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THE ORGANIZATION OF BEHAVIOUR

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**Word-of-Mouth Interaction and the Organization of Behaviour**

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**Abstract**

We present a discrete choice model based on agent interaction. The framework combines the features of two well-known models of word-of-mouth communication (Ellison and Fudenberg, 1995 and Bala and Goyal, 2001). Interaction structure is a regular periodic lattice with decision-makers interacting only with immediate neighbours. We investigate the long-run (equilibrium) behaviour of the resulting system and show that for a large range of initial conditions clustering in economic behaviour emerges and persists indefinitely. The setup allows for the analysis of multi-option environments. For these environments we derive the distribution of option popularity in equilibrium.

**Key Words:** Word-of-mouth · Inertia · Clustering · Choice

**JEL classification:** D83

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1 Introduction

Many choices are made in the face of incomplete or uncertain information. Properties and performance of many goods or services are not completely known when agents must choose among them. In this case, information gathering, the processes agents use to find information, the structures over which information flows and the types of information transmitted can be central in understanding system behaviour.

Many studies in both psychology and marketing have shown that social contacts are the sources of the richest, least corrupt, and most trusted information (Hansen, 1972; Myers and Robertson, 1972; Gershoff and Johar, 2006). It also seems to be the case that information transmitted through social contacts, as opposed to more formal sources, is not retained in detail. Rather, the messages passed are typically stored by the recipient as general impressions, such as the overall quality of the good, or how it compares with other, related goods (Wyer and Srull, 1989; Park and Wyer, 1993). Through this word-of-mouth communication, agents receive from each other information about general rankings of the various options.

In this paper we consider repeated choice situations where agents choose, and revise their choices, among a fixed set of alternatives. These alternatives could be substitute goods, competing technologies, political parties or other situations in which a discrete choice among a finite set of mutually exclusive alternatives is present. We analyze the setup in which agents transmit and receive subjective evaluations of the options, from social contacts through word-of-mouth communication. We are interested in the distribution of choices over the population: whether more than one option can survive in the long run; whether choices are clustered in the social space; and how “market shares” are distributed in equilibrium.

In our model agents are non-strategic: the experienced value of an option does not depend in any way on the behaviour of other agents, so strategic manipulation of others’ choices is not relevant. Our concern rather is with how agents’ behaviour
changes, and in what patterns it organizes, as a result of their collective experience. We show that under some conditions choices homogenize over time; under others, heterogeneity is preserved. What determines the properties of long run outcomes is the relative weights agents put on own versus others’ experience in updating their valuations of options. As a consequence the model we develop is generalizable to a variety of situations involving the organization of choices in social space. The model imposes a social communication structure, but the structure of behaviour is emergent and self-organized. We derive the structure of behaviour over space, showing conditions under which multiple options co-exist, and conditions under which we observe (spatial) clustering in choices. Additionally, in particular cases we are able to derive the long run popularity of the different options, which can be interpreted as market shares. In particular we show that market shares can be highly skewed, with small niches of one option coexisting with other options that have dominant market shares. The model also explains the sudden emergence and growth (even to a dominant position) of a particular behaviour in neighbourhoods that have never exhibited that behaviour in the past.

Word-of-mouth communication has received attention in the literature, but it has been common to model it using random interaction models (e.g. Ahn and Suominen, 2001; Ellison and Fudenberg, 1995; Rob and Fishman, 2005), where every period agents are randomly matched to interact. This approach tends to ignore one salient feature of social interaction, namely that social networks, the infrastructure over which word-of-mouth communication takes place, are relatively stable over time. This implies that the typical agent will interact repeatedly with the same (small number of) agents. This is the structure we adopt, in common with Bala and Goyal (2001). Bala and Goyal show that when social learning is the source for agents to update their beliefs about the value of options, even if the society is fully connected, word-of-mouth communication can result in diversity of choices among homogenous agents both when options are homogeneous (of the same intrinsic quality) and when they are heterogeneous (Bala and Goyal, 1998; 2001). What drives the preservation of diversity is the possibility that agents
with similar preferences communicate more intensely among themselves than with agents possessing different preferences.

One of the attractions to consumers of word-of-mouth communication is the variety in the type of information it can transmit. For our concern in particular, it can be used to transmit information about un-used alternatives. This feature has been left largely unexplored in the literature. Although Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004) allude to it, they model a different characteristic, which is the fact that only small (and perhaps the most important) bits of information are transferred through word-of-mouth. In our model we allow agents to pass on information that they have obtained from others, but have had no chance to verify. We refer to this below as the transmission of “rumours”.

This is in contrast to much of the literature, both on information cascades (Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Banerjee, 1992), where only actual choices are observed, and on social learning (Bjonerstedt and Weibull, 1995; Ellison and Fudenberg, 1995; Schlag, 1998), where agents transmit information only about their current choices. Because our agents have this richer communication channel, the proposed framework can account for the sudden emergence of a practice in neighbourhoods with no prior history of that behaviour. This is clearly not possible with the common assumption of “must-see-to-adopt”.

Inertia, the tendency for agents to repeat their actions period after period, even in the face of arguments that change could be an improvement, is both observed empirically (Pope et al., 1980; Chintagunta, 1998; Arnade et al., 2008), and is present in many repeated-choice models. In Ellison and Fudenberg (1995), among others, inertia exists at the system level, driven by the fact that only a small proportion of the population can revise its choices at any moment. In our model inertia is also present, but it exists at the individual level. Here, inertia arises due to habituation. This is not the habituation or “learning to consume” in general (Witt, 2001), but rather habituation towards one option. These habits

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1It is important to distinguish between these rumours and rumors as understood by Banerjee (1993). In the latter case rumours diffuse only through practices, while the essence of the former is the diffusion of information that has not been verified by the experience of the sender.
are called “deep habits” in economic literature (Ravn et al., 2006). They may arise for several reasons. For example, as a consumer uses a product she develops brand loyalty, or skill in use, and so her subjective valuation of the product/option increases with use. This creates inertia in individual choices, which can be translated into inertia at the system level. Inertia arising at the individual level and tends to reinforce the present distribution of choice practices. It creates an obstacle for the interaction process which tends towards homogenization of choices across the society.

As is common in models of this sort, assuming perfectly rational agents would be making a very strong assumption about agents’ abilities to perform complex calculations in a changing environment. Consequently, following the tradition in the literature (Ellison and Fudenberg, 1993; 1995; and Bala and Goyal 2001) we assume that agents use simplified choice heuristics. The heuristic we adopt is similar to that used in the discrete choice literature (Anderson et al., 1992) in which agents make probabilistic choices where the probability of selecting a particular option is an increasing function of the agent’s subjective evaluation of that option. This assumption regarding agents’ choices permits considerable simplification of the modelling and subsequent analysis.

Modeling interactions often involves the communication, from one agent to another, of the returns to a given action. However, in some situations returns can change over time, in an exogenous and/or random manner. In other situations, returns can be uncertain even after the action has taken place (if for example the stream of returns is stretched over time and continues after the information transfer has taken place). Hence, communication of returns is not always feasible or meaningful. Therefore, we propose a model wherein agents exchange subjective valuations rather than objective data on returns.\(^2\)

In our model an option is as good as it is perceived to be by the society.\(^2\)

\(^2\)Additionally, agents can have subjective valuations on goods they have not experienced, based, for example, on what they have been told by their neighbours. Communication of this type of information, which by definition cannot be “objective” data on returns, is a central part of the model.
Thus, because there are no objective payoffs to options, we cannot discuss the social optimality of the outcomes, which has been one of the main concerns of the literature. However, this feature of the model presents two significant advantages. One is that it permits us to derive stronger and more detailed results on the organization of behaviour. Previous work has obtained results on equilibrium frequency distributions over options (e.g. Ellison and Fudenberg, 1995; Bala and Goyal, 1998). In addition to replicating macroscopic results such as frequency distributions, we are able to discuss microscopic features of the economy such as the behaviour of agents located in certain environments. In particular, we are able to show that in certain cases agents located close to each other will behave similarly. In contrast to Bala and Goyal (2001), who obtain similar results, we show that this type of clustering can occur even when every agent has the same degree of social embeddedness.

