way business makes use of the new resources generated by the massive decline in its tax burden since 2014. These funds could lead to a rise in wages, employment, investment or lower prices or to higher dividends and a reduction in debt. Depending on the way business allocates these, the impact to be expected on the standard of living in France and on inequality will not of course be the same. An evaluation of

the impact of these changes on the tax burden will surely lead to future studies and debate.

**Figure: Changes in the tax burden on households and business**



[\[1\]](#) The tax burden on households includes direct taxes (CSG, CRDS, IRPP, housing tax, etc.), indirect taxes (VAT, TICPE, CSPE, excise taxes, etc.), tax on capital (ISF, DMTG, property tax, DMT0, etc.), and salaried and self-employed social security contributions. The corporate tax burden includes the various taxes on production (value-added tax and corporate property tax (ex-TP), property tax, C3S tax, etc.), taxes on wages and labour, corporate income tax and employer social security contributions.

[\[2\]](#) For example, employer social contributions for pensions are analyzed here as a tax burden on business and not as deferred wages for households or a transfer of income from assets to retirees.

[\[3\]](#) In 2013, 61% of the tax burden was on households and 39% on business. However, over the 2010-2013 period, tax increases

were borne 64% by households and 36% by business, which was more or less their respective weights in taxation.

[\[4\]](#) The PPE credit will be replaced by the Prime d'activité working tax credit, in an equivalent amount, which also encompasses the RSA activité tax credit; for accounting purposes the PPE is considered as a public expenditure. However, this new measure should not change household income macroeconomically, but only the nature of the transfer. Thus, excluding the elimination of the PPE, the tax burden on households would increase by 2.1 billion in 2016.

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## Towards a major fiscal reform – at last!

By [Guillaume Allègre](#), [@g\\_allegre](#)

At the start of the week, Jean-Marc Ayrault announced an overhaul of the French tax system that would involve, among other things, a reconciliation between income tax and the CSG wealth tax. The OFCE will definitely take part in this debate, one that it has already tried to shed light on many times, in particular on the occasion of a [special “Tax Reform” issue of the Revue de l’OFCE](#), edited by Mathieu Plane and myself, and published in April 2012.

Several contributions [all in French] can be mentioned: Jacques Le Cacheux’s article in the *Revue* discusses the purposes and methods of tax reform (“[Sustainability and economic justice](#)”), while reviewing what the fundamentals of fiscal policy actually are. Nicolas Delalande conducts a



historical analysis of resistance to tax reform and assesses the constraints on the development and implementation of reform ([“The political economy of tax reform”](#)), all of which seem to be topical subjects today. He stresses that: “Indeed, it may be more difficult to bring together positive support for a measure than to temporarily rally disparate opponents with sometimes conflicting motivations, especially if this involves creating new taxes or affecting established situations.” Mathieu Plane raises the question of the consequences of a tax increase (which did indeed occur in 2012-2013): “In a context of rising unemployment, will it be possible to generate a new large-scale fiscal shock without plunging France into a new crisis? The determination to reduce public deficits solely through structural adjustment is hurting growth and unemployment” ([“Public finances: towards a new tax increase?”](#)). While the government is now announcing it wants a reform that does not change the tax burden, the question of the impact of fiscal adjustments (this time through cuts in public spending) on growth and, ultimately, the social acceptability of a structural reform of the tax system is still posed for the period 2014-2017. Will the government be able to implement a structural reform in a context where unemployment is high and not falling?

The merger of the CSG tax and income tax raises a number of questions that were already discussed in an article in the *Revue de l'OFCE* in 2007 ([“Towards the merging of income tax and the CSG?”](#)). The legislature needs to decide the issue of either joint taxation of spouses or individualisation for the merged tax as well as how to take children into account ([“Should the family quotient be defended?”](#)). This is a particularly sensitive topic, as it affects the representation of the family and the relationship between the State and the family. It has been the subject of controversy even within the OFCE ([“Reforming the marital quotient”](#), [“In defence of the family quotient”](#)).



