Raul Sampognaro and Xavier Timbeau
The noose, in the words of Alexis Tsipras, is getting tighter and tighter around the Greek government. The last tranche of the aid program (7.2 billion euros) has still not been released as the Brussels Group (the ex-Troika) has not accepted the conditions on the aid plan. The Greek state is therefore on the brink of default. It might be thought that this is simply one more episode in the drama that Greece has been acting out with its creditors and that, once again, at the last moment the money needed will be found. But if Greece has managed to meet its deadlines up to now, it has been at the price of expedients that it is not at all certain can be used again.
While tax revenues since the start of the year have been almost one billion euros behind the anticipated targets, the expenses for wages and pensions still have to be paid each month. This time the wall is getting closer, and an agreement is needed if the game is to continue. In June, Greece must pay 1.6Â billion euros to the IMF in four tranches (5, 12, 16 and 19 June). On 28 May an IMF spokesperson confirmed the existence of a rule that would make it possible to group these payments on the last day of the month (a rule last used by Zambia in the 1980s). Since it would then take six weeks for the IMF to consider Greece in default, the country could still gain a few days after 30 June before the deadline with the ECB (with 2 tranches for a total 3.5 billion euros by 20 July 2015).
Historically very few countries have failed to honour their payments to the IMF (currently only Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe are in arrears to the IMF, for a few hundred million dollars). As the IMF is the last resort in case of a crisis in liquidity or the balance of payments, it has, as such, the status of preferred creditor, so defaulting on its debt may trigger cross defaults on other securities, in particular, in the Greek case, those held by the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). This could make them due immediately. A Greek default with the IMF could well jeopardize Greeceâ€™s entire public debt and force the ECB to reject Greek bonds as collateral in the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) operations, the only firewall remaining against the collapse of the Greek banking system.
The legal consequences of such a default are difficult to grasp (which says a lot about the modern financial system). An article published by the Bank for International Settlements, dated July 2013, whose author, Antonio Sainz de VicuĂ±a, was then Director General of ECB Legal Services, is very informative about this issue in the context of the Monetary Union.
In presenting the legal framework, Sainz de VicuĂ±a focuses on Article 123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), a pillar of the Monetary Union, which prohibits the ECB or the national central banks from financing government. In a footnote, the author concedes that there are two exceptions to this rule:
–Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â â€śCredit institutions controlled by the public sector, which may obtain central bank liquidity on terms identical to private credit institutions.â€ť This exception appears explicitly in paragraph 2 of Article 123 of the TFEU.
–Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â â€śThe financing of state obligations vis-Ă -vis the IMF.â€ť
This second aspect has attracted our attention because it is little known to the general public, it does not appear explicitly in the Treaty and it could be a solution, at least in the short term, to avoid Greece being put in default by the IMF .
In searching the corpus of European law, this exception is defined more precisely in Council Regulation no. 3603/93, Â which clarifies the terms of Article 123 of the TFEU, which it is authorized to do under paragraph 2 of Article 125 of the TFEU. More specifically, in Article 7:
The financing by the European Central Bank or the national central banks of obligations falling upon the public sector vis-Ă -vis the International Monetary Fund or resulting from the implementation of the medium-term financial assistance facility set up by Regulation (EEC) No 1969/88 (4) shall not be regarded as a credit facility within the meaning of Article 104 of the Treaty.
The justification for this article is that: during quota increases in the IMF, the financing by the central bank was accepted because It had as a counterpart an asset comparable to international reserves. In the spirit of the law, financing Greek borrowing from the IMF by a credit from the central bank (the ECB or the Bank of Greece) should not be permitted. The obligations falling upon the Greek state probably only concern, according to the spirit of the text, the contribution to the IMF quotas. Nevertheless, the spirit of the law is not the law, and the proper interpretation of the phrase “obligations falling upon the public sector vis-Ă -vis the International Monetary Fund” could open another door for Greece. Given the consequences of a default with the IMF â€“ in particular the continuity of the ELA â€“ invoking this could be justified as preserving the functioning of the Greek payment system, a role falling within the mission of the ECB.
Beyond the legal possibility of a central bank financing Greeceâ€™s debt to the IMF, which would certainly be challenged by some governments, this action would open up a political conflict. A MemberState could be accused of violating (the spirit of) the Treaties, even though that is not a reason to exclude it (according to the ECBâ€™s Legal Services). But is this really an obstacle in view of the importance a default on Greeceâ€™s debt would have for the sustainability of the single currency?
Greeceâ€™s cash flow problems are not new. Since January, the government has been financing its expenditure through accounting transactions that allowed it to offset tax losses. In particular, on 12 May, the Greek government was able to repay an IMF loan tranche by drawing on an emergency fund that was essentially international reserves. The Eurosystem was able to use this exception to give Greece extra time in order to continue the negotiations and avoid the accident.
 Paragraph 1 of the article stipulates that, â€śOverdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the European Central Bank or with the central banks of the Member States (hereinafter referred to as “national central banks”) in favour of Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States shall be prohibited, as shall the purchase directly from them by the European Central Bank or national central banks of debt instruments.â€ť
Â Which stipulates that, â€śParagraph 1 shall not apply to publicly owned credit institutions which, in the context of the supply of reserves by central banks, shall be given the same treatment by national central banks and the European Central Bank as private credit institutions.â€ť
Â Which stipulates that, â€śThe Council, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may, as required, specify definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles 123 and 124 and in this Article.â€ť
 Article 104 became Article 123 in the TFEU.