The second advantage of our approach is that it permits a straightforward extension of the two-option model to a multi-option environment. Modeling inertia and the diffusion of rumors at the same time allows us to separate the dynamics of the valuation profile (across the population of agents) of one option from the dynamics of the valuation profile of all the other options. Therefore, in contrast to previous work (in particular with Bala and Goyal, 2001), extension to a case of choice among multiple options does not create any particular difficulty.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 presents the main results for the two-option environment. Section 4 presents results in case of multiple options. Section 5 discusses the implications of modeling rumors. And section 6 concludes.

2 The model

We consider an economy where at the start of each period, based on her current valuations, each agent chooses one action from available options. Adoption of this option causes a change in her valuation of it. At the end of the period she
socializes with neighbours and passes to them information (that is, her valuations of all options) that she possesses. Based on the information they receive, all agents revise their valuations of the options and use the new valuations as a basis for decisions in the next period.

The economy is inhabited by a large, finite number \((S)\) of agents, indexed by \(s\). Each is a single decision-maker faced with the same fixed, finite set of exclusive options, indexed by \(n\). In each period, each agent chooses one option. The decision is based on the agent’s subjective valuations of every available option. Assume all options have equal cost, so we can omit it from consideration.

Define \(v_{s,n,t}\) as the valuation agent \(s\) ascribes to option \(n\) at time period \(t\) and \(V_s\) as the vector of valuations of all options for agent \(s\) at period \(t\). Agents use rules-of-thumb to choose among the options, given their private valuation vectors. In particular, we assume there exists a function mapping option valuations into choice probabilities. As a consequence we have \(p_{s,n,t} = p(v_{s,n,t})\), the probability that agent \(s\) will choose option \(n\) at time \(t\). We assume that \(\partial p(v_{s,n,t})/\partial v_{s,n,t} > 0\), and that \(\partial p(v_{s,n,t})/\partial v_{j,t} < 0, \forall j \neq n\).

As we argued in the introduction valuations can change over time as a result of the influence of two forces: the agent’s choice history and information the agent receives from others. Assume valuations are separable in these two variables: \(v_{n,t} = x_{n,t} + y_{n,t}\), where \(x_{n,t}\) is represents the agent’s by own choice history (incorporating inertia), and \(y_{n,t}\), the choice history of other agents.

To model word-of-mouth interaction among agents we assume that every decision-maker has a fixed social location and a fixed neighbourhood. A neighbourhood is the set \((H^s)\) of other agents with whom an agent \((s)\) interacts directly. In this context, interaction is tantamount to information exchange. Each information exchange consists of two agents revealing to each other their private evaluations of each of the options. The information revealed is assumed to be “convincing” in the sense that the post-exchange valuations of each of the two agents partially converge. Hence, this exchange process can be expressed simply in terms of the dynamics of beliefs of a single agent, \(s\), following her exchanges
with all of her neighbours, $i$:

$$\Delta y_{ns}^s = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{H}^s} \frac{\mu}{|\mathcal{H}^s|} (v^i_n - v^s_n),$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)$$

where $|\mathcal{H}^s|$ is the cardinality of the set $\mathcal{H}^s$ (number of neighbours of agent $s$), and $\mu (\in [0, 1])$ is the intensity of interaction. We assume that all options are substitutes and there are no ex ante systematic differences among agents, so interaction intensity is the same across all the options and agents.

For concreteness, assume that decision-makers are located on a one-dimensional, regular, periodic lattice such that the distance between any two agents corresponds to the social distance between them, and the distance between immediate neighbours is constant across all the population. In this case we can define the neighbourhood of an agent ($\mathcal{H}^s$) simply by specifying the number of agents ($H^s$) with whom this agent interacts on the left and on the right. Then $|\mathcal{H}^s| = 2H^s$.

Assuming neighbourhood size to be constant across the population, $H^s = H$ $\forall s$, we can write

$$\Delta y_{ns}^s = \mu \frac{2H}{H} \left[ \sum_{h=1}^{H} (v_{n+h}^s - v_n^s) + (v_{n-h}^s - v_n^s) \right],$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)$$

where $s$ can be interpreted as a “serial number” of an agent, or her address (consequently, $s + 1$ and $s - 1$ are her immediate neighbours to the right and left respectively).

Re-arranging, (2) can be rewritten as

$$\Delta y_{ns}^s = \frac{\mu}{2H} \left[ \sum_{h=1}^{H} (v_{n+h}^s + v_{n-h}^s) - 2Hv_n^s \right].$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)$$

Modeling inertia in behaviour is typically done by allowing only a small, randomly selected, part of the population to make choices in any period (e.g. Ellison and Fudenberg, 1993). We introduce a different source of Inertia, internal to the decision-maker: agents form habits for options. This mechanism implies that choices are “sticky” at the individual level. Habits in economics have largely been
understood from a macro prospective. For example, for macroeconomists, habits in consumption mean strong positive autocorrelation in expenditures (e.g. Abel, 1990; Constantinides, 1990). However, in our case we consider forming a habit for one particular choice, and model it as an increment in valuation of the option that has been chosen. This is equivalent to the formation of “strong habits” (Ravn et al., 2006). The economic justification for this kind of behaviour can range from learning particular new features about the option (think about purchasing a sophisticated consumer electronic product) to the fear of disappointment with the new option (consider a large consumer durable from an unknown manufacturer). These sources of inertia are often observed empirically (see, for example, Chintagunta et al., 2001; Arnade et al., 2008).

Formally, we assume that $\Delta x_n^s$ is equal to zero for the options that are not chosen in a given period and is equal to some positive value for the chosen option:

$$
\Delta x_n^s = \begin{cases} 
\omega & \text{if } n \text{ has been chosen} \\
0 & \text{otherwise},
\end{cases}
$$

where $\omega (>0)$ is a constant.

Before we proceed, two comments are in order. Details of behaviour of particular agents are less interesting than system behaviour. For studying the system behaviour it is sufficient to analyze the expected agent behaviour. To solve the model we make an assumption about properties of the valuation updating function, and re-write the model as continuous in time and space. Related research in economics uses both discrete (time-space) and continuous settings for this kind of analysis (see for example Fujita et al., 1999; Quah, 2000, 2002 and Ioanides, 2006), however the equivalence of the approaches has been demonstrated by Turing (1952, sections 6 and 7, pp. 46-50) and Ellis (1985, section V.10, pp. 190-198). Therefore, the transition from discrete to continuous model (and back) is innocuous.

At any moment agent chooses option $n$ with probability $p_n^s$. Thus, the agent’s
valuation dynamics can be described as a Markov process:

$$\Delta x^s_n = \begin{cases} \omega & \text{with probability } p^s_n \\ 0 & \text{with probability } 1 - p^s_n \end{cases}$$

(5)

and the expected change in valuation due to habit formation can be written as:

$$E(\Delta x^s_n) = \omega p_n(V^s_t)$$

(6)

The choice probability for an option $n$ depends on valuations of all available options. However, it is reasonable to assume that the contribution of changes in valuations of options other than $n$ are of second order significance. Consider the effects of an increase in the valuation of option $n$. This will increase its choice probability by $\Delta p_n$. This will also decrease the choice probabilities of all the other options, each by $\Delta p_j$. As probabilities are normalized values it will be the case that $|\Delta p_n| = \sum_{j \neq n} |\Delta p_j|$. If we have a relatively large number of options in the economy, in general it will be true that $\Delta p_n \gg \Delta p_j, \forall j \neq n$. Thus, a change in the valuation of one option will cause a change in its choice probability. It will also cause the changes in choice probabilities of other options, but the size of each of these changes will be considerably smaller. Therefore, we restrict the probability function to satisfy

$$\left| \frac{\partial p_n}{\partial v_n} \right| \gg \left| \frac{\partial p_n}{\partial v_j} \right|,$$

(7)

$$\forall j \neq n.$$

If (7) is satisfied, as a first approximation, we can disregard the effects of lower orders of magnitude and write $p_n(V_t^s) \approx \gamma v^s_{n,t}$. This permits us to write the expected change in $x^s_{n,t}$ as

$$\Delta x^s_n = \alpha v^s_n,$$

(8)

where $\alpha (= \gamma \omega)$ can be interpreted as the rate of habit formation.\(^3\)

\(^3\)Here and in what follows we drop the expectation sign, although it should be remembered
This allows us to write the key equation of our model as

$$\Delta v_s^n = \alpha v_s^n + \frac{\mu}{2H} \left[ \sum_{k=1}^{H} (v_s^{n+h} + v_s^{n-h}) - 2H v_s^n \right].$$  \hspace{1cm} (9)

From (9) it is clear that the law of motion of valuation for every option for any agent depends on the agent’s own valuation of that option, and on the valuations of the agent’s neighbours of that same option.\(^4\)

Before moving to a multi-option environment, to demonstrate the main implications we assume there are only two options in the choice set \((N = 2)\), and that each agent has exactly two neighbours \((H = 1)\). In this case the model reduces to a system of \(S\) pairs of equations of the form

$$\Delta v_s^1 = \alpha v_s^1 + \frac{\mu}{2} (v_s^{1+1} + v_s^{1-1} - 2v_s^1),$$  \hspace{1cm} (10)

$$\Delta v_s^2 = \alpha v_s^2 + \frac{\mu}{2} (v_s^{2+1} + v_s^{2-1} - 2v_s^2),$$  \hspace{1cm} (11)

where \(s = 1, 2, 3, \ldots, S\).

