

Is nationalization a trap or a tool of industrial policy?

By [Jean-Luc Gaffard](#)

The closure of the Florange blast furnaces in the Moselle region by ArcelorMittal and the French government's hunt for a buyer led it to temporarily consider nationalizing the site, that is, not only the production of crude steel, but also the cold forming line. The threat of nationalization was clearly wielded with a view to forcing the hand of the Mittal group so that it would sell the operations to another firm. If a nationalisation like this had been carried out, it would have been a penalty-nationalization, *i.e.* a sanction of behaviour by the Mittal group deemed contrary to the public interest. Apart from this unusual feature, it would have also raised issues about competition.

The project around the Mittal site is reminiscent in some ways of the nationalization of Renault in 1945. It would be hard to argue, however, that any reproaches would be along the same lines. There would clearly be no question of the nationalized site being made a showcase for a social policy designed to spur the country's growth. The goal was less ambitious. It involved neither more nor less than a transfer of ownership from one private group to another. This would, of course, have been a first in the use of the weapon of nationalization. Any comparison with the French government's support for Alstom in 2004 doesn't hold: in this latter case, the point was to save a company that might go bankrupt as a result of risky acquisitions, and not simply to replace it with another company. Moreover, the problem was confined to the company in question, with no global or even sectoral implications. Comparisons with the support of the Obama administration for the automotive industry in 2009 are also out of place, as that involved saving a company that was being forced into

bankruptcy in an industry generally considered strategic.

The reality in the case of Florange was and remains that no potential buyer thought they would be able to keep the blast furnaces operating in an environment marked by falling demand for steel, in particular in the wake of the crisis in the automobile industry. That is why, whatever happened, the buyer would demand to keep the rolling mill too. This requirement would be in its best interest: the blast furnaces could not be taken over except on the condition that they could supply the activity immediately downstream on the same site. If this condition had been met, it would undoubtedly have posed a problem for the Mittal group, as it currently provides the steel for the mill in Florange from its Dunkirk site, so the new situation would have caused it difficulties, including in terms of jobs. In other words, a temporary nationalization with a view to a transfer of ownership would interfere with competition between private entities. It is far from clear that this was in line with the general interest.

The occasionally argued thesis that Mittal's strategy was the act of managers who were merely obeying the shareholders and who were advocates of an economy without factories or machines does not really hold water in light of the nature of the firm's activity and the degree of integration of the different production sites. One could, however, make the hypothesis that Mittal's strategy involving the closure of the blast furnaces in Florange amounted to a plan to ration supply that was designed to prevent a collapse of steel prices and boost already low margins. This hypothesis might be credible if the demand for steel depended primarily on its price, whereas it is obvious that the decline observed is the result of the global crisis and particularly the slump in sales in the automotive and construction industries. In other words, a fall in steel prices today would not lead to higher demand and ensure the continued operation of all the blast furnaces. It is much more plausible to assume that, in the current

macroeconomic environment, the transfer of ownership that was considered would simply have resulted in changing market shares rather than increasing the market's size.

In fact, there could only be real doubt about both the legitimacy and the capacity of the public authorities to arrange the most appropriate configuration for the market, or even the breakdown of the jobs to be saved or destroyed. Furthermore, if a decision to nationalize had indeed been taken in a situation like this, any determination of fair compensation would have proven difficult and prone to litigation.

In short, the nationalization under consideration could hardly have been an effective tool of industrial policy. It is not for the public authorities to arbitrate between private interests to determine who owns what, including when certain sites are to be closed. This type of arbitration is the responsibility of the competition authorities. Industrial policy, in turn, should interfere as little as possible with the division of market shares between the various competitors. At most it could ensure the survival of companies whose activity is considered strategic and who are going through a difficult period due to the global situation or to industrial choices that have proved erroneous or simply more expensive than expected.

In this situation, it is not surprising that the government did not follow up with the nationalization project and instead supported the compromise of simply requiring that Mittal undertakes to make investments to modernize the site and to maintain the blast furnaces in running order with a view to equipping them with highly efficient technology in terms of carbon dioxide emissions, leading to a gain in competitiveness, as part of the European Ultra-Low Carbon Dioxide Steelmaking project ([Ulcoss](#)).

