

Pigeons: how to tax entrepreneurial income? (2/2)

By [Guillaume Allègre](#) and [Xavier Timbeau](#)

After having proposed in the [2013 Budget Bill](#) to tax gains from the sale of securities at the progressive scale used by France's income tax, and no longer at a proportional rate of 19%, the government has now promised to correct its course, under the pressure of a group of entrepreneurs who rallied on the social networks under the hashtag #geonpi ("pigeons", using French verlan slang, which inverts syllables). [An amendment proposed by the government](#) introduces an exemption from the income tax rate on the condition of a specified period of ownership (2 years), a percentage of ownership of the shares (10% of voting rights) and status as an employee or director. Entrepreneurs will thus remain subject to the proportional tax rate of 19%. [In a first post](#), we described how capital gains should be taxed in an equitable way with levies on income from work. In what conditions could entrepreneurs and people with a significant stake in a company justify special treatment of their gains from the sale of securities?

At first glance, the joint taxation of capital income and labour income is particularly relevant for entrepreneurs, who can choose to pay themselves either in the form of wages or in the deferred form of capital gains. In this context, the neutrality of the tax is fair and effective in so far as it does not distort the entrepreneur's choice.

Advocates for the special treatment of entrepreneurship advance several arguments: (1) Entrepreneurship contributes a strong positive externality in terms of innovation, growth and employment. (2) Entrepreneurs are deserving (they work hard and take risks). (3) The risks taken by entrepreneurs cannot

be diversified. They cannot offset their capital losses and gains, so the taxation of capital gains in itself reduces the *ex-ante* yield from entrepreneurship, and therefore the number of entrepreneurs, growth and employment.

The counter-arguments to this are:

(1) Income tax is a poor instrument for taking into account externalities: from this perspective, researchers, teachers, social workers, doctors, and in general all occupations in activities that produce externalities (health , education, culture, etc.) could claim a tax benefit (journalists have already managed to hold their own), so what is to be feared, in this context, is that the tax benefit reflects the level of influence rather than the economic externality.

(2) From the point of view of equity, there is no reason to treat labour income and the risky income of entrepreneurs differently. Young people without connections who engage in long-term studies also take a risk: like entrepreneurs, they forego an immediate wage income for an uncertain future income (they may fail in their studies or choose a poorly paid career, etc.). The entrepreneur's income already takes into account the risk and the effort: it is because entrepreneurship is risky and demanding that it is potentially profitable. The government cannot – and should not – distinguish the share of income (labour or capital) that derives from risk, effort and talent from the share that is the fruit of chance, social networks and circumstance. Finally, taking risk into account by rewarding those who have the good fortune to emerge as winners (those with capital gains) reflects a peculiar vision of equity: in the presence of chance, equity advocates compensating the losers rather than adding to the rewards of the winners.

(3) In terms of efficiency, in the presence of a chance event, compensating the losers acts as insurance, which encourages risk-taking. Domar and Musgrave (1944) emphasized

long ago that the proportional taxation of income from business encourages the taking of entrepreneurial risk. This result is based on the assumption of a negative income tax in the presence of losses, so that the State acts as a supportive partner. While this assumption is justified for large corporations that can consolidate the gains and losses of their subsidiaries and / or carry forward certain losses, it is less legitimate for entrepreneurs who cannot diversify the risks they take. The limited liability company, the limitation on the goods that the entrepreneur can pledge, the possibility of being able to refuse an inheritance so that any eventual debts (including tax and social charges) of entrepreneurs facing failure can then be wiped clean (whereas any eventual assets, if successful, may be transmitted) are all devices that favour individual risk-taking. A more favourable tax treatment for the allocation and carrying-forward of shortfalls and capital losses for entrepreneurs and individuals who hold a significant proportion of a company could enhance these opportunities and increase the incentives for entrepreneurship.

Entrepreneurs need to have the benefit of a legal and administrative environment that is simple and accessible. The authorities can strengthen the entrepreneurial ecosystem by bringing together entrepreneurs, financiers (in particular France's Public Investment Bank), incubators and research laboratories.

Ex-post, from the point of view of equity as well as efficiency, it is the entrepreneurs who fail, and not those who succeed, that must be helped via personal bankruptcy laws, unemployment compensation, and favourable tax systems for deductibility and carrying forward losses. Implicit subsidies for those who succeed, through income tax, while the potential rewards are already extremely large, are instead a form of social Darwinism.

Should households pay for a competitiveness shock?

By [Henri Sterdyniak](#)

France is suffering from an industrial problem. Its current account balance went from a surplus of 2.6% of GDP in 1997 to a deficit of 1% in 2007 and then 2% in 2012, while Germany went from a deficit of 0.4% of GDP in 1997 to a surplus of 5.7%. This raises the issue of France's industrial recovery. Should a major transfer take place from households to large companies for the purpose of a competitiveness shock or to redress business margins? There are many who advocate such a shock (including the MEDEF, but also the CFDT). This would reduce employers' social contributions (by at least 30 billion euros) and in return increase levies on households. The issue of France's industrial recovery is discussed in detail in the latest [Note de l'OFCE \(No. 24 of 30 October 2012\)](#).

It is out of the question to reduce the social security contributions of employees, as these finance only retirement and unemployment benefits, and thus contributory benefits that depend on the contributions paid and that cannot be financed through taxes. Only employer contributions intended for the family or health insurance can be reduced. And then it's necessary to find a substitute resource: VAT or the CSG wealth tax?

In fact, there is little difference between an increase in the CSG tax and an increase in VAT. In both cases, households will lose purchasing power. In the case of a VAT increase, this

would involve higher prices. However, inflation is automatically reflected in the minimum wage and social benefits, and after wage bargaining, in salaries too, so any gain in business competitiveness / profitability is likely to be temporary unless indexing is suspended. In contrast, the victims of a higher CSG would not enjoy automatic indexing mechanisms and would have to accept a reduction in purchasing power. Using the CSG thus makes for a more long-term option.

The big issue at the macroeconomic level is the reaction of companies, which will have to arbitrate between maintaining their prices to rebuild their margins or lowering their prices to become more competitive.

Let's imagine ourselves in a country with a GDP of 100 and exports and imports of 25. The share of wages (including employer contributions) and consumption is 80, and the share of profits and investment is 20. In the short run, wages and pensions are fixed. The reform consists of reducing the amount of employer contributions by 5 (*i.e.* 5% of GDP), while increasing the CSG tax by the same amount. Two scenarios can be adopted based on the pricing policy chosen by companies.

In the first case, the companies maintain their prices and increase their margins. There is no *ex post* gain in business competitiveness, but profitability rises. Wages suffer a loss of 6.25% of their purchasing power (*i.e.* $5/80$). Will the revival in investment offset the fall in consumption? Let's use standard assumptions, *i.e.* a propensity to consume wages of 0.8 and to invest profits of 0.4, with a multiplier of 1. GDP falls in the short term by 2% and employment first drops and then eventually recovers due to the substitution of labour for capital. The measure is costly in terms of purchasing power, and higher employment is not ensured.