We seek the solution to the system given by (10) - (11). In the two-option system, what drives the dynamics is the difference in the probabilities that each of the options is chosen (by each agent). We can thus re-write the system in terms of the difference in valuations between two options. Define the valuation difference \(z^s = v_s^1 - v_s^2\) and rewrite the system (10)-(11) as

$$\Delta z^s = \alpha z^s + \frac{\mu}{2} (z^{s+1} + z^{s-1} - 2z^s).$$  \hspace{1cm} (12)

Now we assume the population is dense enough on the circle that we can safely use a continuous space approximation. To do this we define a new variable \(\delta\) which is the distance between two neighbouring agents in social space (on a circle). Taking the limit as \(\delta\) goes to zero gives a continuous space, which permits that all the discussion in this section is about the expected values of the variables.

\(^4\)Note that in (9) the valuation of option \(n\) does not depend on the valuations of other options. This is the characteristic of our approach that allows us to analyze the multi-option environment in section 4.
us to treat the agent index as a variable.

Further, due to the way we have modeled inertia in the system, we can also allow agents to make choices with infinite speed and still be sure that inertia remains. This allows us to rewrite the system in continuous time.

The continuous analog of (12) becomes

\[
\frac{\partial z(s)}{\partial t} = \alpha z(s) + \frac{\mu}{2} (z(s + \delta) + z(s - \delta) - 2z(s)) .
\] (13)

A second order Taylor approximation in space around \( s \) for the terms \( z(s + \delta) \) and \( z(s - \delta) \) yields:

\[
z(s + \delta) \approx z(s) + \delta \frac{\partial z(s)}{\partial s} + \frac{\delta^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 z(s)}{\partial s^2},
\] (14)

and

\[
z(s - \delta) \approx z(s) - \delta \frac{\partial z(s)}{\partial s} + \frac{\delta^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 z(s)}{\partial s^2}.
\] (15)

Substituting equations (14) and (15) into equation (13) collapses our system into one partial differential equation

\[
\frac{\partial z}{\partial t} = \alpha z + \tilde{\mu} \frac{\partial^2 z}{\partial s^2},
\] (16)

where \( \tilde{\mu} = \mu \delta^2 / 2. \)

In the following sections we investigate the long run (equilibrium) behaviour of the dynamic system (16).

3 Organization of behaviour

It simplifies the analysis to separate the dynamics of \( z(s; t) \) into the dynamics of the average over the population \( \bar{z}(t) \), and the dynamics of the deviations from

\footnote{Note that making higher order approximations in (14) and (15) will leave only the even number terms in the expression (16). Odd number terms will always cancel out. Thus, the third order term, the one with the order of significance from the omitted terms, can be safely ignored. Taking into account the fourth or higher order terms is not customary to economics.}
this average $\bar{z}(s; t) = z(s; t) - \bar{z}(t)$. With this formalism we can characterize the long-run behaviour of the system by following three lemmas.

**Lemma 1.** At any point in time, $\bar{z}(t)$ can be described by

$$\bar{z}(t) = e^{\alpha t} \bar{z}(0).$$

The proof of Lemma 1 can be found in the appendix A. As $\alpha \geq 0$, Lemma 1 implies that the average difference in option valuations increases or decreases exponentially with time. $\bar{z}(0)$ determines the direction of $\bar{z}(t)$ dynamics. If $\bar{z}(0) > 0$, $\bar{z}(t) \to \infty$, while if $\bar{z}(0) < 0$, $\bar{z}(t) \to -\infty$.

**Lemma 2.** With time, $\tilde{z}(s; t)$ converges to

$$\tilde{z}(s; t) = e^{\sigma t} \cos \left( \frac{2\pi}{l} s \right) \tilde{z}(0; 0),$$

where $l$ is the length of the circle on which decision-makers are placed, while $\sigma$ is the amplitude growth rate and $k (\in \mathbb{Z}_+)$ is the frequency of the sinusoid $\tilde{z}$.\(^6\)

The comprehensive proof of this proposition can be found in Turing (1952); here we give the basic intuition. The general solution to differential equations of type (16) can be represented as the (possibly infinite) sum of exponential functions of the form $A e^{bt}$, where $A$ and $b$ are (possibly complex) coefficients. The real part of each summand in the solution can be represented as a dynamic sinusoid (in our case around the lattice on which agents are located). The real part of each $b$ will be the growth rate of the amplitude of the corresponding sinusoid. As a result, as $t \to \infty$ one summand will dominate all the others. This will be the term with the largest real part of $b$. Consequently the dynamics of the solution will converge to one sinusoid.

\(^6\)Note that as agents are located on a periodic lattice, the identity of agent zero is arbitrary, and thus can be placed anywhere on the circle. To write down proposition 2 we have set label 0 such that $s_0 = \arg \max_{x \in [0, l]} \cos \left( \frac{2\pi}{l} x \right)$, which effectively means that we label agents such that the sinusoid identified in proposition 2 reaches its maximum at agent number zero.
Lemma 3. The growth rate of the amplitude of the dominant sinusoid of system (16) is
\[ \sigma = \alpha - \tilde{\mu}k^2 \left( \frac{2\pi}{l} \right)^2. \]

Proof of Lemma 3 can be found in the appendix B.

Lemmas 1 through 3 fully characterize the solution to the system (16). In what follows we report on the implications of this solution for the organization of choice behaviour.

To make interpretations of the results transparent, it is useful to do further exposition using the discrete representation of the model in which we treat \( s \) as the serial number of an agent.\(^7\) This makes \( \tilde{\mu} = \mu/2 \) and \( l = S \). In this case we can write the complete solution to our system, by combining Lemmas 1 through 3, as
\[ z_s^t = e^{\alpha t} \bar{z}_0 + e^{\sigma t} \cos \left( k \frac{2\pi}{S} s \right) \tilde{z}_0^0. \]

Equation (17) determines the value of the difference in valuations (\( z \)) for every agent for every \( t \gg 0 \). The distribution of \( z \) along the circle has the form of a wave in space around the average, which points to the fact that in some neighbourhoods \( z > \bar{z} \), while in some other neighbourhoods the opposite is the case. When \( z > \bar{z} \), agents tend to choose the first option more frequently than the second; when \( z < \bar{z} \), agents choose the second option more frequently than the first. Thus, the general result is that clustering in behaviour is an emergent property of our system.

Our concern is whether any observed clustering is persistent over time. Consider the case when \( \exists t \geq 0 \) such that \( \bar{z}_t \neq 0 \). That is, at some point in time one of the options is perceived as superior on average.

\(^7\)This effectively means that we fix \( \delta = 1 \). This move does not undermine the results of Lemmas 1 through 3. Moving back to decision-maker addresses is convenient for relating parameters in the solution to the parameters of the model.
**Proposition 1.** If \( \exists t \) such that \( \bar{z}_t \neq 0 \), then as \( t \to \infty \), \( v_i^s > v_j^s \) \( \forall s \) and for every agent the probability of adopting option \( i \) is greater than the probability of adopting option \( j \).

**Proof.** Consider the situation when \( \bar{z}_t > 0 \). Define \( z^{\min} \equiv \min_s (z^s) \) as the valuation difference of an agent with the lowest \( z \).