The nationalization under consideration was indeed a trap in

every sense of the word. The political and media battle about the fate of the Florange site revealed, in fact, an error in the government's analysis. The difficulties being experienced by the French steel industry result from a lack of demand, which is in turn the result of a policy choice of generalized austerity. Trying to resolve this macroeconomic problem with a microeconomic solution was, at a minimum, risky and shows the inconsistency of the short-term and medium-term decisions being taken on economic policy.

The dilemma of competitiveness

By [Jean-Luc Gaffard](#)

The competitiveness of a country is a complex subject. Some people rebel against the very concept on the grounds that it can't be applied to a nation and is only meaningful for companies. It is true that if a company gains market share, this necessarily comes at the expense of a competitor. And it is no less true that when one country increases its exports to another, then the extra income earned by the first will, in part, fuel demand that then benefits the second. The benefits of one become a condition of benefits for the other. This back-and-forth justifies international trade, whose aim is a better use of resources by everyone, with the benefits being shared by all, on an equitable basis. This story makes sense. And it does indeed indicate that the competitiveness of a nation is not comparable to that of a business.

However, there are global imbalances that result in longer-term surpluses or deficits that reflect differences in the competitiveness of the companies in the countries in question. These require appropriate policy responses to meet the challenge of making possible what some have called the return journey, that is to say, to set in motion the mechanisms through which the income earned by one country is converted into demand on the other.

This is the difficulty facing France today. The country has been building up trade deficits since 2002: it is facing a problem with the competitiveness of its companies on global markets, and is no longer able to use the exchange rate instrument. The persistent trade deficit is clearly of even greater concern than the public deficit, and its absorption should be a priority. This is why calls have been mounting for a competitiveness shock, that is to say, economic policy measures that are able to make companies more competitive by reducing their production costs.

That said, a competitiveness shock is not easy to implement. Of course, in a developed economy, business competitiveness primarily means non-cost competitiveness that is based on a company's ability to occupy a technological or market niche. But regaining this type of competitiveness requires investment and time. Furthermore, non-cost competitiveness is not independent of immediate price competitiveness. Quickly rebuilding business margins is a necessary, though probably not sufficient condition for a return to non-cost competitiveness. This requirement is all the more stringent today as obtaining captive markets through differentiation can often be very costly in terms of R&D and exploring customer prospects.

The difficulty facing the French economy is that the restoration of margins needed may come at the expense of household purchasing power and thus of domestic demand. Competitiveness gains could remain a dead letter if final demand were to collapse. Moreover, there is nothing to say

that restoring margins *per se* will result in a pick-up in investment if companies face just such a slowdown in demand, if not a fall.

It seems that what is needed is to grasp both ends of the chain: short-term price competitiveness and medium-term non-price competitiveness. Quickly restoring business margins requires transferring the financing of social protection to taxes on households. Enabling companies to re-establish their price competitiveness demands further improvements in the level of infrastructure and support for the establishment of productive ecosystems that combine good local relationships and the internationalization of production processes. In both cases, this involves the question of what fiscal and budget strategy should be implemented.

The difficulty comes from the prioritization of objectives. If priority is given to immediately restoring the public accounts, then adding another burden due to the transfer of charges onto the tax grabs already taken from households will definitely run the risk of a collapse in demand. This means either admitting that such a transfer is really possible only in conditions of relatively strong growth and thus postponing it, or making the improvement of the trade deficit a priority over the public accounts and thus not tying our hands with a budget target that is too tough.

The government has decided to stay the course of public deficit reduction, and has in fact postponed the competitiveness shock by proposing, after a year or more, business tax credits that are to be offset by hikes in the VAT rate in particular. The underlying rationale is clear. The search for a balanced budget is supposed to guarantee a return to growth, but care is being taken about further weighing down demand by adding to the tax increases already enacted to meet the target of a 3% government deficit by 2013. The prevailing idea is that, aided by a wise budget, a pick-up in activity will take place within two years in line with the supposedly

conventional economic cycle, which has the additional advantage of coinciding with the electoral cycle.

The path being chosen is narrow and, quite frankly, dangerous. Fiscal austerity measures are still subjecting domestic demand to heavy pressure. The restoration of business margins has been put off. Would it not be better to stagger the recovery of the public accounts more and ensure more immediate gains in competitiveness by using the appropriate fiscal tools?

