By CĂ©dric Durand (UniversitĂ© Paris 13), and SĂ©bastien Villemot
When it was introduced at the turn of the millennium, the euro was widely perceived as a major achievement for Europe. The apparent economic successes, coupled with cross-country convergence of several economic indicators, fueled this sentiment of success. A couple of years later, the picture looks dramatically different. The world financial crisis has revealed imbalances that have led to the sovereign debt crisis and brought the euro area on the verge of dislocation. The austerity policies that became the norm on the continent in 2011 fueled a protracted stagnation, with growth rates that look bleak in comparison to the United States and the United Kingdom.
This economic underperformance has fueled popular resentment against the euro, now seen by a growing number of European people as the problem rather than the solution. The financial community itself seems to be prepared to the possibility of an exit or a dissolution of the single currency by cutting back on cross-border positions. Greece was on the verge to leave in 2015. And the intellectual mood is also shifting: leading thinkers, such as US economist Joseph Stiglitz, or German Sociologist Wolfgang Streeck are among the most visible figures of a wider change of attitude. suite…»
The five-year presidential term in France will have been marked by the success of COP21, which led to the signing in December 2015 of the Paris Agreement to limit the rise in global temperatures to 2Â°C by the end of the century. Despite this, climate and energy issues do not seem to be priorities in the upcoming presidential debate.
These issues nevertheless deserve to be dealt with in depth, given that the decisions required entail a long-term commitment by France. In order to meet the goals France has set itself in the Law on the energy transition and green growth (LTECV), it is necessary as soon as possible to undertake the changes required in our energy mix and to improve its efficiency in order to hold down demand from the main energy-consuming sectors, i.e. residential, services, transport and industry. suite…»
The publication of the price index by the INSEE on November 15 confirmed the return of inflation to positive territory, +0.4%, in October and September, after it oscillated around 0 since the end of 2014. The deflationary phase experienced over the past two years has in part replicated the trajectory of the energy price index, which saw the price of oil fall in early 2016 to one-third of its price in mid-2014. With a weighting of almost 8% in the all-items index, the energy price index, which incorporates the price of fuel but also of oil-indexed products such as gas and electricity, automatically pushed down inflation. This phase of energy-related disinflation now seems to have come to an end, with crude oil prices rising to between USD 45 and 50 a barrel since the low in mid-January 2016 at under USD 30. The gradual rise in the year-on-year change in the energy price index since spring has in fact pulled along the overall index. suite…»
Analysis and Forecasting Department (international team)
This text relies on the 2016-2018 forecast for the global economy and the euro zone,Â the full version of which is available here, in French.
After avoiding a Grexit in the summer of 2015, Europeans will now have to face a Brexit. In addition to what should be a significant impact on the UK economy lies the question of the effect this shock will have on other countries. Given that all the indicators seemed to be green for finally allowing the euro zone to recover from the double-dip recession following the 2007-2008 financial crisis and then the sovereign debt crisis, will a Brexit risk interrupting the trend towards a recovery? This fear is all the more credible as the delayed recovery was not sufficient to absorb all the imbalances that built up over the years of crisis. The unemployment rate for the euro zone was still over 10% in the second quarter of 2016. A halt to growth would only exacerbate the social crisis and in turn fuel doubt â€“ and therefore mistrust â€“ about Europe’s ability to live up to the ambitions set outÂ in the preamble to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and reiterated in Lisbon in 2000. suite…»
By the Analysis and Forecasting Department
This text summarizes the 2016-2017 forecast for the French economy.Â Click here to consult the full version, in French.
The news on 28 October that French economic growth came to 0.2% in the third quarter of 2016 constitutes a cyclical signal that is consistent with our analysis of the state of Franceâ€™s economy. This figure is close to our latest forecast (+0.3% forecast for the third quarter) and in line with our growth scenario up to 2018.
After three years of sluggish growth (0.5% on average over the period 2012-14), activity picked up moderately in France in 2015 (1.2%), driven by falling oil prices, the depreciation of the euro and a lowered level of fiscal consolidation. For the first time since 2011, the French economy has begun to create jobs in the private sector (98,000 for the year as a whole), which has been encouraged by tax measures that cut labour costs. Combined with an increase in the number of employees in the public sector (+49,000) and the creation of non-salaried jobs (+56,000), the number of unemployed according to the ILO fell in 2015 (-63,000, or -0.2 percentage point of the active population). Meanwhile, boosted by additional tax cuts on industrial equipment, business investment has revived in 2015 (+3.9% yoy).
French growth has been below that of the rest of the euro zone since 2014; in addition to the fact that it did better over the period 2008-2013, this is due to two major factors: first, France made greater fiscal adjustments than its European neighbours over the period 2014-16, and second, exports did not contribute much to growth, even though the fiscal approach to supply policy aimed to restore the competitiveness of French business. It seems, however, that since 2015 French exporters have chosen to improve their margins rather than to reduce their export prices, with no impact on their export volumes. While for a number of quarters now this behaviour has resulted in falling market share, this might still turn out to be an asset in the longer term due to strengthening the financial position of the countryâ€™s exporters, especially if these margins are reinvested in non-cost competitiveness and lead to upgrading the products manufactured in France.