By intermingling private interests (what charges for which households?) and social interests (what instruments for what purpose?), the tax issue has always been at the centre of democratic debate. The role of the OFCE is to contribute to this debate with solid arguments backed by data. OFCE researchers will continue to offer their own vision of a “good” tax reform, while discussing its objectives, impact and sustainability in a transparent and rigorous fashion.

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# Reforming the conjugal quotient

By [Guillaume Allègre](#) and [Hélène Périvier](#)

As part of a review of family benefit programmes ([the motivations for which are in any case debatable](#)), the government has announced plans to reduce the cap on the family quotient benefit in the calculation of income tax (IR) from 2014. The tax benefit associated with the presence of dependent children in the household will be reduced from 2000 to 1500 euros per half share. Opening discussion on the family quotient should provide an opportunity for a more general review of how the family is taken into account in the calculation of income tax, and in particular the taxation of couples.

## How are couples taxed today?

In France, joint taxation is mandatory for married couples and civil partners (and their children), who thus form part of one and the same household. It is assumed that members of a

household pool their resources fully, regardless of who actually contributes them. By assigning two tax shares to these couples, the progressive tax scale is applied to the couple's average revenue  $[(R1 + R2) / 2]$ . When the two spouses earn similar incomes, the marital quotient does not provide any particular advantage. In contrast, when the two incomes are very unequal, joint taxation provides a tax advantage over separate taxation.

In some configurations, separate taxation is more advantageous than joint taxation; this is due partly to the particular way that the employment bonus and tax reduction [1] operates, and to the fact that separate taxation can be used to optimize the allocation of the children between the two tax households, which by construction does not permit joint taxation. Tax optimization is complex, because it is relatively opaque to the average taxpayer. Nevertheless, in most cases, marriage (or a "PACS" civil partnership) provides a tax benefit: 60% of married couples and civil partners pay less tax than if they were taxed separately, with an average annual gain of 1840 euros, while 21% would benefit from separate taxation, which would save them an average of 370 euros ([Eidelman, 2013](#)).

### **Why grant this benefit just to married couples and civil partners?**

The marital quotient is based on the principle that resources are fully pooled by the couple. The private contract agreed between two people through marriage or a PACS constitutes a "guarantee" of this sharing. In addition, the marriage contract is subject to a maintenance obligation between spouses, which binds them beyond the wedding to share part of their resources. However, the Civil Code does not link "marriage" to the "full pooling" of resources between spouses. Article 214 of the Civil Code provides that spouses shall contribute towards the expenses of the marriage "in proportion to their respective abilities", which amounts to recognizing that the spouses' abilities to contribute may be unequal.

Since 1985, Article 223 has established the principle of the free enjoyment of earned income, which reinforces the idea that marriage does not mean that the spouses share the same standard of living: “each spouse is free to practice a profession, to collect earnings and wages and to spend them after paying the costs of the marriage”. The professional autonomy of the spouses and the right to dispose of their wages and salaries are fully recognized in the Civil Code, whereas the Tax Code is limited to an overview of the couple’s income and expenditures.

In addition, there is some dissonance between the social and the tax treatment of couples. The amount of the RSA benefit [income support] paid to a couple is the same whether they are married or common-law partners. As for the increased RSA paid to single mothers with children, being single means living without a spouse, including a common law partner. Cohabitation is a situation recognized by the social system as involving the pooling of resources, but not by the tax system.

### **Do couples actually pool their resources?**

Empirical studies show that while married couples tend to actually pool all their income more than do common-law partners, this is not the case of everyone: in 2010, 74% of married couples reported that they pooled all their resources, but only 30% of PACS partners and 37% of common-law couples. Actual practice depends greatly on what there is to share: while 72% of couples in the lowest income quartile report pooling their resources fully, this is the case for only 58% of couples in the highest quartile ([Ponthieux, 2012](#)). The higher the level of resources, the less the couple pools them. Complete pooling is thus not as widespread as assumed: spouses do not necessarily share exactly the same standard of living.