The result to be expected from either of these strategies is of course highly dependent on the choices being made at the European level. Persevering on the path of widespread austerity will mean nothing good will happen for anyone.

Should households pay for a competitiveness shock?

By [Henri Sterdyniak](#)

France is suffering from an industrial problem. Its current account balance went from a surplus of 2.6% of GDP in 1997 to a deficit of 1% in 2007 and then 2% in 2012, while Germany went from a deficit of 0.4% of GDP in 1997 to a surplus of 5.7%. This raises the issue of France's industrial recovery. Should a major transfer take place from households to large companies for the purpose of a competitiveness shock or to redress business margins? There are many who advocate such a shock (including the MEDEF, but also the CFDT). This would reduce employers' social contributions (by at least 30 billion

euros) and in return increase levies on households. The issue of France's industrial recovery is discussed in detail in the latest [Note de l'OFCE \(No. 24 of 30 October 2012\)](#).

It is out of the question to reduce the social security contributions of employees, as these finance only retirement and unemployment benefits, and thus contributory benefits that depend on the contributions paid and that cannot be financed through taxes. Only employer contributions intended for the family or health insurance can be reduced. And then it's necessary to find a substitute resource: VAT or the CSG wealth tax?

In fact, there is little difference between an increase in the CSG tax and an increase in VAT. In both cases, households will lose purchasing power. In the case of a VAT increase, this would involve higher prices. However, inflation is automatically reflected in the minimum wage and social benefits, and after wage bargaining, in salaries too, so any gain in business competitiveness / profitability is likely to be temporary unless indexing is suspended. In contrast, the victims of a higher CSG would not enjoy automatic indexing mechanisms and would have to accept a reduction in purchasing power. Using the CSG thus makes for a more long-term option.

The big issue at the macroeconomic level is the reaction of companies, which will have to arbitrate between maintaining their prices to rebuild their margins or lowering their prices to become more competitive.

Let's imagine ourselves in a country with a GDP of 100 and exports and imports of 25. The share of wages (including employer contributions) and consumption is 80, and the share of profits and investment is 20. In the short run, wages and pensions are fixed. The reform consists of reducing the amount of employer contributions by 5 (*i.e.* 5% of GDP), while increasing the CSG tax by the same amount. Two scenarios can be adopted based on the pricing policy chosen by companies.

In the first case, the companies maintain their prices and increase their margins. There is no *ex post* gain in business competitiveness, but profitability rises. Wages suffer a loss of 6.25% of their purchasing power (*i.e.* $5/80$). Will the revival in investment offset the fall in consumption? Let's use standard assumptions, *i.e.* a propensity to consume wages of 0.8 and to invest profits of 0.4, with a multiplier of 1. GDP falls in the short term by 2% and employment first drops and then eventually recovers due to the substitution of labour for capital. The measure is costly in terms of purchasing power, and higher employment is not ensured.

In the second case, the companies fully pass on the reduction in charges in their producer prices, which fall by 5%, with consumer prices decreasing by 4% (as the prices of imported goods remain stable). The purchasing power of wages is down by only 1%. The gains in competitiveness come to 5%. Will the gains in foreign trade offset the reduction in consumption? With a price elasticity of exports of 1 and of imports of 0.5, GDP increases by 1.25%. The measure is less painful.

Should it be done?

The government needs to ask households to accept a reduction in their income, even though they have already lost 0.5% in purchasing power in 2012, consumption stagnated in 2011 and 2012, France is in a state of recession, and demand is already too low.

Should France adopt Germany's strategy: to gain competitiveness at the expense of household purchasing power, knowing that this strategy is a losing one at the level of the euro zone as a whole? Admittedly, this would replace the devaluation that is impossible today in the euro zone, but it would hurt our European partners (which could even respond, to our detriment) and it does not guarantee gains in competitiveness vis-à-vis countries outside the euro zone, which depends primarily on changes in the exchange rate for

the euro. Nor would a measure like this replace a reform of the zone's economic policy. Finally, it takes time for gains in competitiveness to translate into renewed growth. For instance, from 2000 to 2005, French growth came to 7.8% (1.55% per year), and German growth to 2.7% (0.55% per year). Can France afford to lose another 5 percentage points of GDP?