**Case 1:** \( z^{\min} > 0 \). This implies that \( \forall s z^s > 0 \), thus there is one cluster of size \( S \). This is a stable pattern as both forces (interaction and habit formation) work to reinforce it.

**Case 2:** \( z^{\min} < 0 \). In this case some of the agents prefer the relatively “inferior” option.

**Case 2a:** \( \sigma < 0 \). Lemma 2 tells us that if \( \sigma < 0 \), with time, the amplitude of the wave goes to zero, which implies that \( \forall s z^s = \bar{z} \). This, together with proposition 1, results in \( z^s > 0 \) \( \forall s \) as \( t \to \infty \).

**Case 2b:** \( \sigma > 0 \). From lemma 2 we know that the amplitude of the wave around the average increases at rate \( \sigma \). At the same time, proposition 1 suggests that the average over agents of the valuation-difference rises at the rate \( \alpha \). Therefore \( z^{\min} \) is rising at the rate \( \alpha - \sigma \). Equation (18) establishes that this rate is positive.\(^8\) \( \alpha - \sigma > 0 \) ensures that as \( t \to \infty \), \( z^{\min} > 0 \). \( z^{\min} > 0 \) implies that \( \forall s z^s > 0 \). Thus case 2b with certainty collapses into case 1 at some point in time.

These intuitions hold for the situation when \( \bar{z}_t < 0 \).

Notice that due to the fact that agents use probabilistic choice heuristics there are two relevant spaces: the valuation space and the choice space. Of course the choice space is the derivative of the valuation space. What proposition 1 implies is that there exists a solution of the model where the entire economy is made up of one cluster in the valuation space. Because the correspondence between the valuation and choice spaces is probabilistic, in general, this will only imply the fact that agents will choose one of the options with higher probability. We call this pattern in choice space a probabilistic clustering. We also define a

\(^8\)Unless \( \mu = 0 \), which is not a very interesting case as it implies no word-of-mouth communication. In this case the existing choice pattern is reinforced indefinitely.
somewhat stronger notion of absolute clustering, which means that neighbours will consistently choose the same option in the long run. As in our case choices are probabilistic, this will only be the case when the probability of choice of one of the options goes to one in the long run.

Proposition 1 implies that there is a probabilistic clustering in the system. In this particular case, however, the system will be characterized by the absolute clustering.

**Proposition 2.** If \( \exists t \) such that \( \bar{z}_t \neq 0 \), as \( t \to \infty \), \( v^*_i - v^*_j \to \infty \) \( \forall s \), therefore clustering in the economy will be absolute and in the long run global conformism will obtain.

*Proof.* Proof of Proposition 1 directly implies not only that \( v^*_i > v^*_j \) \( \forall s \) in equilibrium, but also that \( v^*_i - v^*_j \to \infty \), which on its own implies that as long as the choice probability function is a positive monotonic mapping of valuations to choice probabilities, the probability of any agent choosing option \( i \) converges to 1.

Proposition 2 implies that probabilistic clustering converges to absolute clustering in behaviour asymptotically. Thus, \( \bar{z}_t \neq 0 \) is a relatively trivial case, and implies that ultimately only one option survives in the population, no matter the dynamics of the deviations from the average. Similar results on global conformism have been obtained in models of global (Ellison and Fudenberg, 1995) and local (Bala and Goyal, 2001) interaction, with repetitive (Ellison and Fudenberg, 1993) and sequential (Banerjee, 1992) choices.

Far more interesting is the case in which \( \forall t \bar{z}_t = 0 \), which permits both options to co-exist indefinitely. To analyze this case note that intuitively the stability of a cluster should depend on its size. For example, if one individual constitutes a cluster she is susceptible to influence from both her neighbours, both proponents of the choice contrary to hers. This cluster is less likely to be stable than a larger cluster where most of the members of the cluster (the ones away from its boundaries) receive information that reinforces their choices. Thus, there should
be some minimum cluster size for which clustering will be persistent. When \( \forall t \bar{z}_t = 0 \) we know that behaviour of the system is governed by the pattern sine wave, which implies that all the clusters are of an equal size in the long run.

**Proposition 3.** In system (16), if \( \forall t \bar{z}_t = 0 \), clustering in demand is stable if and only if the pattern wave of the system results in the clusters of size \( c \geq \zeta = \frac{\pi}{\sqrt{2}} \frac{\sqrt{\alpha}}{\mu} \).

**Proof.** From equation (17) it can be readily seen that when \( \bar{z}_t = 0 \forall t \), temporal stability of clustering depends on the sign of \( \sigma \). If \( \sigma < 0 \), as \( t \to \infty \), \( z^s \to 0 \forall s \), which implies that \( v_1^s \to v_2^s \forall s \). This means that valuations of options converge, so in the case of probabilistic choices every agent decides on her choice by tossing a (fair) coin. At any moment choices are distributed randomly over space, and no clustering emerges.

However, if \( \sigma > 0 \) the amplitude of the pattern wave increases exponentially with time, so clustering becomes more and more pronounced. If \( \sigma = 0 \), the amplitude of the wave does not change with time, and clustering is still stable.

Given the parameters of the model, the sign of \( \sigma \) depends on the frequency of the wave in the initial condition. We can pin down the critical frequency of the pattern wave \( (k) \), for which clustering will be stable, simply by solving \( \alpha - \mu k^2 \frac{2\alpha^2}{S^2} = 0 \), for \( k \). This gives \( \tilde{k} = \frac{S}{\pi} \sqrt{\frac{2\alpha}{\mu}}. \) And \( k \leq \tilde{k} \) ensures that \( \sigma \geq 0 \). The inverse of the frequency is the wave length, and the size of the cluster is half of the wave length. Since the size of the economy is \( S \), the size of the cluster(s) is \( S/(2k) \). Thus, given \( \tilde{k} \), we can find the size of the smallest cluster that will persist over time: \( \zeta = \frac{S}{\sqrt{2}} \sqrt{\frac{\alpha}{\mu}}. \) Any pattern wave exhibiting clusters larger than \( \zeta \), would ensure \( \sigma \geq 0 \), and thus will result in stable clustering.

The important property of the minimum stable cluster size is that it does not depend on the size of the economy. However, as \( \sigma \) depends on \( S \), a larger economy (\textit{ceteris paribus}) increases the likelihood that the pattern wave of the system will support clusters of any given size \( c \), thus it also increases the likelihood of clustering. We also point out that the minimum stable cluster size depends on the ratio of two parameters, habit formation and information transmission: \( \mu/\alpha \).
There are three distinct behavioural clustering patterns identified in the proof of proposition 3. These are implied by following three scenarios: $\sigma = 0$ (this is the same as $c = \bar{c}$), $\sigma > 0$ ($c > \bar{c}$) and $\sigma < 0$ ($c < \bar{c}$).

$\sigma = 0$: In this situation the valuation distribution converges to a static sinusoid. Consequently, the long run valuations are constant. This implies that $v_i^s - v_j^s$ is bounded $\forall s$. Therefore, the in case of $\sigma = 0$ the long run presents only probabilistic clustering in behaviour.

$\sigma > 0$: In this case valuation distribution is governed by the sinusoid with ever increasing amplitude. Therefore, the behaviour in social space is organized as alternating neighbourhoods of agents with $v_i^s - v_j^s \to \infty$ and $v_i^s - v_j^s \to -\infty$. In this case polarization among clusters reaches extreme values and the organization converges to absolute clustering in behaviour.

$\sigma < 0$: This is the case when there is no clustering in behaviour, no particular pattern of organization. Here valuations for the options converge to each other for every agent. Therefore, every decision maker’s probability of choosing one of them converges to 0.5. In this case information coming through word-of-mouth is so strong\(^9\) about each of the options, that it confuses the agent, who ultimately decides to randomly choose between the options.

This result is somewhat similar to the result of “confounded learning” by Smith and Sorensen (2000). In a sequential choice model with interactions they find a scenario where the learning process consistently maintains the balance between the options in the sense that information gathered from other decision-makers carries no value for the decision process of an agent.

This result so far has assumed that each agent has two neighbours ($H = 1$ on either side). It is interesting how results of the model change if we consider larger neighbourhoods.

\(^9\)From equation 18 one can easily see that negative $\sigma$ is a result of higher rate of communication $\mu$. 

