1

Can students evaluate teaching quality objectively?

By Anne Boring, OFCE-PRESAGE-Sciences Po and LEDa-DIAL, www.anneboring.com.

The author will present her work at the International Symposium on Gender Bias in the Governance and Evaluation of Research Bodies organized by the EGERA (Effective Gender Equality in Research and the Academia), which will take place on 23 February 2015 at Sciences Po, on the CERI premises in Paris.

Anglo-American universities generally rely on the evaluation of teaching by students to measure teaching quality. They hypothesize that students are the best placed to judge the quality of teaching in that they observe the teachers throughout a course. The evaluations usually serve two purposes. First, they are used as a tool for pedagogical management for the teachers themselves, by providing them with suggestions for improving their teaching; and second, these evaluations are also often used by the administration to make decisions about promotions or the extension of teaching contracts. The evaluations then act as incentives: they encourage teachers to give the best of themselves so as to be rehired the following semester or to obtain a promotion.

In France, the practice of evaluating teaching is still not very widespread, but many higher education institutions are planning to develop it. Some private schools already use it in their recruitment policy or to extend the contracts of supply teachers. As for the public institutions, they use the evaluations of teaching only to help teachers improve their pedagogical methods. Public institutions are obliged to comply with a directive from the French Ministry of Higher Education and Research which states that “evaluation results” can be disclosed “only to the teacher concerned and not the head teacher or principal of the institution”.[1] This Directive upholds a 1997 decision of the French State Council, which indicates that the procedure for evaluating teaching should “simply allow teachers to have a better understanding of how the educational dimensions of their teaching are appreciated by the students”, and “it does not include or imply any impact on teachers’ prerogatives or careers”. Thus, only the teacher concerned may have “knowledge of the elements of this type of evaluation”.[2]

Regardless of whether the end use of this supervisory tool is the improvement of teaching or the management of the teaching teams, universities need to be sure that student evaluations are an objective measure of the quality of teaching. To do this, at least three conditions need to be verified:

1) that the students know how to measure the quality of teaching, that is to say, they are able both to establish criteria that define teaching quality and to use these criteria to judge the teacher;

2) that the students are not biased in their judgments and assessments; and

3) that the teachers cannot adopt strategic behaviours to secure good evaluations; in other words, that efforts to obtain good evaluations do not lead teachers to engage in behaviour that could undermine educational quality.

Do students know how to judge the quality of teaching? (Condition 1)

What teacher has not been in a discussion with colleagues where everyone defended his or her own teaching method as being “the best”? These discussions generally centre on the content of teaching and how to transmit this content, as well as on different ways to check on students’ learning. It is not easy to determine the criteria that define good teaching quality, and the professionals themselves disagree. Yet the system of evaluation assumes that students are able to do this to some extent at least.

In the students’ view, what criteria are important for determining the quality of teaching? The literature suggests that students believe that one essential criterion is the teacher’s extroversion and dynamism, that is, their ability to capture attention (e.g. Radmacher and Martin, 2001). Several research studies tend to confirm that students seem to give priority to how a lesson is taught, rather than to the educational quality or the content what is being taught.

Consider the “Doctor Fox” effect (Naftulin, Ware and Donnelly, 1973), which makes reference to friendly teachers who can get good ratings by giving the impression of being competent, without however teaching relevant or good-quality content. In this example, which is well known in the United States, researchers hired an actor to teach a lesson on a fictitious subject. The course featured numerous neologisms and meaningless assertions, and the idea of ​​the three researchers who hired the actor was to determine whether people attending it were able to detect this without being blinded by the lecturer’s flair, self-assurance and academic authority (he was given a false resumé: a full range of prestigious fake diplomas and fake research papers). At the end of Dr. Myron Fox’s course, those who attended gave him a positive evaluation. This experience shows first that the students’ perception of a teacher’s academic authority matters, and, second, that students are not always able to judge the content of what is taught.

Likewise, according to Carrell and West (2010), the perception that students have of teaching quality is not necessarily correlated with the actual quality of the course, when the latter is measured by long-term success. These authors show that evaluations are correlated positively with the students’ short-term success, but not with longer-term success. Their results suggest that teachers whose pedagogical techniques encourage cramming might be better assessed than teachers who use more demanding and difficult teaching techniques but promote the long-term learning of knowledge. Indeed, students are often primarily concerned with their success on final exams, rather than the future usefulness of the knowledge acquired during the semester. Universities need to develop incentives for teachers to use teaching methods that promote long-term learning, methods that do not always seem to be rewarded by students in their evaluations.