In the second case, the companies fully pass on the reduction in charges in their producer prices, which fall by 5%, with consumer prices decreasing by 4% (as the prices of imported

goods remain stable). The purchasing power of wages is down by only 1%. The gains in competitiveness come to 5%. Will the gains in foreign trade offset the reduction in consumption? With a price elasticity of exports of 1 and of imports of 0.5, GDP increases by 1.25%. The measure is less painful.

Should it be done?

The government needs to ask households to accept a reduction in their income, even though they have already lost 0.5% in purchasing power in 2012, consumption stagnated in 2011 and 2012, France is in a state of recession, and demand is already too low.

Should France adopt Germany's strategy: to gain competitiveness at the expense of household purchasing power, knowing that this strategy is a losing one at the level of the euro zone as a whole? Admittedly, this would replace the devaluation that is impossible today in the euro zone, but it would hurt our European partners (which could even respond, to our detriment) and it does not guarantee gains in competitiveness vis-à-vis countries outside the euro zone, which depends primarily on changes in the exchange rate for the euro. Nor would a measure like this replace a reform of the zone's economic policy. Finally, it takes time for gains in competitiveness to translate into renewed growth. For instance, from 2000 to 2005, French growth came to 7.8% (1.55% per year), and German growth to 2.7% (0.55% per year). Can France afford to lose another 5 percentage points of GDP?

France is in an intermediate position between the Northern countries which have made strong gains in competitiveness at the expense of purchasing power and the Southern countries which have experienced excessive wage increases. On a base of 100 in 2000, the level of real wages in 2011 was 97.9 in Germany and 111.2 in France (an increase of 1% per year, corresponding to trend gains in labour competitiveness). Who is wrong? Should we ask the employees in the euro zone

countries, first one then another, to become more competitive than the employees of their partner countries by accepting wage cuts?

The margin of French companies was 29.6% in 1973. This fell to 23.1% in 1982, rebounded to 30.2% in 1987, and was 30.8% in 2006, *i.e.* a satisfactory level. The decline occurring since then (28.6% in 2011) can be explained by the drop-off in activity and the retention of labour. It was not caused by higher taxation nor by excessive wage increases. Overall, the share of profits has returned to a satisfactory level historically. But in 1973 gross fixed capital formation was around the level of profits, while it is lower by 3 points of added value today and the share of net dividends paid has increased significantly. What commitments would business make in terms of investment and employment in France in exchange for a measure that would greatly boost profits? How could companies be prevented from increasing their dividends or their investments abroad?

Making use of an internal devaluation like this implies that France is suffering primarily from a lack of price competitiveness. However, deindustrialization undoubtedly has other deeper causes. Companies prefer to develop in the emerging countries; young people are rejecting poorly paid industrial careers with an uncertain future; France is failing to protect its traditional industries or to develop in innovative sectors; the financial sector has favoured the joys of speculation over financing production and innovation; and so forth. All this will not be solved by an internal devaluation.

France needs a big industrial leap forward. It needs to carry out a different strategy: it is growth that must rebuild business margins, and it is industrial policy (via France's Public Bank Investment [the BPI], research tax credits, competitiveness clusters, support for innovative companies and for certain threatened sectors, and industrial planning) that

must ensure an industrial recovery. This should be funded by the BPI, which needs to have sufficient capacity for action and specific criteria for its interventions.

Long-term competitiveness based on an environmental tax

By [Jacques Le Cacheux](#)

“Shock” or “Pact”? The debate over the loss of France’s competitiveness has recently focused on how fast a switchover from employer payroll taxes to another type of financing is being implemented, implying that the principle of doing this has already been established. As France faces a combination of a deteriorating situation in employment and the trade balance, plus growing evidence that its companies are becoming less competitive compared to those of most of our partners [1] and that business margins are alarmingly low for the future, the need to reduce labour costs seems to be clear. But how and how fast are subject to debate. Should there be a rise in the CSG tax, VAT, or other charges, at the risk of reducing the purchasing power of households in an economic context that is already worse than bleak?

The economic situation has to be managed at the euro zone level

The value of switching a portion of charges on employers – a figure of 30 billion is often bandied about – over to another levy is often disputed by invoking the risks that such a strategy would pose to what is already sluggish growth:

undermining consumption would further curtail business opportunities, hurting activity and thus employment and margins.

But France is in this depressed situation only because the European Union is committed to a forced march of fiscal adjustment that everyone – or almost everyone – now recognizes is counterproductive and doomed to failure: as the heartbreaking situation in Spain illustrates, the quest to reduce the budget deficit when the economy is in recession is futile, and “virtuous” efforts – repeatedly slashing public spending and increasing taxes – merely weaken the economy further and increase unemployment, since the fiscal multipliers are very high, as Keynes demonstrated over 70 years ago!

Fiscal support for economic activity is the only way out. But the experience of the early years of the first Socialist government is alive in all our memories: the failure was as great as were the illusions, and the “turn to austerity” made the government unpopular. An approach that failed in the context of the early 1980s, with a less open economy, an autonomous monetary policy and the possibility of adjusting the currency’s exchange rate, is all the less appropriate in the context of deeper integration and the single currency. Trying to maintain the purchasing power of French households while the rest of the euro zone is in recession and French companies are less competitive could only widen the deficit without boosting growth or employment.

We must therefore continue the fight in Europe: to slow down the pace of deficit reduction; to implement a more accommodative monetary policy in the euro zone, which would have the double advantage of reducing the cost of debt, public and private, thereby making them more sustainable, and of exerting downward pressure on the exchange rate of the euro, boosting external competitiveness at a time when the US and Japanese central banks are seeking to reduce the value of

their own currencies, which would automatically push the euro up; and to jointly engage in a coordinated European policy to support growth, by funding research and investing in trans-European transport and electricity and in education and training.

The national productive capacity must be supported and stimulated

The lack of competitiveness of French industry is not reducible to a problem of labour costs. And it is well known that a downward spiral of wage moderation and social dumping, which we can already see is wreaking havoc in Europe, can only lead the euro zone into a deflationary spiral, comparable to what these same countries vainly attempted in the 1930s in their “every man for himself” effort to escape the Great Depression.

Reducing social spending cannot therefore be an answer, while rising unemployment and the precarious situation of an increasing number of households, workers and retirees are pushing up the needs on all sides. Lowering wages, as some countries have done (Greece and Ireland in particular), either directly or through an increase in working hours without an increase in pay, is not a solution, as wage deflation will further depress demand and thereby feed yet another round of social dumping in Europe.

Improving cost competitiveness by reducing the charges on wages may be part of the solution. But this option does not necessarily send the right signals to businesses and will not necessarily lead to a decrease in their selling prices or an increase in hiring: windfall gains are inevitable, and the greatest affluence is likely to go to shareholders as much as to customers and employees. Reductions in social security contributions could be targeted for certain levels of pay, but they cannot be sectoral or conditional or else they would violate European rules on competition.