18
Proposition 4. In the case of arbitrary an neighbourhood size $2H$, where agents interact with $H$ nearest neighbours on either side, the minimum sustainable cluster size is

$$c_H = \frac{\pi}{2\sqrt{3}} \sqrt{2H^2 + 3H + 1} \sqrt{\frac{\mu}{\alpha}}.$$

The proof of this proposition can be found in appendix C.

Proposition 4 implies that as neighbourhoods grow in size so does the minimum sustainable cluster. The intuition is that a larger neighbourhood facilitates the information diffusion process: each agent receives information from relatively distant agents. This works to homogenize the information structure across the population, and so works against small clusters.

There are a few relevant findings in literature that we can draw parallels with. For example, Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) find that less communication increases the likelihood of conformism. In our case we can decompose the “amount” of communication into intensity of communication (controlled by $\mu$) and the scope of communication (controlled by $H$). In our model the outcome of global conformism does not depend on any model parameters (proposition 1). However, any type of clustering is conformism and if clustering is local, so is conformism. In our model, once global conformism is ruled out, the likelihood of local conformism is inversely related with both $\mu$ and $H$ (see equation (25) in the proof of proposition 4).

In Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) slow information exchange ensures multiplicity of trials before the equilibrium is reached and thus increases the likelihood of the society learning about the true best option. In our model slow information exchange gives the chance for groups of agents to “develop the taste” for one particular option.

A related finding has been reported by Bala and Goyal (2001). They concentrate directly on local conformism as the long run outcome. They characterize the social network by the degree of integration of decision-makers and find that lower degrees of integration increase the likelihood of clustering. In our model $H$ can also be viewed as the degree of integration: higher $H$ means that every agent interacts with a larger number of other agents. This directly implies a higher level
of integration. In this way our results are in line with the findings of Bala and Goyal (2001): a lower level of integration increases the likelihood that the amplitude growth rate of the dominant sinusoid is positive. Positive \( \sigma \) is a sufficient condition for local conformism.

On a more general level, the existing literature has examined the effect of the scope of interaction. In general, the contrast is made between local and global interactions. Local interactions imply a limited (and usually fixed) subset of other agents that any given agent interacts with, while global interactions assume that an information stream from every agent can directly reach any other agent in the economy. Contrasting these two interaction schemes, researchers find that global interactions usually result in more ordered systems, while local interaction usually produces richer and more complex dynamics (e.g. Glaeser and Scheinkman; 2000; Gonzalez-Avella et al., 2006). This issue can be addressed in our model by looking at its behaviour as neighbourhoods become very large \((H \rightarrow S/2)\). According to proposition 4, increasing the neighbourhood size \((H)\) puts an upward pressure on the minimum stable cluster size \(\zeta\) and for a larger region of parameter space pushes it above the threshold \((\zeta > S/2)\) beyond which clustering is unstable in the long run (in the case when the differences between average valuations are zero).\(^{10}\) Thus, in line with previous research, our model demonstrates that local interactions result in richer and more complex dynamics than do global interactions.

Based on proposition 4, we can analyze how minimum sustainable cluster size changes with enlargement of the interaction neighbourhood. It is obvious from proposition 4 that \(\zeta_{H+1} - \zeta_H\) is increasing with \(H\). Moreover, it turns out that

\[
\lim_{H \rightarrow \infty} (\zeta_{H+1} - \zeta_H) = \frac{\pi}{\sqrt{6}} \sqrt{\frac{\mu}{\alpha}}.
\]

Equation 19 implies that for any value of \(\mu/\alpha\), minimum sustainable cluster size increases linearly with the size of the neighbourhood, as long as \(H\) is sufficiently large.

\(^{10}\)For example, in the small economy that we have simulated \((S = 100)\), \(H = 49\) implies that the speed of habituation, \(\alpha\), must be roughly 80 times as high as the influence of neighbours, \(\mu\), in order the system to be stable for the largest possible cluster \((\zeta = S/2)\)


4 The multi-option environment

As asserted in the introduction, one of the advantages of the present approach is that it is straightforward to extend the analysis to a multi-option environment. In fact the core of the model has been written in this environment and two-option setup has been chosen only for the demonstration of the major findings in the previous section.

Proposition 3 describes the relationship between the parameters of the model and the average cluster size in the long-run, in the two-option case. In this section we analyze the same relationship for the multi-option environment.

Consider the setup where decision-makers have to choose between $N$ options. Assume again that agents interact with only two of their neighbours ($H = 1$). In this case the dynamics of the model are represented by $N$ equations of the form of Equation (9). We can choose one of the options as a numeraire (say option $N$) and subtract the value of its valuation from every other option for each agent $z_i = v_i - v_N, \forall i \neq N$. After rewriting the system in continuous time and space and applying a Taylor approximation to appropriate terms, the $N$-option system will be described by $N - 1$ equations of the type

$$\frac{\partial z_n}{\partial t} = \alpha z_n + \tilde{\mu} \frac{\partial^2 z_n}{\partial s^2}. \quad (20)$$

The consequence of the separability of inertia is that the dynamics of $z_n$ do not depend on the dynamics of $z_i, i \neq n$.

Every equation in the system (20) has the same form as equation (16). Therefore, similar to the two-option environment, in this case we again have two different outcomes: one in which there is global conformism; the other in which several choices co-exist in the long run. Which of these scenarios obtains depends on initial conditions.

As lemma 1 applies to all $N - 1$ equations for identifying the pattern of choice organization we have to compare the growth patterns of average valuation differences. As $\alpha$ has the same value across all $N - 1$ equations, the growth rate of
average valuation differences across every option is the same (according to lemma 1, this rate is equal to $\alpha$). What becomes important is the initial value of the average valuation for each of the option. It can be shown that the difference between two variables that grow at an equal exponential rate goes to plus or minus infinity depending on the sign of the initial value difference. Therefore, we can formulate the following remark.

**Remark 1.** In a multi-option environment an option with the highest initial average valuation will be the only choice for every agent in the long run. Therefore, there will be absolute clustering and global conformism.

If two or more options have the same, highest initial average valuation, these will be the only surviving options in the long run. Therefore, for the analysis of long-run behaviour we can safely drop all inferior practices and concentrate on those surviving in the long run. In this case the system can be reformulated, reindexed as the system with several options with equal average initial valuations. In what follows we restrict attention to this case. For notational simplicity assume that there are $N$ options with equal initial average valuations.

As it can be readily seen from equation (20) each of the $N - 1$ equations has the same form, and the same parameter values, as the unique equation (16) in the two-option case. Therefore, the following remark is true:

**Remark 2.** In a multi-option environment, minimum cluster size implied by the dominant sinusoid of each $N - 1$ valuation difference distribution is unchanged from the two-option case, and is equal to $c_N = \epsilon = \frac{\pi}{\sqrt{2N}} \sqrt{\frac{\pi}{\alpha}}$.

Although the solution to the system is very similar to two-option case, its implications for the organization of behaviour is considerably harder to analyze. The reason is multiplicity of dominant sinusoids that are present in the system. However, one important finding that we can directly point out is that for any option, valuations cluster. That is, the valuation for every option is distributed in a form of sinusoid in a social space, implying that for any option, nearby agents have similar valuations. Therefore, the multi-option system should also result in
clustering in behaviour (probabilistic or absolute). The only exception to this will be the case when amplitude growth rates of all \( N - 1 \) dominant sinusoids are negative. In this case each option will have equal chance of being chosen by any agent in the long run. Furthermore, the probability of clustering increases with the number of options, as the likelihood of at least one sinusoid having \( \sigma \geq 0 \) increases. In other words, increases in the number of options decreases the likelihood of a coincidence where all \( \sigma \)s are negative.

In order to predict clustering patterns we have to compare the amplitude growth rates of dominant sinusoids. Recall that by equation (18) \( \sigma = \alpha - 2\mu \frac{\pi^2 k^2}{S^2} \), where \( k \in \mathbb{Z}_+ \) is the frequency of the sinusoid. As lower \( k \) implies higher \( \sigma \), as long as initial conditions permit, the fastest growing sinusoid will be the one corresponding to \( k = 1 \). The role of initial conditions requires additional clarification. Recall the outline of the proof of lemma 2. If we have \( S \) decision-makers, using a Fourier transform, the initial distribution of choice valuations over social space can be represented as the sum of waves with \( k = 1, 2, \ldots, S/2 \), each with corresponding initial amplitude and its growth rate. As \( \partial \sigma / \partial k < 0 \) we know that out of all the Fourier components the one most likely to become the dominant wave has the longest wavelength (\( k = 1 \)). The only case when \( k = 1 \) will not emerge as the dominant sinusoid is if its initial amplitude is equal to zero. In this case the amplitude will not change over time. The next most probable nominee for the domination will then be the wave corresponding to \( k = 2 \) and so on. This is true for the valuation distribution of every option.

