Current account imbalances are at the heart of the process that led to the crisis in the euro zone starting in 2009. The initial years of the euro, up to the crisis of 2007-2008, were a period that saw widening imbalances between the countries of the so-called North (or the core) and those of the South (or the periphery) of Europe, as can be seen in Figure 1. Continue reading “Major adjustments are awaiting the euro zone”
By Cédric Durand (Université Paris 13), and Sébastien Villemot
When it was introduced at the turn of the millennium, the euro was widely perceived as a major achievement for Europe. The apparent economic successes, coupled with cross-country convergence of several economic indicators, fueled this sentiment of success. A couple of years later, the picture looks dramatically different. The world financial crisis has revealed imbalances that have led to the sovereign debt crisis and brought the euro area on the verge of dislocation. The austerity policies that became the norm on the continent in 2011 fueled a protracted stagnation, with growth rates that look bleak in comparison to the United States and the United Kingdom.
This economic underperformance has fueled popular resentment against the euro, now seen by a growing number of European people as the problem rather than the solution. The financial community itself seems to be prepared to the possibility of an exit or a dissolution of the single currency by cutting back on cross-border positions. Greece was on the verge to leave in 2015. And the intellectual mood is also shifting: leading thinkers, such as US economist Joseph Stiglitz, or German Sociologist Wolfgang Streeck are among the most visible figures of a wider change of attitude. Continue reading “Balance sheets effects of a euro break-up”
Between 2007 and 2015, Greece’s public debt rose from 103% to 179%  of its GDP (see chart below). The debt-to-GDP ratio rose at an uninterrupted pace, except for a 12-point fall in 2012 following the restructuring imposed on private creditors, and despite the implementation of two macroeconomic adjustment programs (and the beginning of a third) that were aimed precisely at redressing the Greek government’s accounts. Austerity has plunged the country into a recessionary and deflationary spiral, making it difficult if not impossible to reduce the debt. The question of a further restructuring is now sharply posed. Continue reading “Why can’t Greece get out of debt?”
… La même nuit que la nuit d’avant […The same night as the night before
Les mêmes endroits deux fois trop grands The same places, twice too big
T’avances comme dans des couloirs You walk through the corridors
Tu t’arranges pour éviter les miroirs You try to avoid the mirrors
Mais ça continue encore et encore … But it just goes on and on…]
Just hours before an exceptional EU summit on Greece, an agreement could be signed that would lead to a deal on the second bail-out package for Greece, releasing the final tranche of 7.2 billion euros. Greece could then meet its deadlines in late June with the IMF (1.6 billion euros) as well as those in July and August with the ECB (6.6 billion euros) and again with the IMF (0.45 billion euros). At the end of August, Greece’s debt to the IMF could rise by almost 1.5 billion euros, as the IMF is contributing 3.5 billion euros to the 7.2 billion euro tranche.
Greece has to repay a total of 8.6 billion euros by September, and nearly 12 billion by the end of the year, which means funding needs that exceed the 7.2 billion euros covered by the negotiations with the Brussels Group (i.e. the ex-Troika). To deal with this, the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF) could be used, to the tune of about 10 billion euros, but it will no longer be available for recapitalizing the banks. Continue reading “Greece: an agreement, again and again”
This text draws on the special study, Équations d’investissement : une comparaison internationale dans la crise [Investment equations : an international comparison during the crisis], which accompanies the 2015-2016 Forecast for the euro zone and the rest of the world.
The collapse in growth following the subprime crisis in late 2008 resulted in a decline in corporate investment, the largest since World War II in the advanced economies. The stimulus packages and accommodative monetary policies implemented in 2009-2010 nevertheless managed to halt the collapse in demand, and corporate investment rebounded significantly in every country up to the end of 2011. But since 2011 investment has followed varied trajectories in the different countries, as can be seen in the differences between, on the one hand, the United States and the United Kingdom, and on the other the euro zone countries, Italy and Spain in particular. At end 2014, business investment was still 27% below its pre-crisis peak in Italy, 23% down in Spain, 7% in France and 3% in Germany. In the US and the UK, business investment was 7% and 5% higher than the pre-crisis peaks (Figure). Continue reading “Investment behaviour during the crisis: a comparative analysis of the main advanced economies”
Since early 2015, Greece’s new government has been facing intense pressure. At the very time that it is negotiating to restructure its debt, it is also facing a series of repayment deadlines. On 12 May 2015, 750 million euros was paid to the IMF by drawing on the country’s international reserves, a sign that liquidity constraints are becoming more and more pressing, as is evidenced by the letter sent by Alex Tsipras to Christine Lagarde a few days before the deadline. The respite will be short: in June, the country has to make another payment to the IMF for 1.5 billion euros. These first two deadlines are only a prelude to the “wall of debt” that the government must deal with in the summer when it faces repayments of 6.5 billion euros to the ECB. Continue reading “Greece on a tightrope”