It is also necessary to encourage and assist French companies in modernizing their supply capacity. The new Public Investment Bank [*Banque publique d'investissement* – BPI] can help by funding promising projects. But we can also make use of the taxation of corporate profits, including through incentives for investment and research that allow tax credits and depreciation rules: this is a way of more directly using incentives for businesses and conditioning public support on conduct that is likely to improve their competitiveness.

Environmental taxation: a lever for long-term competitiveness

Which charges should now bear the cost of these measures to boost business? Discussions on the respective advantages and disadvantages of VAT and the CSG tax abound. Suffice it to recall here that the VAT has been created to anticipate the reduction in tariff protection, which it replaces very effectively without discriminating on the domestic market between domestic products and imports but while exempting exports: an increase in VAT therefore differs little from a devaluation, with very similar pros and cons, especially with regard to its non-cooperative character within the euro zone. But also recall (see our post of July 2012) that consumption is now relatively less taxed in France than a few years ago, and less than in many of our European partners.

The recourse to a genuine environmental tax would, with regard to the other options for financing these concessions, have the great advantage of promoting sectors that are less polluting and less dependent on fossil fuels – while at the same time diminishing our problems with trade balances, which are partly due to our energy imports – and putting in place the right price and cost incentives for both businesses and consumers. In particular, taking a serious approach to the energy transition demands the introduction of an ambitious carbon tax that is better designed than the one that was censored by the *Conseil constitutionnel* in 2009. Its creation and its step-by-step implementation need to be accompanied by reforming both

the direct levies on household income and the main means-tested benefits so that compensation is kept under good control (cf. article in the [work “Réforme fiscale”, April 2012](#)).

A “competitiveness shock” therefore, but also a “sustainable competitiveness pact”, which encourages French companies to take the right paths by making good choices for the future.

[1] See in particular the [post of 20 July 2012](#).

Pigeons: how to tax capital gains (1/2)

By [Guillaume Allègre](#) and [Xavier Timbeau](#)

After having proposed in the [2013 Budget Bill](#) to tax gains from the sale of securities at the progressive scale used by France’s income tax, and no longer at a proportional rate of 19%, the government has now promised to correct its work under the pressure of a group of entrepreneurs who rallied on the social networks under the hashtag #geonpi (“pigeons”, using French verlan slang, which inverts syllables). An [amendment to the Bill](#) was passed to this effect. Here we discuss the equitable taxation of capital gains on securities. In a second post, we will discuss the specificity of entrepreneurship.

The Budget Bill reflects François Hollande’s commitment to

enact a major tax reform to make the contribution of each fairer: “capital income will be taxed just like work income” (Commitment 14 of the 60 commitments for France). When the capital results from the saving of employment income that was paid at a “normal” rate, taxing it poses the problem of double taxation and may seem questionable. Note, however, that in a financialized economy income from capital is not simply the result of saving, but also the direct result of an activity (see issue 122 of the special *revue de l’OFCE* issue on tax reform, and in particular Allègre, Plane and Timbeau on “Réformer la fiscalité du patrimoine? “Reforming wealth taxation”). In this sense, capital income derives from households’ ability to pay, just as does labour income. The progressive tax on income must apply to all income, whether it comes from capital or labour, in order to respect the principle of horizontal equity, *i.e.* “on equal income, equal tax”.

With respect to gains on disposal, only the change in the real value of the capital can be considered as income: if the value of a good has increased at the same rate as inflation, the nominal gain, even if positive, does not cover the implicit cost of ownership. The Bill provided that gains on disposals are entitled to an allowance based on the length of holding, which was copied from that applicable to real estate gains. The amendment reduces the durations of holding relative to the original text:

– the capital gains taxable at the income tax rate are reduced by an allowance equal to:

a) 20% of their value when the shares, units, rights or securities have been held for at least two years and less than four years at the date of sale;

b) 30% of their value when the stocks, units, rights or securities have been held for at least four years and less than six years at the date of sale;

c) 40% of their value when the stocks, units, rights or securities have been held for at least six years.

This type of allowance on the nominal capital gain is a poor instrument for taking account of inflation: if the variation of the real value of the capital is zero, then the tax should be zero (there is no real income), whereas an allowance will only reduce it; and on the contrary, if the change in the real value of the capital is much higher than inflation, then the allowance will be too favourable; the allowance is a fixed amount based on increments, while price rises are a continuous phenomenon. At least the allowance does not reach 100%, which is still the case for most real estate capital gains, which are totally exempt from gains on property that has been held 30 years. A good system would not apply an allowance to the nominal gain, but would actualize the purchase price using an index that reflects prices, which would make it possible to determine changes in the real value of the asset.

Examples: a good is purchased in January 2000 for 100. It is re-sold for 200 in January 2011. The nominal gain is 100. The allowance of 40% applies, and hence, in the system proposed by the government, the taxation would be on 60, and incorporated in the income tax. The variation in the real value of the capital is 79, which is the most reasonable basis for the taxation (we are not interested here in the rate of taxation, but the taxable base).

If, however, in January 2011 the property were re-sold for 120, the amount used by the allowance system would be 8, whereas the variation in the real value of the capital would be -1.

The following table shows the tax base according to the allowance system and the change in the real value of the capital (in parentheses) based on the re-sale value and on the date of acquisition for a good acquired for a value of 100 and re-sold in 2012.

Year of purchase Re-sale value	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2012
110	6 (-36)	6 (-22)	6 (-14)	6 (-2)	8 (6)	10 (10)
150	30 (4)	30 (18)	30 (26)	30 (38)	40 (46)	50 (50)
200	60 (54)	60 (68)	60 (76)	60 (88)	80 (96)	100 (100)
250	90 (104)	90 (118)	90 (126)	90 (138)	120 (146)	150 (150)

Note on interpretation: For a good purchased at 100 in 1990 and resold at 110 in 2012, the tax base after deduction of 40% is 6 while the change in the real value of the capital is -36, given inflation. While the economic income is negative (there is a loss of purchasing power), with the allowance system the tax base increases. For a good purchased at 100 in 2005 and resold at 250 in 2012, the tax base after deduction is 90, while the change in the real value of the capital is 138: the allowance system is very favourable when the gain is large.

The tax base should be the capital gain after taking into account the inflation tax (variation in the real value of the capital). But this tax base should not be directly subject to a progressive tax scale. Gains on disposals are in fact deferred and should be subject to a charge equivalent to that on a regular income throughout the ownership period. Smoothing with a quotient that varies with the holding period deals with this point. This kind of system divides the income by the number of years held [1], applying the progressive scale to this "regular income equivalent", while adding the household's other income for the current year, then multiplying the increase in the tax related to the exceptional income by the number of years held [2]. An alternative is to tax the capital gains upon disposal at a constant rate equal to the principal marginal rate (30%, to which should be added the CSG wealth tax).

The following points need to be added to the comments above:

- General clearing systems between gains and losses over a long period (currently 10 years) make it possible to take into account risks and potential losses, at least for diversified investors;

- As income from employment can easily be converted into capital income (through various financial instruments and portage arrangements), aligning the two taxes could limit the temptations of tax optimization, which opens the door to tax avoidance;
- In this respect, an Exit Tax, based on the unrealized capital gains, could be used to minimize the interest of becoming a tax exile, which increases with accumulated gains and tax potential.