In the multi-option case what becomes important is not only the dominant sinusoid for each valuation distribution, but also the competition among the dominant waves across all the options. We know that most of the dominant sinusoids have the same amplitude growth rate \( \sigma = \alpha - 2\mu \frac{\pi^2}{S^2} \). The rest of the sinusoids have lower amplitude growth rates. Thus, what becomes important for identifying the winner, the champion wave, is the initial amplitude. Because the difference between the amplitudes of two sinusoids with the same (positive) growth rates and different initial values goes to infinity in the long-run, we can formulate the
following remark.

Remark 3. Consider an economy with equal initial average valuations for all \( N \) options. If in this economy there is at least one option characterized by the dominant sinusoid with a positive growth rate, in the long run there will be an option that will be consistently chosen by (exactly) half of the population. The number of clusters where this half of the population will be distributed depends on the frequency of the champion wave.

Consider a space in which the agents are located along the abscissa and the ordinate scales the valuation of the different options. The solution to equation (16) generates a family of sine waves, cycling around the abscissa, each wave representing the value of each option.\(^\text{11}\) Amplitudes of the waves are growing, so over time, one wave (that with the highest growth rate, \( \sigma \)) comes to dominate all others, and the difference between its amplitude and all others goes to (plus and minus) infinity. Thus over half the space, it dominates all other options and all agents (probabilistically) choose that dominant option. But over half the space it is the least favoured option, and this part of the space is divided among the other options. We might reasonably expect that as the number of options increases the probability of finding one large cluster covering half the social space increases. This simply because the more options the more likely the dominant wave will have a wave frequency \( k = 1 \).

Thus, we have established that half of the social space will be organized in a few clusters all of which choose the same option. In order to understand how the other half will be organized note again that we are dealing with sinusoids. The remaining half of the social space will be shared among the options other than the champion. In determining how this space is distributed not only the initial amplitude and amplitude growth rate, but also the location of the sinusoid becomes important.

To see why, consider the example shown in Figure 1. There are five options, and we show their valuations over the social space. One option is a numeraire

\(^{11}\)More precisely, one wave for each difference in valuation between an option and a numeraire option.
so we have four dominant waves, each representing the difference in valuation between one option and the numeraire. Consider the case where the wavelength is equal to 1, (and similarly $k = 1$), for all of them. The left panel of the figure presents the system relatively late in the process of transition to equilibrium. At this time valuation dynamics for the options have settled to their respective dominant sinusoids, but the waves have not yet completely diverged from each other. The right panel depicts the equilibrium to which the system is headed.\(^\text{12}\)

On this panel the ranking of options is clearly visible.\(^\text{13}\) And we can see that the highest ranked option takes half of the market, $\left(0; \frac{S}{2}\right)$. The option ranked the second dominates on $\left(\frac{S}{2}; S_1\right)$. However, due to the unfortunate location of its wave the option ranked third is dominated throughout the social space, while the option ranked lower (the fourth) is present in equilibrium with a positive market share, $\left(S_1; S_2\right)$. The interval $\left(S_2; S\right)$ is captured by the numeraire product.

Despite the fact that the average valuations for all the options are equal there will be differences in their popularity. And more importantly, some of the options might not be present in the equilibrium choice set even though they are valued (on average) just as highly, and ranked higher in some cases, as any other option in the economy.

\(^{12}\)In the limit the sine waves become infinitely steep, and with peaks at infinity. Because different waves have different growth rates, it will remain the case that one will dominate others.

\(^{13}\)“Ranking” is slightly tricky here, since on average all options are ranked equally. To rank options in this sense we use the maximal (absolute) valuation over the population.
Despite the fact that the average valuations for all the options are equal there will be differences in their popularity.

**Proposition 5.** Consider an environment with a large enough option set, \( \{1, 2, \ldots, N\} \), each option having the same average (over agents) valuation: \( \bar{z}_n(0) = 0 \ \forall n \in (1, 2, \ldots, N - 1) \). In this society the expected long-run distribution of option popularity is described by

\[
F_n = \begin{cases} 
\frac{1}{2} & \text{if } R_n = 1 \\
\frac{1 - \sum_{i=1}^{R_n-1} F_i}{1 + 2 \left( 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{R_n-1} F_i \right)} & \text{otherwise,}
\end{cases}
\]

where \( F_n \) represents the long-run share of an option \( n \) and \( R_n (\in \mathbb{Z}_+) \) is option’s rank in popularity ranking.

Proof of proposition 5 can be found in appendix D, and a plot of the function \( F_n \) is presented in figure 2. Proposition 5 presents an important feature of the model. It shows that the model is consistent with niche options co-existing with dominant options in equilibrium. In another context, this implies that niche designs can continue to exist even after a dominant design has emerged and stabilized (Anderson and Tushman, 1990). We should note here that the long run
distribution of option adoption (or market share) is independent of the parameters of the model (given that we satisfy the constraints to preserve variety).

In the economy described in proposition 5 the distribution of choices is the same as the cluster size distribution. This is due to the fact that the large number of options ensures that all options chosen in equilibrium have dominant sinusoids with frequency equal to one.\textsuperscript{14}

To understand why this is the case, consider a single option. Its valuation across the population at any point in time can be represented by a sum of sinusoids of various frequencies and amplitudes. Over time the amplitudes of these waves change, as the option becomes more or less valued by different agents, relative to the other options. Equation (18) implies that the sinusoid with the lowest frequency has the highest amplitude growth rate. Therefore, if the wave with the lowest frequency ($k = 1$) has non-zero initial amplitude it will become the pattern wave of the option and it will describe the agent valuations for the option in equilibrium. Due to the fact that the model has random initial conditions there is a (fixed) nonzero probability that any option will be characterized by the pattern wave with the lowest possible frequency.

Initial conditions can be thought of as a random matrix, $M_{i,j}$ each cell of which represents the valuation of agent $i$ for option $j$. It is natural to read this matrix horizontally, thinking of each agent having a valuation vector over options. However, reading vertically, we see that this is equivalent to each option having a "vector" of valuations over agents. In continuous space, this "vector" is a function that can be described by a sum of sinusoids. There exist (a non-zero measure of) such functions in which the sinusoid description includes a wave of frequency one with non-zero amplitude. If the number of options is large enough, then, there will be a strictly positive number with a non-zero amplitude low frequency ($k = 1$) sinusoid in the sum. Those waves all grow at the same speed, and in the limit will solely describe corresponding options.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{14}This is similar to the case presented in figure 1.
\textsuperscript{15}This argument suggests that one might need many options to guarantee this condition. In fact, however, the probability that a function decomposed into sinusoids has a low frequency wave of zero amplitude is vanishingly small. Thus a small number of options will typically be
The valuation wave for any option has a part of the population where it is negative, relative to the numeraire. But if there are many low frequency \((k = 1)\) waves, passing through zero at different agents, for any agent there will be some low frequency wave that takes on a positive value at her location. This wave (or one of these waves), because it grows fastest, will determine her preference in the long run. This means that by assuming there are many options, the equilibrium pattern will be described by some number of waves with the same frequency; \(k = 1\).

**Remark 4.** *Some options might never be chosen in the long-run despite the fact that all the options are equally valued by the society.*

This stems from the proof of proposition 5 and is true even if the economy consists of infinitely many practices in equilibrium and infinite number of agents.\(^{16}\) The number of clusters will increase with the size of the economy. And in reverse, as the number of options surviving increases, the economy must increase in size. For example, if sustaining six practices in the long run demands an economy of \(1/F_6 = 3614\) decision makers, sustaining seven practices requires \(1/F_7 > 6.5 \times 10^6\) agents, and sustaining eight demands \(1/F_8 > 2.1 \times 10^{13}\) and so on. So we can say, for example, that no matter how large is the initial option set, in an economy with less than 3614 agents, at most only five options can survive in the long run.