France is in an intermediate position between the Northern countries which have made strong gains in competitiveness at the expense of purchasing power and the Southern countries which have experienced excessive wage increases. On a base of 100 in 2000, the level of real wages in 2011 was 97.9 in Germany and 111.2 in France (an increase of 1% per year, corresponding to trend gains in labour competitiveness). Who is wrong? Should we ask the employees in the euro zone countries, first one then another, to become more competitive than the employees of their partner countries by accepting wage cuts?

The margin of French companies was 29.6% in 1973. This fell to 23.1% in 1982, rebounded to 30.2% in 1987, and was 30.8% in 2006, *i.e.* a satisfactory level. The decline occurring since then (28.6% in 2011) can be explained by the drop-off in activity and the retention of labour. It was not caused by higher taxation nor by excessive wage increases. Overall, the share of profits has returned to a satisfactory level historically. But in 1973 gross fixed capital formation was around the level of profits, while it is lower by 3 points of added value today and the share of net dividends paid has increased significantly. What commitments would business make in terms of investment and employment in France in exchange for a measure that would greatly boost profits? How could companies be prevented from increasing their dividends or their investments abroad?

Making use of an internal devaluation like this implies that France is suffering primarily from a lack of price competitiveness. However, deindustrialization undoubtedly has

other deeper causes. Companies prefer to develop in the emerging countries; young people are rejecting poorly paid industrial careers with an uncertain future; France is failing to protect its traditional industries or to develop in innovative sectors; the financial sector has favoured the joys of speculation over financing production and innovation; and so forth. All this will not be solved by an internal devaluation.

France needs a big industrial leap forward. It needs to carry out a different strategy: it is growth that must rebuild business margins, and it is industrial policy (via France's Public Bank Investment [the BPI], research tax credits, competitiveness clusters, support for innovative companies and for certain threatened sectors, and industrial planning) that must ensure an industrial recovery. This should be funded by the BPI, which needs to have sufficient capacity for action and specific criteria for its interventions.

France: will the war of the 3% take place?

By [Eric Heyer](#)

This text summarizes the [OFCE's October 2012 forecasts for the French economy](#).

The French economy is expected to see average annual growth of 0.1% in 2012 and 0.0% in 2013. This performance is particularly poor and far from the path that an economy recovering from a crisis would normally experience.

Four years after the onset of the crisis, the French economy has real potential for a rebound: this should lead to spontaneous average growth of about 3.0% per year in 2012 and 2013, making up some of the output gap built up since the start of the crisis. But this spontaneous recovery is being hampered, mainly by the establishment of budgetary savings plans in France and throughout Europe. The fiscal consolidation strategy imposed by the European Commission is likely to slice nearly 6 percentage points off GDP in France during 2012 and 2013.

Table 1. The brakes on growth in France

En points of GDP

Rythm	... quaterly		... annually	
	2012	2013	2012	2013
<i>Spontaneous recovery</i>	0,8	0,8	2,1	3,1
<i>Budget impact</i>	-0,4	-0,4	-1,6	-1,7
<i>Oil shock</i>	-0,05	0,0	-0,2	0,0
<i>External environment</i>	-0,4	-0,3	-1,4	-1,2
<i>Achievement</i>			-1,0	-0,2
Growth forecasts	-0,04	0,04	0,1	0,0

Sources : INSEE, OFCE calculations.

By setting a pace that is far from its potential, the expected growth will increase the output gap accumulated since 2008 and will lead to a further deterioration on the labour market. The unemployment rate will rise steadily and hit 11% by late 2013.

Moreover, the reduction of the budget deficit expected by the Government due to the implementation of its consolidation strategy – the target for the general government deficit is 3% of GDP in 2013 – will be partially undermined by the shortfall in tax revenue due to weak growth. The general government deficit will come to 3.5% in 2013.

Under these conditions, should the government do whatever it can to fulfil its commitment to a 3% deficit in 2013?

In a context of financial uncertainty, being the only State not to keep its promise of fiscal consolidation is a risk,

i.e. of being punished immediately by an increase in the financial terms on the repayment of its debt. This risk is real, but limited. The current situation is that of a “liquidity trap” and abundant savings. The result is a “flight to quality” phenomenon on the part of investors seeking safe investments. But among these are both German and French government bonds. Under these conditions, reducing the government deficit by 1 GDP point instead of 1.5 point would have very little impact on French bond rates.