In 2016, despite a strong first quarter (+0.7%) driven by exceptionally strong domestic demand excluding stock (+0.9%), GDP growth will peak at 1.4% on average over the year (see table). The mid-year air pocket, which was marked by strikes, floods, terrorist attacks and the originally scheduled end of the investment tax reduction, partly explains the weak recovery in 2016. As a result of the pick-up in margin rates, the historically low cost of capital and the extension of the investment tax cut, investment should continue to grow in 2016 (+2.7% yoy). The creation of private sector jobs should be relatively dynamic (+149,000), due to support from the CICE competitiveness tax credit, the Responsibility Pact and the prime Ă lâ€™embauche hiring bonus. In total, taking into account unwaged employees and the workforce in the public sector, 219,000 jobs will be created in 2016. The unemployment rate will fall by 0.5 point over the year, of which 0.1 point is linked to the implementation of the “training 500,000” programme, so at year end will come to 9.4% of the workforce. Meanwhile the public deficit will drop to 3.3% of GDP in 2016, after a level of 3.5% in 2015 and 4% in 2014.
In 2017, Franceâ€™s economy will grow at a 1.5% rate, which will be slightly above its potential rate (1.3%), as the countryâ€™s fiscal policy will not hold down GDP for the first time in seven years. On the other hand, in contrast to the forecast last spring, France will have to confront two new shocks: the negative impact of Brexit on foreign trade and the terrorist attacksâ€™ influence on the number of tourists. These two shocks will cut 0.2 percentage point off GDP growth in 2017 (following 0.1 point in 2016). The French economy will create 180,000 jobs, including 145,000 in the private sector, reducing the unemployment rate by “only” 0.1 point, due to the rebound in the labour force as people who benefit from the training programme gradually re-join the workforce. The renewed rise in oil prices and the depreciation of the euro will see inflation rising to 1.5% in 2017 (after 0.4% in 2016). Finally, the government deficit will be 2.9% of GDP in 2017, back below the 3% threshold for the first time in ten years. After stabilizing at 96.1% of GDP in 2015 and 2016, the public debt will fall slightly, down to 95.8% in 2017.
The French economy though battered by new shocks and with the wounds from the crisis far from having healed, is recovering gradually, as can be seen by the gradual improvement in economic agentsâ€™ financial position: business margins are up, household purchasing power has rebounded, the deficit is down and the public debt has stabilized.
On 11 June 2014, the European Central Bank decided to set a negative rate on deposit facilities and on the excess reserves held by credit institutions in the euro zone. This rate was then lowered several times, and has been -0.40% as of March 2016. This raises questions about the reasons why agents, in this case the commercial banks, agree to pay interest on deposits left with the ECB. In an article on the causes and consequences of negative rates, we explain how the central bank has come to impose negative rates and how far they can go, and then we discuss the costs of this policy for the banks. suite…»
By Paul Hubert and Fabien Labondance
â€śAnimal spiritsâ€ť, also called â€śerrors of optimism and pessimismâ€ť or â€śsentimentsâ€ť, contribute to macroeconomic fluctuations, as has been pointed out by Pigou (1927) and Keynes (1936) and more recently by Angeletos and La’O (2013) . Quantifying these kinds of unobservable concepts is crucial for understanding how economic agents form their expectations and arrive at decisions that in turn influence the economy. In a recent working paper, â€śCentral Bank Sentiment and Policy Expectationsâ€ť, we examine this issue by analysing central bank communications and assessing their impact on expectations about interest rate markets. suite…»
By Pierre Cahuc and AndrĂ© Zylberberg
We would like to thank Xavier Ragot for permitting us to respond to his comments about our book, Le NĂ©gationnisme Ă©conomique [Economic Negationism]. Like many critics, Xavier Ragot considered that:
1) â€śThe very title of the book proceeds from great violence. This book is on a slippery slope in the intellectual debate that is heading towards a caricature of debate and verbal abuse.â€ť
2) The approach of our work is â€śscientisticâ€ť and â€śreductiveâ€ť, with â€śfaith in knowledge drawn from natural experimentsâ€ť that he doesnâ€™t believe has a â€śconsensus in economicsâ€ť.
3) We â€śwant to import the hierarchy of academic debate into the public debateâ€ť.
We would like to respond to these three allegations, with which we disagree.Â suite…»
By Xavier Ragot
The book by Pierre Cahuc and AndrĂ© Zylberberg is an injunction to take scientific truths about economics into account in the public debate, in the face of interventions that conceal private and ideological interests. The book contains interesting descriptions of the results of recent empirical work using natural experiments for the purpose of evaluating economic policies in the field of education, tax policy, the reduction of working hours, etc.
However, assertions in the book that are at the borderline of reason ultimately make it a caricature that is probably counter-productive. More than just the debate over the 35-hour working week or Franceâ€™s CICE tax credit, what is at stake is the status of economic knowledge in the public debate. suite…»
By CĂ©line Antonin
Since early 2015, the renewal of growth in Italy, the implementation of Act II of Matteo Renziâ€™s Jobs Act, and the reduction in business charges have undeniably contributed to the improvement on the countryâ€™s jobs front. Dynamic job creation, particularly with permanent (CDI) contracts, and an increase in the labour force, could give the impression that (partial) liberalization of Italyâ€™s labour market has resolved the structural weaknesses it has been facing. Nevertheless, in the first half of 2016, the creation of permanent jobs has severely dried up, and what is driving growth in employment now is an increase in fixed-term (CDD) contracts. Moreover, stagnating labour productivity has accompanied more employment-yielding growth, particularly in the services sector. So in the absence of further action to address Italyâ€™s structural weaknesses, the upturn in the labour market may not last. suite…»