## 5 Emergence of Novelty

In the dynamics we model, word-of-mouth interaction is a force moving the system towards the homogenization of valuation profiles across neighbours. As expressed in equation (1), agents partially conform to each others views as a result of interaction. On the other hand, inertia at the agent level reinforces every agent’s current choice profile. Therefore, agents in the interior of a cluster (ones which are surrounded by like-minded agents) get doubly encouraged to stick to their

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\(^{16}\)If the number of decision-makers is finite, due to the integer problem (cluster size cannot be less then one agent), there will always be only a finite number of clusters in the economy.
current choices. As a larger cluster implies a higher number of agents located in the interior, we can expect larger clusters to have higher growth potential.

But we can also expect that initial development of the industry will be noisy. It will involve shrinking and the ultimate disappearance of certain clusters at the expense of the growth of others. This suggests that these growing clusters will be the large clusters, and shrinking ones will be the ones that are relatively small. Although true in a general sense, this statement does not describe the whole story. It is also the case that new behaviour can emerge in locations it has not been seen, diffuse and even survive in the long run.

Options can emerge (and become popular) in locations with no prior history of similar behaviour. Consider the following simple example. Agent $s - 1$ ranks option 1 first and option 3 last; agent $s + 1$ ranks option 3 first and option 1 last. Both agents, though, rank option 2 second. It is clear that agent $s$, based on the information communicated to her, could easily come to rank option 2 before either 1 or 3. If the relatively high rankings of option 2 by $s - 1$ and $s + 1$ have emerged (due to information received by their neighbours) at roughly the same time, agent $s$ can then switch to option 2, regardless of what he was doing in the past. Maintaining the practice for longer period and passing negative information about option 1 to agent $s - 1$ and about option 3 to agent $s + 1$, it is also possible that agent $s$ will induce both agents to abandon their choices and switch to option 2.\footnote{Even though emergence of novelty can also be observed in a similar model without rumors (agents transmitting information only about the products that they have consumed during the period), the richer communication channel including rumors substantially expands relaxes the conditions under which emergent novelty can be observed.}

To demonstrate that this kind of behaviour is possible (and in fact not improbable in the early stages of industry development) we perform a small numerical exercise. Set the number of options to $N = 10$; and the population size to $S = 100$. The population is located on a one-dimensional periodic lattice, so the neighbours of agent 1 are agents 2 and 100. Set the parameters $\alpha = 0.001$ and $\mu = 0.01$. Finally, each agent has one neighbour on either side, $H = 1$. Initially, agents are randomly assigned a valuation vector. These valuations are updated each period.
We present a typical run in Figure 3. To read the figure, agents are arrayed along the abscissa, remembering that the axis is a circle, so the right-most and left-most agent are neighbours. Time is read on the ordinate, from the initial period, $t = 0$ to the final period, $t = 2000$. We simulate the development of the society as described by system (20). As the model was solved in expectation terms, figure 3 depicts the expected development of the system. Each option is assigned a different shade of grey. The ordering of options, and therefore the shades of grey, is arbitrary. At each point in time the most valued option for any agent is shown by the corresponding shade.

Consider agent 40 with its neighbourhood. After some initial experimentation the agent finds the white option to have the highest valuation. Notice that the agent is on the edge of her neighbourhood. From her left, she will receive signals reinforcing her choice; from the right, though, she will receive contradictory signals (telling her that a medium grey is good). This is stable for many periods. Around period 650, though, agent 40 changes her most valued option. At this point, she values the black option higher than all others, and (probabilistically) shifts her
behaviour accordingly. But interestingly, black was not valued highly (and thus only consumed infrequently, if at all) in her neighbourhood prior to her switch. This switch introduces a novel option to the neighbourhood. With time this new practice becomes popular in the neighbourhood, survives and expands, at least until period 2000. A similar pattern appears at later stage of development in the run, when agent 96 decides to experiment at $t \approx 1400$. Again, the very-dark-grey option emerges as most valued, even though it was not present as the favorite anywhere in the neighbourhood. It too survives and expands in popularity.

We see that behavioural clusters can emerge, apparently ex nihilo, in social space. Rumors from different sources can aggregate to a signal powerful enough to induce agents with narrow margins at the top of their rankings to switch to an unexplored alternative. Thus, our model is consistent not only with shrinking and disappearance of smaller clusters, but also with the emergence and growth of new ones.\textsuperscript{18}

6 Conclusion

In this paper we have argued that interaction with peers over social networks can have important effects on the organization of behaviour. This external force, together with internal forces such as inertia, generate rich choice dynamics among mutually exclusive options. Information diffusion through fixed social networks naturally generates clustering in behaviour: some neighbourhoods collectively prefer one option over another, while other neighbourhoods do the reverse. But depending on the characteristics of the society, this pattern can be either fragile or stable. In essence, several parallel informational cascades can result in persistent lateral distributions in social space, where clearly identified neighbourhoods have

\textsuperscript{18}Figure 3 presents the evolution of the most preferred option, driven by system (20). This is not necessarily the evolution of choices, as choices are only probabilistically determined by valuations. Because actual behaviour is “noisy” in this sense, it is more difficult to observe the emergence of pure novelty in behaviour, unless the function mapping valuation to behaviour has a very steep gradient near 1. However, even with less severe gradients, it is not uncommon to observe behaviour that was rare (and sometimes completely absent) in a neighbourhood emerging and growing to become common in that neighbourhood, and beyond.
higher concentrations of one particular type of information (information about one option), or to put it differently, where the peaks of different positive informational cascades (Hirshleifer, 1993) are located in different places in social space.

The model presented in this paper, in which information is transmitted by word-of-mouth, includes the ability of agents to transmit “rumours” through social interaction. The framework we have developed is extended beyond the two-option case that is typical in the literature. We show that system behaviour in the multi-option case is similar to the two option case, but including more than two options in the analysis permits us to extend the framework and derive more reasonable results on the distribution of “market shares” of the options. The extension to multiple options means that the model can be applied not only to binary choice situations, such as bribery or criminal activity, but also to voting in multi-party systems or product choice in multi-product environments. The model reproduces many analytical and empirical findings, such as clustering in social space, emergence of conformism, existence and stability of market niches. However, by including the ability of agents to transmit rumours, we can avoid the “must see to adopt” assumption common in the literature, and so are able to explain not only the fact that clusters increase, decrease, or stabilize, but also provide a natural explanation of the emergence of novelty. In this model behaviour previously unseen in a neighbourhood can suddenly appear, grow and even come to dominate.

**References**


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Appendix

A Proof of lemma 1.

Proof. In the continuous case the average over space can be defined as \( \bar{z} = (1/S) \int_0^S z ds \). This implies that

\[
\frac{\partial \bar{z}}{\partial t} = \frac{1}{S} \int_0^S \frac{\partial z}{\partial t} ds.
\]

Then, using equation (16) we can write

\[
\frac{\partial \bar{z}}{\partial t} = \alpha \frac{1}{S} \int_0^S z ds + \bar{\mu} \frac{1}{S} \int_0^S \frac{\partial^2 \bar{z}}{\partial s^2} ds.
\] (21)

As space in our system is a periodic lattice the second summand in equation (21) is zero.\(^{19}\) Then, using the definition of average again we can write equation (21) as

\[
\frac{\partial \bar{z}}{\partial t} = \alpha \bar{z}.
\] (22)

This is an ordinary differential equation with the solution described in the lemma.

B Proof of lemma 3.

Proof. From proposition 1 and 2, we know that

\[
z(s; t) = e^{\alpha t} \bar{z}(0) + e^{\sigma t} \cos \left( k \frac{2\pi}{l} s \right) \tilde{z}(0; 0).
\]

\(^{19}\)To see more easily why the second summand is zero, one can discuss the discrete case and thus use equation (12) instead of equation (16). In the discrete case the second summand is \( \sum_s \left( (z^{s+1} - z^s) - (z^s - z^{s-1}) \right) \). As decision-makers are indexed by \( s \) around a circle, it is obvious that this sum is zero.
Substituting this into equation (16) and noticing that
\[ \frac{\partial^2 \cos(\beta x)}{\partial x^2} = -\beta^2 \cos(\beta x), \]
allows us to solve for \(\sigma\). \(\square\)

C Proof of proposition 4.