However, maintaining a target of a 3% deficit in 2013 could have a dramatic impact on economic activity and employment in France. We simulated a scenario in which the French government maintains its budgetary commitment regardless of the costs and the economic situation. If this were to occur, it would require the adoption of a new programme of budget cuts in the coming months in the amount of 22 billion euros.

This strategy would cut economic activity in the country by 1.2% in 2013. It would lead to a further increase in the unemployment rate, which would reach 11.7% at year end, nearly 12%. As for employment, this obstinacy would intensify job losses, costing nearly 200,000 jobs in total.

A darker scenario is also possible: according to our forecasts, and taking into account the draft budget bills known and approved, no major European country would meet its deficit reduction commitments in 2013. By underestimating the difficulty of reaching inaccessible targets, there is a high risk of seeing the euro zone countries locked into a spiral where the nervousness of the financial markets would become the engine driving ever greater austerity. To illustrate this risk, we simulated a scenario in which the major euro zone countries (Germany, France, Italy and Spain) implement new austerity measures to meet their deficit targets in 2013. Adopting such a strategy would result in a strong negative shock to economic activity in these countries. For the French economy, it would lead to additional austerity that either at

the national level or coming from its euro zone partner countries would cause a severe recession in 2013. French GDP would fall by more than 4.0%, resulting in a further increase in the unemployment rate, which would approach 14%.

Table 2. Illustrative scenarios of risks to French growth

In %

	2011	2012*	2013*
Central scenario			
GDP	1,4	0,1	0,0
Gov't deficit (in GDP points)	-7,1	-4,4	-3,5
Unemployment rate	9,4	10,2	11,0
Market employment	104	-95	-166
Scenario where France alone meets its budget commitments			
GDP			-1,2
Gov't deficit (in GDP points)			-3,0
Unemployment rate			11,7
Market employment (in 1000s)			
Change			-361
Deviation from central scenario			-195
Scénario where euro zone countries meet their budget commitments			
GDP			-4,6
Gov't deficit (in GDP points)			-3,0
Unemployment rate			18,8
Market employment (in 1000s)			
Change			-910
Déviati on from central scenario			-744

* OFCE forecast October 2012

Sources : INSEE ; OFCE calculations *e-mod.fr*.

The Insolent health of the luxury sector: a false


paradox

By [Jean-Luc Gaffard](#)

The luxury industry has been spared the spreading crisis, which in the media's eyes seems to be posing a paradox. This situation in fact corroborates the diagnosis that rising inequality is the true breeding ground of the crisis.

LVMH, the global leader in the luxury sector, saw its sales jump 26% in the first half of 2012. Richemont, the global number two and owner of such brands as Cartier, Montblanc, Van Cleef & Arpels and Jaeger-LeCoultre, saw its operating income increase by 20% during the second half-year ending 30th September. The Italian firm Prada announced a 36.5% increase in its turnover in the first half of 2012 (37.3% in Europe). The luxury division of PPR, the other French company in the sector, saw sales go up by 30.7% in the first half year.

These results contrast sharply with the situation in other industries. They are the result of a rise in prices that is nothing less than staggering. The price index for luxury goods as calculated since 1976 (the "[Forbes Cost of Living Extremely Well](#)") rose 800% in 35 years, compared with 300% for the price index for consumer goods.



In an article on the subject ("The more expensive the product, the more desirable", 8 August 2012), *Le Monde* reported that the price of a Burberry gabardine raincoat has multiplied by 5.6 and that the price of a Rolex YachtMaster has rocketed from 5,488 to 39,100 euros. These soaring prices simply reflect the great and growing willingness to pay of the richest strata, for whom price is simply a mark of differentiation and desirability.

In these circumstances, the stock market success of companies in the luxury industry is hardly surprising. Nor is it surprising to see the stock market success of companies at the other end of the spectrum, those that produce low-end, cheap goods. This effect, called the hourglass effect, is starkly revealing of the reality of the crisis, which is clearly rooted in widening inequalities in income and wealth.