Donations, especially when they are made outside inheritance, should not be used to erase capital gains, as is currently the case. This provision, which was initially intended to avoid double taxation, can now be used to completely escape taxation.

[\[1\]](#) Based on the equivalence of tax treatment for a regular income and an exceptional income, it appears that the division is made using a coefficient that depends on the interest rate. In practice, for low interest rates, this coefficient is equal to the number of years of ownership.

[\[2\]](#) This calculation is equivalent to regular taxation over time if the household's current earnings are representative of its income (assuming regular income) for the duration of ownership and if the tax schedule is relatively stable.

Setting expectations carefully

[Zakaria Babutsidze](#)

We all base certain our decisions on expectations. We buy new products because we expect that they carry certain quality, we vote for certain candidates because we expect they will do a “good job”, etc. However, recent research suggests that our expectations affect not only decisions. They also affect the level of enjoyment we derive from taking these decisions (or from experiencing their consequences). In economic terms it means that level of utility derived from the consumption of a product is affected by the expectations of the consumer. Even more technically, we say that people possess expectation-based reference-dependent preferences.

Consider a situation where a decision maker has to make an action. The level of the satisfaction that she will extract from this action (denote this value by x) is not perfectly known to her before the action is taken. This level of satisfaction is realized afterwards. However, a decision-maker has an expectation of what that level might be before making the decision (denote this value by y). A simple interpretation of the theory suggests then that mismatch between x and y will affect the actual satisfaction derived from the action. In particular, if $y - x < 0$, which means that realized satisfaction exceeded expectations then consumer gets an extra boost in satisfaction level and ultimate level of satisfaction is in fact above x . However, if consumer gets disappointed ($y - x > 0$) his satisfaction will be lower than x .

How these satisfaction-affecting expectations are formed is another matter. In this respect we can imagine certain number of opportunities given to the decision-maker to decide on the final expectation that he will base his decision on. What

complicates the calculation of the final impression is that early impressions actually affect the later ones. Therefore, more opportunities there are to form the impression harder it is to detect the actual pattern of expectation formation.

Experimental evidence supporting the principles underlying expectation-based reference-dependent preferences is mounting as this entry is being written ([Crawford and Meng, 2011](#); [Pope and Schweitzer, 2011](#); [Gill and Prowse, 2012](#)). I have discussed certain business and economic implications of these principles in a [recent OFCE working paper](#). For example, the mechanism implies that advertising campaigns can get wasteful not only from social, but also from individual producer's point of view as they may scare off potential customers instead of attracting them.

What is interesting is the fact that this principle seems to have been known for advertisers, media strategists and business practitioners for some time now ([Parasuraman et al., 1991](#); [Dixon et al., 2010](#)). In fact, we can even speculate that this principle is known for certain politicians (or at least members of their staff).

Take a look at the current US presidential campaign. More precisely at the three debates held between the two presidential candidates (Democrat incumbent Barak Obama and Republican challenger Mitt Romney) that were held on October 3rd, 16th and 22nd. President Obama is known to have lost the first debate and won the third one, while the second debate was called a draw. Now, what is important to understand is that there is no actual score. These "scores" were simply based on the feelings of the electorate surveyed after each debate. These debates can be seen as opportunities to the voters to form their expectations based on which they will cast their votes on November 6.

Sequencing in results has been clearly beneficial for Mr Obama for few different reasons. For example, psychologists have a memory “bin” model of impression formation where the last piece of information received is the most relevant piece in determining the decision ([Wyer and Srull, 1989](#); [Babutsidze, 2012](#)). Another reason why the sequencing favors the incumbent is that voters usually prefer voting for candidates that are on a winning streak to voting for those on a losing streak.

However, what expectation-based reference-dependent preferences can offer is the insight into the judgment of voters on the outcome of single debates. The theory implies that voters would give higher appraisal to the positive performance of the candidate when they expect him not to do well compared to when they expect him to perform well. This means voters would judge President Obama’s performance to be poorer hadn’t they been “primed” by the results of the first two debates.

Presidential candidates might not know about this theory, but Mr Obama tried to use the principle (consciously or unconsciously) by saying that: [“Governor Romney, he’s a good debater. I’m just okay”](#) just before the first debate. The fact is that the strategy to set voter expectations low has not been sufficient to convince enough voters that his poor performance was satisfactory. Perhaps this was the case because it indeed was very hard to set expectations lower than those set by Mr Romney who has provided meaty [gaffe](#) after [gaffe](#) throughout the campaign.

However, the lost first debate might actually benefit President Obama. Somewhat counter-intuitive suggestion of the theory is that had he performed well during the first debate, he’d have *a higher likelihood of losing elections*.

The euro zone: confidence won't be enough

By [Céline Antonin](#), [Christophe Blot](#) and Danielle Schweisguth

This text summarizes the OFCE's October 2012 forecasts for [the economy of the euro zone](#).

After more than two years of crisis in the euro zone, this time the meeting of the European Council, held on 18 and 19 October, had nothing of the atmosphere of yet another last-chance summit. Even though discussions on the future banking union [\[1\]](#) were a source of tension between France and Germany, there was no sword of Damocles hanging over the heads of the European heads of state. However, it would be premature to assume that the crisis is coming to an end. It is sufficient to recall that the GDP of the euro zone has still not regained its pre-crisis level, and in fact declined again by 0.2% in the second quarter of 2012. This decline is forecast to continue, as we expect GDP to fall by 0.5% in 2012 and by 0.1% in 2013. Consequently, the unemployment rate in the euro zone, which has already surpassed its previous historical record from April 1997, will rise further, reaching 12.1% by end 2013. What then are the reasons for the lull? Can the euro zone quickly resume its growth and hope to finally put an end to the social crisis?


Since the end of 2011, Europe has adopted a new treaty (the Treaty on stability, coordination and governance, the TSCG) which is being ratified in the 25 signatory countries. The new law is specifically intended to strengthen both budgetary

discipline – through the adoption of national golden rules – and solidarity through the creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), in so far as the use of the ESM is conditional on ratification of the TSCG. On 6 September, the ECB unveiled the basic points of its new conditional purchase of sovereign debt ([see here](#)), which is aimed at reducing the interest rates of countries subject to the ESM. Thus, the risk premium, as measured by the difference between the Italian and Spanish sovereign interest rates and the German rate, after peaking on 24 July 2012, decreased respectively by 2.2 and 2.5 points (Figures 1 and 2). This is of course still far from normal, but this lull is nevertheless welcome and it shows that the spectre of a breakup of the euro zone has receded.