### **Capacity to contribute and number of tax shares allocated**

The tax system recognizes that resources are pooled among

married couples and civil partners, and assigns them two tax shares. The allocation of these tax shares is based on the principle of ability to pay, which must be taken into account to be consistent with the principle of equality before taxation: in other words, the objective is to tax the standard of living rather than income *per se*. For a single person and a couple with the same incomes, the singleton has a higher standard of living than the couple, but due to the benefits of married life it is not twice as high. To compare the living standards of households of different sizes, equivalence scales have been estimated ([Hourriez and Olier, 1997](#)). The INSEE allocates a 1.5 share (or consumption unit) to couples and a 1 share to single people: so according to this scale, a couple with a disposable income of 3000 euros has the same standard of living as a single person with an income of 2000 euros. However, the marital quotient assigns two shares to married couples but one to the single person. It underestimates by 33% the standard of living of couples relative to single people, and therefore they are not taxed on their actual ability to contribute.

Moreover, once again there is an inconsistency between the treatment of couples by social policy and by fiscal policy: social security minima take into account the economies of scale associated with married life in accordance with the equivalence scales. The base RSA (*RSA socle*) received by a couple (725 euros) is 1.5 times greater than that received by a single person (483 euros). There is an asymmetry in the treatment of spouses depending on whether they belong to the top of the income scale and are subject to income tax, or to the bottom of the income scale and receive means-tested social benefits.

### **What family norms are encapsulated in the marital quotient?**

The marital quotient was designed in 1945 in accordance with a certain family norm, that of Monsieur Gagnepain and Madame Aufoyer ["Mr Breadwinner and Ms Housewife"]. It contributed

together with other family programmes to encouraging this type of family organization, *i.e.* the one deemed desirable. Until 1982, tax was based solely on the head of the family, namely the man, with the woman viewed as the man's responsibility. But far from being a burden on her husband, the wife produced a free service through the domestic work she performed. This home production (the care and education of children, cleaning, cooking, etc.) has an economic value that is not taxed. Single earner couples are thus the big winners in this system, which gives them an advantage over dual earner couples, who must pay for outsourcing part of the household and family work.

In summary, the current joint taxation system leads to penalizing single persons and common-law couples compared to married couples and civil partners, and to penalizing dual-earner couples compared to single-earner couples. The very foundations of the system are unfavourable to the economic liberation of women.

### **What is to be done?**

The real situation of families today is multiple (marriage, cohabitation, etc.) and in motion (divorce, remarriage or new partnerships, blended families); women's activity has profoundly changed the situation in the field. While all couples do not pool their resources, some do, totally or partially, whether married or in common law unions. Should we take this into account? If yes, how should this be done in light of the multiplicity of forms of union and the way they constantly change? This is the challenge we face [in reforming the family norms and principles that underpin the welfare state](#). Meanwhile, some changes and rebalancing could be achieved.

Currently, the benefit from joint taxation is not capped by law. It can go up to 19,000 euros per year (for incomes above 300,000 euros, an income level subject to the highest tax

bracket) and even to almost 32,000 euros (for incomes above 1,000,000 euros) if you include the benefit of joint taxation for the exceptional contribution on very high incomes. For comparison, we note that the maximum amount of the increase in the RSA for a couple compared to a person living alone is 2900 euros per year. The ceiling on the family quotient (QF), which is clear, is 1500 euros per half share. A cap on the marital quotient of 3000 euros (twice the cap on the QF) would affect only the wealthiest 20% of households (income of over 55,000 euros per year for a single-earner couple with two children). At this income level, it is likely that the benefit from joint taxation is related to an inequality in income that is the result of specialization (full or not) between the spouses in market and non-market production or that resources are not fully shared between the partners.

Another complementary solution would be to leave it up to every couple to choose between a joint declaration and separate declarations, and in accordance with the consumption scales commonly used to accord the joint declaration only 1.5 shares instead of 2 as today. The tax authorities could calculate the most advantageous solution, as households do not always choose the right option for them.

A genuine reform requires starting a broader debate about taking family solidarity into account in the tax-benefit system. In the meantime, these solutions would rebalance the system and turn away from a norm that is contrary to gender equality. At a time when the government is looking for room for fiscal maneuvering, why prohibit changing the taxation of couples?