Are students’ judgements on teacher quality unbiased? (Condition 2)

The evaluation of skills can be subject to bias on the part of the evaluators. The literature on social psychology in particular suggests that it is more difficult for people from minority backgrounds to be perceived as competent (even if they are), while it is more difficult for people from majority backgrounds to be perceived as incompetent (even if they are). Stereotypes and double standards for evaluation have an impact once it comes to determining individual competence (e.g. Basow, Phelan and Capotosto, 2006; Foschi, 2000). This impact can have especially negative consequences for certain minorities, in particular women university professors, who are still in a minority.

A study of evaluations by freshmen at a French higher education institution [3] showed that students do in fact apply many gender stereotypes in the way that they assess their teachers. The results of this econometric analysis show that male students tend to give better evaluations to male professors than to females. Male professors on average benefited from a bias on the part of male students in almost all the dimensions of teaching, in particular the quality of the presentation, the ability to be in touch with the latest developments, and participation in the student’s intellectual development. The female students also tend to evaluate men more favourably on these criteria, but give more favourable evaluations to women on other teaching dimensions, including the preparation and organization of the lessons, the usefulness of the class materials, the clarity of their evaluation criteria and the relevance of their corrective comments. The bias in the responses of the male and female students in favour of men on the criteria related to the presentation of the lessons in particular led to higher overall satisfaction scores for the male professors. However, other measures of teaching quality (such as exam results) tend to show that the education provided by women was as good as that provided by men. Furthermore, some teaching tasks for which women professors were more highly valued (only by women students) tend to be time-consuming. The women professors then find themselves with less time for other professional activities, such as research, for example.

Do teachers adopt strategic behaviours that undermine teaching quality (Condition 3)

Finally, numerous studies show that teachers can adopt strategic behaviours to improve their scores. Indeed, with the introduction of student evaluations, teachers are faced with the problem of the multitasking agent (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Neal, 2013): they must teach well, while getting good evaluations – goals that are not necessarily compatible, as Carrell and West (2010) demonstrate. The two strategic behaviours studied in the literature are a teacher’s capacity for demagogy (the Dr. Fox effect), on the one hand, and generosity in scoring student work, on the other. Although there is no consensus as to the causal link between good scores given by teachers and good ratings given by students, it has been shown that the two are correlated (e.g. Isely and Singh, 2005).

Conclusion

Evaluations by students do not seem to meet the three conditions for an objective measurement of teaching quality. The question can also be raised as to whether the nature of educational activity can be measured objectively at all. But does this mean we should not set up systems for student evaluations? These evaluations can be useful, but they should be interpreted with caution and be taken for what in all likelihood they actually are: a measure of the pleasure that students have in going to the lesson rather than a single, objective measure of the overall quality of teaching. The pleasure that a student feels in going to class is just one ingredient among many in good quality education. It is also necessary to try to take into account and correct the biases that students express in these evaluations by weighting the evaluation criteria so as not to discourage or unfairly penalize certain categories of teachers, especially women, whose evaluations are not as good simply because of gender stereotypes.

logo eu

 

logo egera

 

This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 612413.

 

References

Basow, S. A., Phelan, J. E., & Capotosto, L. (2006). Gender patterns in college students’ choices of their best and worst professors. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 30(1), 25-35.

Carrell, S. E., & West, J. E. (2010). Does Professor Quality Matter? Evidence from Random Assignment of Students to Professors. Journal of Political Economy, 118(3), 409-432.

Foschi, M. (2000). Double standards for competence: Theory and research. Annual Review of Sociology, 21-42.

Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991). Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 24-52.

Isely, P., & Singh, H. (2005). Do higher grades lead to favorable student evaluations?. The Journal of Economic Education, 36(1), 29-42.

Naftulin, D. H., Ware Jr, J. E., & Donnelly, F. A. (1973). The Doctor Fox lecture: A paradigm of educational seduction. Academic Medicine, 48(7), 630-635.

Neal, D. (2013). The consequences of using one assessment system to pursue two objectives. The Journal of Economic Education, 44(4), 339-352.

Radmacher, S. A., & Martin, D. J. (2001). Identifying significant predictors of student evaluations of faculty through hierarchical regression analysis. The Journal of Psychology, 135(3), 259-268.