Proof. Consider the case of arbitrary neighbourhood size of \(2H\). In this case after assuming that the distance between two neighbouring agents is \(\delta\) and considering the two-option case, continuous version of equation (9) can be rewritten as

\[
\frac{\partial z(s)}{\partial t} = \alpha z(s) + \mu \frac{\delta}{2H} \delta h \int_{-H}^{H} z(s + \delta h) \, dh - 2Hz(s) \tag{23}
\]

Using second order taylor approximation we can rewrite the part of (23) under the integral as

\[
\int_{-H}^{H} z(s) \, dh + \int_{-H}^{H} \delta h \frac{\partial z(s)}{\partial s} \, dh + \int_{-H}^{H} \frac{\delta^2 h^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 z(s)}{\partial s^2} \, dh.
\]

Which, after integration of first two summands, is equal to

\[
2Hz(s) + 0 + \frac{\delta^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 z(s)}{\partial s^2} \int_{-H}^{H} h^2 \, dh.
\]

To obtain more accurate values for smaller neighbourhood size, we go back to discrete space and replace the integral in expression above with the sum of squares of integer values.

Substituting this result back to (23) yields

\[
\frac{\partial z(s)}{\partial t} = \alpha z(s) + \mu \frac{\delta^2}{4H} \sum_{h=-H}^{H} h^2 \frac{\partial^2 z(s)}{\partial s^2}.
\]

Thus, it follows that the only modification that this generalization brings to
the system can be captured by the definition of \( \tilde{\mu} \) in the text being changed to

\[
\tilde{\mu} = \frac{\mu \delta^2}{4H} \sum_{h=-H}^H h^2. \tag{24}
\]

Going back to agent addresses (\( \delta = 1 \)), using new definition of \( \tilde{\mu} \), and the identity \( \sum_{n=1}^x n^2 = \frac{n^3}{3} + \frac{n^2}{2} + \frac{n}{6} \) we can rewrite equation (18) as

\[
\sigma_H = \alpha - 2\mu \left( \frac{\pi}{l} \right)^2 \left( \frac{H^2}{3} + \frac{H}{2} + \frac{1}{6} \right), \tag{25}
\]

which results in

\[
\tilde{k}_H = \frac{S}{\pi} \sqrt{\alpha \left( 2\mu \left( \frac{H^2}{3} + \frac{H}{2} + \frac{1}{6} \right) \right)^{-1}}, \tag{26}
\]

and further in

\[
\varepsilon_H = \frac{\pi}{2\sqrt{3}} \sqrt{2H^2 + 3H + 1} \sqrt{\frac{\mu}{\alpha}}. \tag{27}
\]

\[ \square \]

\section{D Proof of proposition 5.}

\textit{Proof.} In order to derive the distribution of popularity it is useful to split the popularity rankings in three parts: \( R_n = 1, R_n = 2 \) and \( R_n \geq 3 \). We consider each of these cases separately.

\( R_n = 1 \): The fact that \( F_1 = 1/2 \) is demonstrated by remark 3.

\( R_n = 2 \): Consider the effect of large number of options. We know that highest \( \sigma \) guarantees the championship of the wave. However, as each equation in system (20) has the same parameters, we know that there will be many waves with the same values of \( \sigma \). Consider the grouping the waves in subsets, where waves in each subset have the same value of \( \sigma \). Then we can rank these subsets starting from the highest to lowest. We also know that for winning the championship
in case of equal \( \sigma \)'s what matters is the initial amplitude. Then in each subset we can rank waves in decreasing order of their initial amplitude values. Now we have a unique ranking of all the waves. We call this a preliminary ranking as some of the waves might get dropped from the top places due to the subsequent refinement. We will demonstrate that not every option will appear in the long run frequency distribution. As higher waves in ranking have higher chances for ending up in the frequency distribution we assume that the set of options is so large that all the ultimate practices will be selected from the highest ranked subgroup. Therefore, we simply disregard lower ranked subgroups. Thus, large number of options ensures that every option present in the long run frequency distribution with a non-zero weight has the wave length of \( k = 1 \).

We know that the most popular option has half of the market size. As large number of options ensures that the champion wave has the wave length of \( k = 1 \), and thus the most popular option has one cluster (of size \( S/2 \)) in the social space. As our social space is circular we can reindex the agents without loss of generality. Assume the champion sinusoid starts at agent \( s = 0 \). This would mean, that the cluster of the champion practice comprises the social space between \( s = 0 \) and \( s = S/2 \). Now, what becomes important for identifying the size of the second largest cluster is the offset of the second ranked wave from the champion. Offset if the difference in social space between the sinusoid under discussion and the champion sinusoid. As we normalized the champion to start at \( s = 0 \), the offset of any wave will simply be equal to the location \( s \) where they start. To identify which option is going to be the second most popular in the long run we go down the preliminary ranking. If the second ranked option in the preliminary ranking has offset exactly equal to zero this means that this sinusoid is positive in space \( (0; S/2) \) and negative in \( (S/2; 1) \). But so is the champion wave. And we know that champion dominates any other wave completely in the space \( (0; S/2) \). Therefore, the wave with offset zero will never show up in the long run frequency distribution with the positive weight. Thus, we can discard the wave and remove it from the rankings.
Then we go down to the rankings until we find the wave with offset \( s_i > 0 \). Consider how the share of social space dominated by this option depends on \( s_i \). If \( s_i < S/2 \) we know that this wave will be positive on \((s_i; S/2 + s_i)\) and negative on \((0; s_i) \cup (S/2 + s_i; 1)\). However, on \((s_i; S/2)\) if will be dominated by the champion wave, therefore this option will only acquire \( S/2 + s_i - S/2 = s_i \) part of the social space. In case when \( s_i > S/2 \) the wave is positive on \((s_i; 1) \cup (0; S/2 - 1 + s_i)\). But it is dominated by the champion on fraction \((0; S/2 - 1 + s_i)\), and thus, it obtains the section \( 1 - s_i \). It can be easily seen that as \( s_i \) goes from \( s_i = 0 \) to \( s_i = S/2 \), the part dominated by the second ranked wave also increases linearly from zero to \( S/2 \). As \( s_i \) continues move to the right after passing \( S/2 \), the part dominated by the wave decreases linearly from \( S/2 \) to zero (when \( s_i = 1 \)).

Now, as initial conditions are random and agents are distributed uniformly over the social space, the probability of choice of any \( s_i \) is constant. Therefore, we can calculate that the average market share of the second ranked practice in the long run \( F_2 = 1/4 \). In order to build the case for \( R_n > 2 \) notice that there are two actual waves corresponding to the market share of 1/4. These are \( s_i = S/4 \) and and \( s_i = 3S/4 \). It does not matter for the further calculations which of them we choose to be present while considering \( R_n > 2 \) options. Because of the circularity of social space, there will always be two waves corresponding to each share distribution. Without loss of generality we always choose to consider that the wave with the smaller \( s_i \) is at place. Thus, for later options there will always be some space \((0; W > S/2)\) that we be occupied by stronger waves and the space \((W; 1)\) left to be distributed among the weaker waves.

\( R_n = m > 2 \): As pointed out in case \( R_n = 2 \), by now the social space \((0; W)\) is already distributed. Then \( W = \sum_{j=1}^{m-1} F_j \). Denote the size of the remaining social space \( w = 1 - W \). Then, \( w \) is the size of the not-yet-distributed portion. In this case, the we know that the weakest wave already assigned its long-run share is the wave with the positive part on \((S/2 - w; 1 - w)\). Therefore, any wave to be placed next on the social space has to have the offset more than \( s_i > S/2 - w \). This is because the waves with less offset will always be dominated by the already the
most popular $m-1$ waves. Therefore, while going down the preliminary ranking we through out all the waves with offset less then $S/2 - w$, and concentrate only on offsets with higher offsets.

Consider how long-run market share depends on $s_i$ in this case. With $s_i$ increasing from $S/2 - w$ till $S/2$ the share increases linearly from zero to $w$. In the section where $s_i \in (S/2; 1 - w)$ the share is constant at $w$. Once $s_i$ passes $1 - w$ the share decreases linearly and reaches zero at $s_i = 1$. In this case taking the average long run market size and converting it to shares results in

$$F_m = \frac{w}{1 + 2w}.$$ 

It is easy to check that $m = 2$ also obeys this formula (although the calculation of $F_2$ was slightly different, it was in fact the specific case of these calculations). \qed