Could this new wave of optimism be a precursor to an upturn in the economy of the euro zone? The answer to this question is, unfortunately, negative. The fiscal policies of countries in the zone are still highly restrictive, a situation that has even intensified in 2012, pushing Italy and Spain back into recession and deepening the recession that was already hitting Portugal and Greece. For the euro zone as a whole, the fiscal stimulus will come to 1.7 percent of GDP in 2012 (table). The series of votes on national budgets confirms this strategy of a forced reduction of budget deficits for 2013, with the overall fiscal consolidation for the euro zone as a whole coming to 1.3%. There will be significant differences between the countries, since in Germany the fiscal stimulus will barely be negative (-0.2 point) while in Spain, Italy and Greece it will be more than -2 GDP points. However, the recessionary impact of this synchronized fiscal consolidation will be even greater given that the euro zone countries are still at the bottom of the economic cycle. In these conditions, the targets for budget deficit reduction will not be met, which will inevitably raise the question of the appropriateness of further budget cuts. More and more Member States thus risk being caught in a vicious circle where low growth calls for further fiscal adjustments that in turn

deepen the economic and social crisis. It is essential that any decision about improving the governance of the European Union or the transmission of monetary policy restores confidence and creates the conditions for a return to growth. But this will be insufficient to escape the recession and should not obscure the impact of the fiscal strategy.

Graphique 1. Long-term sovereign interest rates in Italy and the Italy-Germany Spread



Graphique 2. Long-term sovereign interest rates in Spain and the Spain-Germany Spread



Source : Datastream.

Tableau. Fiscal stimulus in the euro zone countries

In GDP points

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Germany	0,7	1,5	-0,9	-0,5	-0,2
Austria	0,4	0,6	-1,6	-0,1	-0,9
Belgium	1,9	-0,3	-0,1	-1,1	-0,8
Spain	3,8	-2,5	-1,1	-3,4	-2,4
Finland	0,4	1,5	-1,6	-0,4	-1,3
France	2,3	-0,5	-2,9	-1,6	-1,8
Greece	3,2	-8,0	-5,3	-5,0	-3,9
Ireland	2,2	-4,4	-1,5	-2,4	-1,8
Italy	0,8	-0,4	-1,2	-3,2	-2,1
Netherlands	4,0	-1,1	-0,2	-1,0	-1,2
Portugal	5,0	-0,7	-3,7	-3,7	-1,8
Euro zone 11*	1,8	-0,3	-1,3	-1,7	-1,3

* Excluding Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia and Estonia.

Note : The fiscal stimulus is measured by the opposite of the variation in the cyclically adjusted primary balance, that is, excluding interest charges and exceptional revenue: it approximates the discretionary budget policy.

Sources : OFCE calculations and forecasts, October 2012.

tab

[1] See [here](#) for an analysis of the importance of the proposed banking union and the questions it raises.

France: will the war of the 3% take place?

By [Eric Heyer](#)

This text summarizes the [OFCE's October 2012 forecasts for the French economy](#).

The French economy is expected to see average annual growth of

0.1% in 2012 and 0.0% in 2013. This performance is particularly poor and far from the path that an economy recovering from a crisis would normally experience.

Four years after the onset of the crisis, the French economy has real potential for a rebound: this should lead to spontaneous average growth of about 3.0% per year in 2012 and 2013, making up some of the output gap built up since the start of the crisis. But this spontaneous recovery is being hampered, mainly by the establishment of budgetary savings plans in France and throughout Europe. The fiscal consolidation strategy imposed by the European Commission is likely to slice nearly 6 percentage points off GDP in France during 2012 and 2013.

Table 1. The brakes on growth in France

En points of GDP

Rythm	... quaterly		... annually	
	2012	2013	2012	2013
<i>Spontaneous recovery</i>	0,8	0,8	2,1	3,1
<i>Budget impact</i>	-0,4	-0,4	-1,6	-1,7
<i>Oil shock</i>	-0,05	0,0	-0,2	0,0
<i>External environment</i>	-0,4	-0,3	-1,4	-1,2
<i>Achievement</i>			-1,0	-0,2
Growth forecasts	-0,04	0,04	0,1	0,0

Sources : INSEE, OFCE calculations.

By setting a pace that is far from its potential, the expected growth will increase the output gap accumulated since 2008 and will lead to a further deterioration on the labour market. The unemployment rate will rise steadily and hit 11% by late 2013.

Moreover, the reduction of the budget deficit expected by the Government due to the implementation of its consolidation strategy – the target for the general government deficit is 3% of GDP in 2013 – will be partially undermined by the shortfall in tax revenue due to weak growth. The general government deficit will come to 3.5% in 2013.

Under these conditions, should the government do whatever it

can to fulfil its commitment to a 3% deficit in 2013?

In a context of financial uncertainty, being the only State not to keep its promise of fiscal consolidation is a risk, *i.e.* of being punished immediately by an increase in the financial terms on the repayment of its debt. This risk is real, but limited. The current situation is that of a “liquidity trap” and abundant savings. The result is a “flight to quality” phenomenon on the part of investors seeking safe investments. But among these are both German and French government bonds. Under these conditions, reducing the government deficit by 1 GDP point instead of 1.5 point would have very little impact on French bond rates.

However, maintaining a target of a 3% deficit in 2013 could have a dramatic impact on economic activity and employment in France. We simulated a scenario in which the French government maintains its budgetary commitment regardless of the costs and the economic situation. If this were to occur, it would require the adoption of a new programme of budget cuts in the coming months in the amount of 22 billion euros.

This strategy would cut economic activity in the country by 1.2% in 2013. It would lead to a further increase in the unemployment rate, which would reach 11.7% at year end, nearly 12%. As for employment, this obstinacy would intensify job losses, costing nearly 200,000 jobs in total.

A darker scenario is also possible: according to our forecasts, and taking into account the draft budget bills known and approved, no major European country would meet its deficit reduction commitments in 2013. By underestimating the difficulty of reaching inaccessible targets, there is a high risk of seeing the euro zone countries locked into a spiral where the nervousness of the financial markets would become the engine driving ever greater austerity. To illustrate this risk, we simulated a scenario in which the major euro zone countries (Germany, France, Italy and Spain) implement new

austerity measures to meet their deficit targets in 2013. Adopting such a strategy would result in a strong negative shock to economic activity in these countries. For the French economy, it would lead to additional austerity that either at the national level or coming from its euro zone partner countries would cause a severe recession in 2013. French GDP would fall by more than 4.0%, resulting in a further increase in the unemployment rate, which would approach 14%.

Table 2. Illustrative scenarios of risks to French growth

In %	2011	2012*	2013*
Central scenario			
GDP	1,4	0,1	0,0
Gov't deficit (in GDP points)	-7,1	-4,4	-3,5
Unemployment rate	9,4	10,2	11,0
Market employment	104	-95	-166
Scenario where France alone meets its budget commitments			
GDP			-1,2
Gov't deficit (in GDP points)			-3,0
Unemployment rate			11,7
Market employment (in 1000s)			
Change			-361
Deviation from central scenario			-195
Scénario where euro zone countries meet their budget commitments			
GDP			-4,6
Gov't deficit (in GDP points)			-3,0
Unemployment rate			18,8
Market employment (in 1000s)			
Change			-910
Déviation from central scenario			-744

* OFCE forecast October 2012

Sources : INSEE ; OFCE calculations e-mod.fr.

The debacle of austerity

By [Xavier Timbeau](#)

This text summarizes [the OFCE's October 2012 forecasts](#).