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[\[1\]](#) A tax reduction [*décote*] is applied to the tax on households with a low gross tax (less than 960 euros). As the reduction is calculated per household and does not depend on the number of persons included in the household, it is

relatively more favourable for singles than for couples. It helps ensure that single people working full time for the minimum wage are not taxable. For low-income earners, the reduction thus compensates the fact that single persons are penalized by the marital quotient. No similar mechanism is provided for high-income earners.

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## **Replacing the “Prime pour l’emploi” benefit by a reduction in employee social security contributions on low wages**

By [Guillaume Allègre](#)

Nicolas Sarkozy has announced plans to replace the “prime pour l’emploi” benefit (“PPE”) by lowering the social security contributions of workers earning between 1 and 1.3 times the minimum wage (“SMIC”). The reduction on contributions would amount to 4 billion euros and would benefit 7 million low-wage workers. The gain announced (just under 1,000 euros per year) would necessarily be regressive. The elimination of the PPE (2.8 billion euros according to the [2012 Budget Bill](#), p. 76) would be supplemented by higher taxes on financial income.

This proposal is very similar to the original proposal of the Jospin government in 2000 that provided for a reduction on the CSG social contribution for workers earning less than 1.4 times the SMIC. That reform, which was passed by Parliament, was blocked by the Conseil constitutionnel because the decline



in the CSG provided to low-income earners depended on wages alone, and not on individual family circumstances. As the CSG is considered a tax, the high court held that progressivity required taking into account taxpayers' ability to pay, and therefore their family responsibilities. To deal with this ruling, the Jospin government created a new instrument, the PPE benefit, which closely resembled the CSG reduction, but which was calculated, to a very small extent, on the family situation (high income ceiling at the household level, with a small increase for children). But unlike the CSG reduction, the impact of the PPE does not show up on the pay-slip: the benefit is calculated from income tax returns and reduces the tax payable by the household, with households who do not pay tax receiving a cheque from the Treasury. This means that there is a one-year lag in the receipt of the benefit. The PPE was approved by the Jospin government and then increased under the Villepin and Raffarin governments, and by 2008 amounted to 4.5 billion euros ([2010 Budget Bill](#), p. 53). At that point a full-time employee on the minimum wage received 1,040 euros per year. The PPE was then frozen by the Fillon government. This freeze, together with the fact that the RSA benefit was deductible from the PPE benefit, led to a 1.7 billion euro reduction in the value of the PPE between 2008 and 2012, from 4.4 billion euros to 2.8 billion. By 2012, a full-time employee on the minimum wage now received only 825 euros a year. Moreover, the lack of a boost in the minimum wage has greatly reduced the number of households eligible for the full rate (as well as the number of employees eligible for the full-rate reduction on employer contributions). This effect comes on top of the impact of rising unemployment, which is reducing the number of eligible employees. A 4-billion euro scheme, for which the maximum gain would be just under 1,000 euros, would amount to a little less than the PPE did in 2008. If we add in the cost of the RSA income supplement (1.6 billion in 2012), and if we take into account the previous RMI and API-related incentive schemes (600 million), we conclude that these various support mechanisms for low-income employees

would total 5.6 billion euros in 2012, against 5.1 billion in 2008, an increase that barely exceeds inflation: the new policies that have been proposed since 2008 have been funded mainly by shuffling instruments targeted at the same population.

The replacement of the PPE by a reduction in social contributions would represent progress in administrative terms, since the government would cease to levy contributions and then repay a smaller tax credit to the same people 6 to 12 months later. The benefit of lowering contributions would be immediate and strongly linked to employment. This would also clarify the fact that low-paid employees are contributors to and not beneficiaries of social assistance. The proposed merger of the CSG tax and income tax (with the PPE as one element) has precisely the same goal. This reform nevertheless raises several questions. What would happen if the Constitutional Council were approached? And, employees working part-time currently benefit from an increase in the PPE; will this be renewed?