The healthy state of luxury firms, which are creating jobs at a time of rising unemployment, is obviously a source for rejoicing. But if we simply left things at this remark about the sector, we would be missing the essential point. First, it must be recognized that the industries in question are responding to higher demand much more by raising prices, and

not the quantities produced, for the simple reason that the number of wealthy people, even if growing significantly with the arrival of the nouveaux riches in China and elsewhere, is still limited. We are a long way from the fundamental mechanism driving growth, whereby gains in productivity push prices down and have an impact on income that is substantial enough to stimulate demand on an ever increasing scale. We also have to recognize the other side of the coin of this genuine increase in inequality, namely, the fall in median income and the corresponding weakening of the large middle class, whose demand for midrange products and services was a foundation for growth.

It is also worth noting recent trends in the luxury industry, which has successfully striven to produce brands that are lower cost versions of goods that were previously reserved for the rich. As shown by some studies, the diversification of the luxury industry is being accompanied by a sociological change indicating that middle-class households are developing a greater preference for these types of goods (see J. Hoffmann and I. Coste-Manière, *2012 Luxury Strategy in Action*, Palgrave Macmillan). This might be a long-term development if it is remembered that preferences are not homothetic, in other words, that lower incomes are not leading back to the map of preferences as it existed previously (before incomes had increased). Many households are trying to maintain the kind of consumption that they have become accustomed to, ultimately at the cost of higher indebtedness, if by chance that is permitted by the financial system. However, the business segment preserved in this way may prove to be fragile, and the performance of the luxury industry could continue to be driven by the conspicuous consumption of genuine luxury products. It is not surprising, then, to observe that, with the continuation of the crisis and its consequent impact on the consumption of the middle class, a company like PPR is planning [to hive off certain brands](#), notably FNAC, in order to focus on the luxury segment.

There is nothing paradoxical about the insolent health of the luxury industry. It goes hand in hand with the heightening difficulties facing industries and companies whose products and services are intended for those on middle-incomes. The constantly increasing divergence in performance between industries and firms depending on their positioning range is merely another sign of a deepening crisis.

How France can improve its trade balance*

By [Eric Heyer](#)

Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault has made a commitment to restoring France's balance of trade, excluding energy, by the end of his five-year term. Without addressing the curious anomaly of leaving the energy deficit out of the analysis of the country's trade position, as if it did not count in France's dependence on the rest of the world, we will examine the various solutions that the government could use to achieve this goal.

The first solution is to do nothing and to wait until the austerity policy that has been implemented in France through public spending cuts and higher taxes reduces consumer spending. In the face of higher unemployment and the resulting increase in household precautionary savings, the French will cut back on consumption. However, since some of this comes from outside France, this will limit imports into France from

abroad and, everything else being equal, improve the country's trade balance.

This solution, it is clear, not only is not virtuous, as it relies on a reduction in employee purchasing power and rising unemployment, but it also has little chance of success, because it assumes that French exports will not follow the same path as imports and will continue to grow. However, since our partner countries are following this same strategy of a rapid return to balanced public finances, their austerity policies will result in the same dynamics as described above for France, thereby reducing their own domestic demand and hence their imports, some of which are our exports.

As a result, and since the austerity programmes of our partners are more drastic than ours, it is very likely that our exports will decline faster than our imports, thus exacerbating our trade deficit.

The second solution is to increase our exports. In a context where our European partners, who represent 60% of our trade, are experiencing low or even negative growth, this can be achieved only through gains in market share. Lowering the cost of labour seems to be the fastest way to do this. But in the midst of an effort to re-establish a fiscal balance, the only way to lower the charges on labour is to transfer these to another tax: this was the logic of the "social VAT" set up by the previous government, but repealed by the new one, which seems to lean more towards transferring these to the CSG tax, which has the advantage of having a larger tax base, affecting all income, including capital income.

But in addition to the fact that this strategy is not "cooperative", since it resembles a competitive devaluation and thus is essentially aimed at gaining market share from our euro zone partners, there is no indication that it would be sufficient. Indeed, there is nothing to prevent our partners from adopting the same approach, particularly since their

economic situation is worse than ours, and this would cancel all or part of any potential gains in our competitiveness.

The last solution consists of making the country more competitive by raising the productivity of our employees and by specialising in high value-added sectors that are not subject to competition from the emerging countries with their low costs.