The year 2012 is ending, with hopes for an end to the crisis disappointed. After a year marked by recession, the euro zone will go through another catastrophic year in 2013 (a -0.1% decline in GDP in 2013, after -0.5% in 2012, according to our forecasts – see the table). The UK is no exception to this trend, as it plunges deeper into crisis (-0.4% in 2012, 0.3% in 2013). In addition to the figures for economic growth, unemployment trends are another reminder of the gravity of the situation. With the exception of Germany and a few other developed countries, the Western economies have been hit by high unemployment that is persisting or, in the euro zone, even rising (the unemployment rate will reach 12% in the euro zone in 2013, up from 11.2% in the second quarter of 2012). This persistent unemployment is leading to a worsening situation for those who have lost their jobs, as some fall into the ranks of the long-term unemployed and face the exhaustion of their rights to compensation. Although the United States is experiencing more favourable economic growth than in the euro zone, its labour market clearly illustrates that the US economy is mired in the Great Recession.

Was this disaster, with the euro zone at its epicentre, an unforeseeable event? Is it some fatality that we have no choice but to accept, with no alternative but to bear the consequences? No – the return to recession in fact stems from a misdiagnosis and the inability of Europe's institutions to respond quickly to the dynamics of the crisis. This new downturn is the result of massive, exaggerated austerity policies whose impacts have been underestimated. The determination to urgently rebalance the public finances and restore the credibility of the euro zone's economic

management, regardless of the cost, has led to its opposite. To get out of this rut will require reversing Europe's economic policy.

The difficulty posed by the current situation originates in widening public deficits and swelling public debts, which reached record levels in 2012. Keep in mind, however, that the deficits and public debts were not the cause of the crisis of 2008-2009, but its consequence. To stop the recessionary spiral of 2008-2009, governments allowed the automatic stabilizers to work; they implemented stimulus plans, took steps to rescue the financial sector and socialized part of the private debt that threatened to destabilize the entire global financial system. This is what caused the deficits. The decision to socialize the problem reflected an effort to put a stop to the freefall.

The return to recession thus grew out of the difficulty of dealing with the socialization of private debt. Indeed, in the euro zone, each country is forced to deal with financing its deficit without control of its currency. The result is immediate: a beauty contest based on who has the most rigorous public finances is taking place between the euro zone countries. Each European economic agent is, with reason, seeking the most reliable support for its assets and is finding Germany's public debt to hold the greatest attraction. Other countries are therefore threatened in the long-term or even immediately by the drying up of their market financing. To attract capital, they must accept higher interest rates and urgently purge their public finances. But they are chasing after a sustainability that is disappearing with the recession when they seek to obtain this by means of austerity.

For countries that have control of their monetary policy, such as the United States or the United Kingdom, the situation is different. There the national savings is exposed to a currency risk if it attempts to flee to other countries. In addition, the central bank acts as the lender of last resort. Inflation

could ensue, but default on the debt is unthinkable. In contrast, in the euro zone default becomes a real possibility, and the only short-term shelter is Germany, because it will be the last country to collapse. But it too will inevitably collapse if all its partners collapse.

The solution to the crisis of 2008-2009 was therefore to socialize the private debts that had become unsustainable after the speculative bubbles burst. As for what follows, the solution is then to absorb these now public debts without causing the kind of panic that we were able to contain in the summer of 2009. Two conditions are necessary. The first condition is to provide a guarantee that there will be no default on any public debt, neither partial nor complete. This guarantee can be given in the euro zone only by some form of pooling the public debt. The mechanism announced by the ECB in September 2012, the Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT), makes it possible to envisage this kind of pooling. There is, however, a possible contradiction. In effect this mechanism conditions the purchase of debt securities (and thus pooling them through the balance sheet of the ECB) on acceptance of a fiscal consolidation plan. But Spain, which needs this mechanism in order to escape the pressure of the markets, does not want to enter the OMT on just any conditions. Relief from the pressure of the markets is only worthwhile if it makes it possible to break out of the vicious circle of austerity.

The lack of preparation of Europe's institutions for a financial crisis has been compounded by an error in understanding the way its economies function. At the heart of this error is an incorrect assessment of the value of the multipliers used to measure the impact of fiscal consolidation policies on economic activity. By underestimating the fiscal multipliers, Europe's governments thought they could rapidly and safely re-balance their public finances through quick, violent austerity measures. Influenced by an extensive economic literature that even suggests that austerity could be

a source of economic growth, they engaged in a program of unprecedented fiscal restraint.

Today, however, as is illustrated by the dramatic revisions by the [IMF](#) and the [European Commission](#), the fiscal multipliers are much larger, since the economies are experiencing situations of prolonged involuntary unemployment. A variety of empirical evidence is converging to show this, from an analysis of the forecast errors to the calculation of the multipliers from the performances recorded in 2011 and estimated for 2012 ([see the full text of our October 2012 forecast](#)). We therefore believe that the multiplier for the euro zone as a whole in 2012 is 1.6, which is comparable to the assessments for the United States and the United Kingdom.

Thus, the second condition for the recovery of the public finances is a realistic estimate of the multiplier effect. Higher multipliers mean a greater impact of fiscal restraint on the public finances and, consequently, a lower impact on deficit reduction. It is this bad combination that is the source of the austerity-fuelled debacle that is undermining any prospect of re-balancing the public finances. Spain once again perfectly illustrates where taking this relentless logic to absurd lengths leads: an economy where a quarter of the population is unemployed, and which is now risking political and social disintegration.

But the existence of this high multiplier also shows how to break austerity's vicious circle. Instead of trying to reduce the public deficit quickly and at any cost, what is needed is to let the economy get back to a state where the multipliers are lower and have regained their usual configuration. The point therefore is to postpone the fiscal adjustment to a time when unemployment has fallen significantly so that fiscal restraint can have the impact that it should.

Delaying the adjustment assumes that the market pressure has been contained by a central bank that provides the necessary

guarantees for the public debt. It also assumes that the interest rate on the debt is as low as possible so as to ensure the participation of the stakeholders who ultimately will benefit from sustainable public finances. It also implies that in the euro zone the pooling of the sovereign debt is associated with some form of control over the long-term sustainability of the public finances of each Member State, *i.e.* a partial abandonment of national sovereignty that in any case has become inoperative, in favour of a supranational sovereignty which alone is able to generate the new manoeuvring room that will make it possible to end the crisis.

OFCE growth forecasts, October 12

Annual growth in GDP, %

	2011	2012	2013
Euro zone	1,5	-0,5	-0,1
Germany	3,1	0,8	0,6
France	1,7	0,1	0,0
Italy	0,5	-2,4	-1,1
Spain	0,4	-1,4	-1,2
Netherlands	1,1	-0,2	0,3
Belgium	1,8	-0,1	0,9
Finland	2,8	0,8	1,1
Austria	2,7	1,0	0,5
Portugal	-1,7	-2,8	-1,2
Greece	-6,2	-6,2	-3,7
Ireland	0,8	-0,4	-0,1
United Kingdom	0,9	-0,4	0,3
United States	1,8	2,2	0,9
Japan	-0,7	2,4	1,3

Sources : National calculations, OFCE forecasts October 2012.