Financing higher education: Should students have to pay?

By Guillaume Allègre and Xavier Timbeau

Is it necessary to ensure that a greater portion of the cost of higher education is borne by students in the form of higher tuition fees, which might or might not be coupled with loans? It is often argued that financing higher education through taxes is anti-redistributive. We show in a working document that from a life cycle perspective proportional taxation is not anti-redistributive.

While raising higher education fees is not on the political agenda in France, it is a subject of intense fighting, not only in Quebec, but also in Spain and Great Britain, where student protests erupted at the end of 2010. Reports in France regularly propose raising tuition fees: recently (2011), in a note by the Institut de l’Entreprise [in French] on the role of business in financing higher education, Pierre-André Chiappori proposes “lifting the taboo on tuition fees”. In a contribution to Terra Nova [in French] published in 2011, Yves Lichtenberger and Alexandre Aïdara propose raising annual university tuition fees by about 1000 euros. Paradoxically, the authors also propose creating a study allowance that could be used anytime in a person’s life. The authors are attempting to deal with two contradictory economic dynamics. On the one hand, a study allowance would help raise the general level of education, a factor in innovation and growth, while simultaneously fighting against social self-selection in higher education:
In countries that have adopted it [the study allowance], disadvantaged social strata may have an opportunity to undertake lengthier studies even though their social origins have predestined them to short-term courses that provide quick entry into salaried employment. This is an important means of raising the general level of education and the qualifications of young people, which is a central concern of this report. (Lichtenberger and Aïdara, p.82)
But on the other hand, education benefits better-off strata, and being free makes it anti-redistributive:
The fact that public higher education is virtually free leads, first, to a transfer of resources (the public cost of education) to young people who are in education the longest. This overwhelmingly means young people from better-off strata. This transfer is reflected ultimately in private returns to the beneficiaries: higher wages and then pensions, which benefit the most highly educated throughout their lives…. As things stand, higher education’s free character has no redistributive value and even aggravates inequalities. (Lichtenberger and Aïdara, p.84)
Indeed, even if the anti-redistributive character of free higher education is not the only argument made by advocates of higher tuition, it is one of their main arguments. This argument relies on a static and familialist vision of redistribution. We adopt a life cycle perspective instead.
As highlighted in the second excerpt above, on average the beneficiaries of education spending enjoy a significant private benefit: they will have higher wages and pensions throughout their lives. Even assuming that tax (on income) is proportional to income (which is not the case: in reality, it is progressive), they will pay much more tax, in absolute terms, than individuals who have completed shorter studies. Above all, tax allows for the financing of education by individuals who actually receive significant private benefits, and in proportion to this benefit. People who suffer discrimination in the labour market or who were oriented towards less profitable sectors and benefit from low returns to education reimburse society a lesser amount through their taxes than those who benefit more. Financing through income tax leads people with higher incomes to contribute even when they have not had a lengthy education. The injustice would therefore lie in the transfer between persons with high incomes who are not highly educated and those who are highly educated. But if education is characterized to a great extent by significant social returns, thanks to its impact on growth (see Aghion and Cohen), then people with high incomes are actually beneficiaries of spending on education, whether or not they are highly educated themselves (for instance, self-taught entrepreneurs benefit from the availability of skilled labour).
Adopting a life cycle perspective, we show in a working document that financing spending on non-compulsory education (beyond 16 years) by a proportional tax represents a net transfer from those with higher incomes during their careers to those with lower incomes during their careers. From a life cycle perspective, free non-compulsory education financed by taxes does not benefit individuals with more affluent parents (the transfer from individuals from better-off households to those from poorer households is not significantly different from zero). If individuals from the poorest households react to the increase in tuition fees by reducing their investment in education, even when this is financed by loans, then there can be little doubt that they will be the first victims of this type of reform. Advocates of tuition increases generally argue for small increases in tuition fees and exemptions based on means-testing the parents. But recent developments in Australia, the United Kingdom and Canada show that, once the fees have been introduced, it is difficult to prevent governments that are seeking new funds from increasing the fees and reducing the exemption thresholds.
In higher education, the leading injustice is the lack of access to people from modest backgrounds. The surest way to ensure equity in education is still to fund it through income tax and to reform education so that it is targeted at academic success for all rather than at selection.