The Insolent health of the luxury sector: a false


paradox

By [Jean-Luc Gaffard](#)

The luxury industry has been spared the spreading crisis, which in the media's eyes seems to be posing a paradox. This situation in fact corroborates the diagnosis that rising inequality is the true breeding ground of the crisis.

LVMH, the global leader in the luxury sector, saw its sales jump 26% in the first half of 2012. Richemont, the global number two and owner of such brands as Cartier, Montblanc, Van Cleef & Arpels and Jaeger-LeCoultre, saw its operating income increase by 20% during the second half-year ending 30th September. The Italian firm Prada announced a 36.5% increase in its turnover in the first half of 2012 (37.3% in Europe). The luxury division of PPR, the other French company in the sector, saw sales go up by 30.7% in the first half year.

These results contrast sharply with the situation in other industries. They are the result of a rise in prices that is nothing less than staggering. The price index for luxury goods as calculated since 1976 (the "[Forbes Cost of Living Extremely Well](#)") rose 800% in 35 years, compared with 300% for the price index for consumer goods.



In an article on the subject ("The more expensive the product, the more desirable", 8 August 2012), *Le Monde* reported that the price of a Burberry gabardine raincoat has multiplied by 5.6 and that the price of a Rolex YachtMaster has rocketed from 5,488 to 39,100 euros. These soaring prices simply reflect the great and growing willingness to pay of the richest strata, for whom price is simply a mark of differentiation and desirability.

In these circumstances, the stock market success of companies in the luxury industry is hardly surprising. Nor is it surprising to see the stock market success of companies at the other end of the spectrum, those that produce low-end, cheap goods. This effect, called the hourglass effect, is starkly revealing of the reality of the crisis, which is clearly rooted in widening inequalities in income and wealth.

The healthy state of luxury firms, which are creating jobs at a time of rising unemployment, is obviously a source for rejoicing. But if we simply left things at this remark about the sector, we would be missing the essential point. First, it must be recognized that the industries in question are responding to higher demand much more by raising prices, and

not the quantities produced, for the simple reason that the number of wealthy people, even if growing significantly with the arrival of the nouveaux riches in China and elsewhere, is still limited. We are a long way from the fundamental mechanism driving growth, whereby gains in productivity push prices down and have an impact on income that is substantial enough to stimulate demand on an ever increasing scale. We also have to recognize the other side of the coin of this genuine increase in inequality, namely, the fall in median income and the corresponding weakening of the large middle class, whose demand for midrange products and services was a foundation for growth.

It is also worth noting recent trends in the luxury industry, which has successfully striven to produce brands that are lower cost versions of goods that were previously reserved for the rich. As shown by some studies, the diversification of the luxury industry is being accompanied by a sociological change indicating that middle-class households are developing a greater preference for these types of goods (see J. Hoffmann and I. Coste-Manière, *2012 Luxury Strategy in Action*, Palgrave Macmillan). This might be a long-term development if it is remembered that preferences are not homothetic, in other words, that lower incomes are not leading back to the map of preferences as it existed previously (before incomes had increased). Many households are trying to maintain the kind of consumption that they have become accustomed to, ultimately at the cost of higher indebtedness, if by chance that is permitted by the financial system. However, the business segment preserved in this way may prove to be fragile, and the performance of the luxury industry could continue to be driven by the conspicuous consumption of genuine luxury products. It is not surprising, then, to observe that, with the continuation of the crisis and its consequent impact on the consumption of the middle class, a company like PPR is planning [to hive off certain brands](#), notably FNAC, in order to focus on the luxury segment.

There is nothing paradoxical about the insolent health of the luxury industry. It goes hand in hand with the heightening difficulties facing industries and companies whose products and services are intended for those on middle-incomes. The constantly increasing divergence in performance between industries and firms depending on their positioning range is merely another sign of a deepening crisis.

The governance of public finances: from the Fiscal pact to France's Organic law

by [Henri Sterdyniak](#)

So the French government has had Parliament enact an “Organic law relating to the planning and governance of public finances” (*loi organique relative à la programmation et à la gouvernance des finances publiques*), which translates into French law the European Fiscal pact (the Treaty on stability, coordination and governance) that France had made a commitment to ratify. This Law can be assessed from two points of view: from the perspective of how well it conforms to the Treaty or from the viewpoint of its own relevance, *i.e.* will it improve France's fiscal policy?

In fact, the government has chosen – as the Constitutional Council had provided it with the possibility of so doing – a minimalist approach to taking into account the Treaty. The new

budgetary procedure is not incorporated into the Constitution, and as we shall see, the Treaty provides for certain automatic binding procedures that the Organic law tempers or does not mention.

The Organic Law has three sections, dealing respectively with the budget plan (*loi de programmation des finances publiques – LPFP*), the High Council on the Public Finances (*Haut Conseil des finances publiques*), and a correction mechanism.

The Budget Plan

Article 1 of the Organic Law stipulates: “In accordance with the objective of balanced government accounts as set out in Article 34 of the Constitution, the LPFP sets the medium-term targets of the government administrations referred to in Article 3 of the TSCG.”

Article 34 of the Constitution, adopted on 31 July 2008, set out only a medium-term non-binding target. It has had little influence on the fiscal policy adopted since then. In times of crisis, the multi-year guidelines quickly cease to have an influence. This was the case, for example, in 2009. The 2009 deficit, which was set at 0.9% of GDP by the four-year budget plan passed in January 2008, and 3.9% of GDP according to the January 2009 plan, ultimately amounted to 7.5%. Should we give up this flexibility?

Moreover, how can the budget plan “set a target” when the target flows from Article 3 of the Treaty, which clearly states that the target should be a structural deficit of less than 0.5% of GDP and that a path for an adjustment to ensure a rapid convergence toward equilibrium will be proposed by the European Commission?

Doesn't the ambiguity of this article actually reflect an attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable: the sovereignty of Parliament in budgetary matters with France's commitment to follow the recommendations of the Commission?

Article 1 of the Organic Law continues: "The budget plan (LPFP) determines the trajectory of the successive annual actual balances and structural balances... The structural balance is the cyclically-adjusted balance net of one-off and temporary measures." Article 3 states that the period covered is at least three years.

Thus, the Law takes no account of the experience of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP): it is impossible to fix a trajectory for the public finances, in terms of the structural and actual deficit, for a period of three years. In January 2008, France was committed to having a balanced budget in 2012. It won't even get close. Should commitments be made that are impossible to keep?

This is impossible for two reasons. First, unpredictable economic fluctuations make it necessary to constantly adapt economic policy. In case of a deep crisis, as since 2009, it is necessary to make use of both economic stabilizers and discretionary measures (which increase what is called the structural deficit). If taken seriously, the Treaty prohibits any policy to boost activity during a downturn in activity. In the autumn of 2008, according to the Commission France had a structural deficit of 3.2% of GDP. If the Treaty had been in force, it would have had to reduce this quickly to 2.5% in 2009. In fact, France has moved to a structural deficit of 6% of GDP, according to the Commission's assessment, in other words, 3.5 percentage points higher. Is the government wrong to have promoted activity, or to have come to the rescue of the banks? Should it have embarked on a tough austerity policy to offset the fall in tax revenue?

The text is, of course, ambiguous. On the one hand, it sets out that the structural deficit does not include "one-off and temporary" measures. Assistance to banks is undoubtedly a one-off, but why not all the 2009 stimulus measures, or in the opposite direction, the 75% income tax assessment which is scheduled for 2 years? Who decides? On the other hand, the

Treaty recognizes that a country may deviate from its target or its adjustment path in the event of “exceptional circumstances” which, since the revision of the Growth and Stability Pact, can be interpreted as negative growth or a large output gap. However, the Commission refuses to recognize that most euro zone countries have actually been in this situation since 2009, and it is insisting on imposing rapid deficit reduction policies on them.

On the other hand, a State has no economic reason to set itself a standard for balancing the public purse. According to the true “golden rule of public finance”, which was stated by the economist Paul Leroy-Beaulieu in the late nineteenth century, it is legitimate to finance public investment through debt. In the case of France, a structural deficit of around 2.4% of GDP is legitimate.

As in the Treaty, Article 1 of the Organic Law refers to the structural balance, the balance that would exist if France were at its potential output, the maximum output consistent with stable inflation. But the size of this potential output, which cannot simply be observed, is a subject of debate among economists. Different methods produce different results, which are subject to sharp revisions. France’s structural balance in 2012 is 3.6% according to the French government, 3% according to the European Commission, 2.8% according to the OECD, and according to us 0.5%, since the crisis has caused us to lose 8% of GDP compared to our growth trend. The Treaty requires the use of the Commission’s method. Is this scientifically legitimate? Can France call into question this assessment?

Article 5 states that the potential growth assumptions should be presented in an appendix, but the definition of potential growth is even more questionable than that of potential output. For example, the latest budget bill (*projet de loi de finances – PLF*) expects potential growth of 1.5% per year up to 2017 for France, thus abandoning forever the expectation of making up the 8 points of activity lost to the crisis.

The Organic Law simply forgets Article 4 of the Treaty (which requires a country with a debt of over 60% of GDP to reduce the gap by one-twentieth per year). It also ignores Article 5, which states that a country subject to an Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) is to be placed under supervision, and has to submit to the EU Council and Commission annual budget plans and a list of the structural reforms that it will implement in order to make a sustainable correction to its deficit. It is this article that obliges France, like many other EU countries, to do all it can to get down to a 3% deficit by 2013, regardless of the economic situation, since, in case of an EDP, the constraint pertains to the actual balance and not the structural balance. It forgets Article 7, which states that, in this context, the decisions of the Commission are obligatory (member countries can oppose it only with a qualified majority, with the country concerned not voting).

The LPFP will cover a period of four to five years, but will be voted upon again each year, so that the constraint thus introduced can be changed by a vote on a new budget plan. This has been the case in France for as long as the Fiscal Pact has existed. Thus, the LPFP does not introduce any supplementary constraint itself, other than what is already required by European legislation.

The High Council of Public Finance

The Organic Law sets up a High Council of Public Finance, which will advise on the macroeconomic forecasts underlying the budget bill (LPF), the bill financing social security, the adjustment budget bills, the stability program that France must provide to the European authorities, and the budget plan (LPFP). It will assess whether France has been meeting its European commitments, and verify that the LPF (budget bill) is consistent with the trajectory announced in the budget plan (LPFP). It will give its opinion on any evocation of "exceptional circumstances".

Chaired by the President of France's Court of Audit (Cour des comptes), the High Council consists of four members from the Court of Audit and four members appointed for their expertise in public finance by the Presidents of the National Assembly, the Senate and the two finance commissions. This predominance of the Court of Audit is problematic. The judicial officers from the Court of Audit are not *a priori* experts in macroeconomics, and they are often, based on their function, more concerned with balancing the public finances than with growth and employment. For instance, the latest reports from the Court of Audit underestimate the output gap, support the thesis that the fiscal multiplier is close to zero, and believe that it is better to reduce public spending than to increase taxes. We would like to be certain that the composition of the High Council and its work and reports reflect the diversity of opinion that exists on fiscal policy.

More fundamentally, it is questionable whether the High Council has room for flexibility in its assessments. Will it have the right to conclude that the path of adjustment is too restrictive, and that the medium-term objective is not realistic? What strategy will be advocated by the High Council in the event of an economic slowdown: an expansionary policy to support growth or an austerity policy to restore the public finances?

Assume, for example, that the government has a budget for 2013 based on growth of 1.2%, resulting in a deficit of 3%. The High Council believes that growth will instead be only 0.6%, causing a decline in tax revenues, and thus a deficit of 3.3%. It will advocate doing whatever is necessary to achieve a 3% deficit. Assuming that the fiscal multiplier is 1, it will be necessary to come up with 12 billion in tax increases (or spending cuts), or 0.6% of GDP, to have an *ex post* deficit of 3%, but no growth. There is thus a great risk that this will lead to pro-cyclical policies. This will of course be mitigated when France is longer be subject to an EDP, as the

High Council can then reason in terms of the structural deficit, but this will persist because everything will then depend on evaluating the structural deficit.

Lastly, there is the question of what legitimacy the High Council will have. The choice of fiscal policy must be subject to democratic procedures. The assessment of economic policy is part of a scientific, democratic debate. Should it be entrusted to a High Council, composed mainly of judicial experts, rather than economists on the one hand and representatives of the nation on the other?

The High Council will of course only give advice, which neither the government nor parliament are obliged to follow, but the risk is great that these opinions will affect the financial markets and the Commission and that it would be risky for the government to ignore them.

The correction mechanism

To ensure that countries do indeed follow the adjustment path, the Treaty requires countries to provide an automatic correction mechanism if deviations are observed with respect to this path. In the minds of the negotiators of the North European countries and members of the Commission, this mechanism should provide that if a deviation of 1% of GDP is seen in year N, the Constitution provides that, automatically, a certain tax (e.g. VAT) would be raised by 0.5 GDP point and certain expenditures (e.g. social benefits) would be reduced by 0.5 GDP point.

In fact, Chapter 3 of France's Organic Law provides that the High Council is to report such a gap, the government is to set out the reasons for this discrepancy and then take it into account in drawing up the next budget bill. Parliament's rights are respected, but fortunately the character of being automatic is not guaranteed.

Conclusion

In the spirit of its founders, the fiscal treaty must put an end to the possibility of autonomous national fiscal policies. Fiscal policies should become automatic. The goal of fiscal policy should be balancing the budget, just as the goal of monetary policy should be fighting inflation; growth and employment are to be sought by means of free market structural reforms.

The Organic Law seems to be an ambiguous compromise. France is ratifying the Treaty, but implementing it only reluctantly. It's a safe bet that, as with the Stability Pact, there will be great tension in the euro zone between purists who demand the strict application of the Treaty and those who do not want to sacrifice growth to it.