This is a medium-term strategy and requires the establishment of policies to promote innovation, research and development, and training. It also means expanding the range of our traditional products such as automobiles, but also specializing in the industries of the future.

The need for a transition to an ecological mode of production that is more energy-efficient could represent this industry of the future, and therefore be the solution to our trade deficit.

* This text is taken from a series of reports by Eric Heyer for the programme “Les carnets de l'économie” on France Culture radio. It is possible to listen to the series on [France Culture](#).

Competitiveness and

industrial demand: The difficulties facing the French-German couple

[Jean-Luc Gaffard](#)

The obsession with competitiveness has returned to centre stage with the election campaign. This reflects the reality that French companies are indeed suffering a loss of competitiveness, which is behind the deterioration in foreign trade for almost a decade. This loss is clear vis-à-vis the emerging markets and explains the trend towards relocating abroad. It is also clear vis-à-vis firms from other developed countries, mainly in the euro zone and in particular German companies. This latter situation is especially serious, as it challenges the coherence of European construction ([cf. OFCE, note 19: Competitiveness and industrial development: a European challenge in French](#)).

The gap in competitiveness that has emerged with Germany is clearly based on non-price competition. One of the reasons for this is Germany's superior business model, which is characterized by the maintenance of a network of local businesses of all sizes that focus on their core business and on the international fragmentation of production. This model is especially suitable for business development that is targeted at global markets, and it largely protects the countries hosting these companies from the risk of deindustrialization.

It would, nevertheless, be a mistake to ignore that this development is also the product of an adverse change in price competitiveness. This reflects labour market reforms in Germany, which lowered the relative cost of labour, as well as strategies that are based on the segmentation of production and the outsourcing of intermediate segments, which have also

contributed to lowering production costs.

Germany has thus managed to virtually stabilize its market share of global exports by increasing their level in the European Union (+1.7% in the 2000s) and even more so in the euro zone (+2.3%), while France has lost market share in these same areas (3.1% and 3.4%, respectively).

Two developments have particularly hurt France's industry. Its network of industrial SMEs has fallen apart. They were hit less by barriers to entry than by barriers to growth. All too often SME managers have been inclined or encouraged to sell the enterprises to large corporations rather than to ensure their growth. This is due both to the lack of genuine partnerships with these corporations and to the difficulties experienced in obtaining permanent financing from the banks and markets. For their part, the large industrial firms, both those operating on a multitude of local markets and those in the international markets, have chosen to focus on acquisitions and on the geographical decentralization of both their operations and their equipment and services suppliers. This strategy has been designed to meet geographical shifts in demand and to deal with the demand for immediate profitability set by volatile shareholders, but this has come in part at the expense of the development of local production networks. This process involved a vast movement of mergers and acquisitions that primarily drew on financial skills. The financial institutions were, in turn, converted to the universal banking model, abandoning some of their traditional role of being lending banks and investment banks. These concomitant developments have proved disastrous for overall competitiveness, particularly as hourly labour costs in industry were rising simultaneously.

There are two requirements for restoring the competitiveness of French companies and thereby encouraging the country's re-industrialization. The first is to allow immediate control of labour costs and the restoration of profit margins; this could

be helped in particular by tax measures that would adjust the financing of a portion of social protection. The second requirement is to promote the reorganization of industry through the creation of a network of stable relationships between all those involved in the industrial process, especially by the use of aid that is conditioned on cooperation between large and small firms in “competitiveness clusters”.

This medium-term effort will nevertheless largely remain ineffective if cooperative policies are not implemented across Europe. These policies need both to stimulate supply through the implementation of technology development programmes and to boost internal demand wherever it is clearly insufficient to satisfy production capacity.

The citizen must be the foundation of any industrial policy – even a free market one

By [Sarah Guillou](#)

The purpose of industrial policy is to direct productive specialization towards sectors that are deemed strategic for well-being or economic growth. This means recognizing that productive specialization is important for growth. But what criteria should be used to determine the importance of a given sector? The argument developed here is that there are no sound criteria that do not refer to the collective preferences of present and future citizens.

There are a limited number of theoretical principles for justifying an industrial policy and demonstrating its effectiveness. From the defence of nascent industries (List, 1841) to support for basic industries that generate externalities for growth, the theoretical arguments set out very limited conditions for the exercise of policy. The international legal framework is also very stringent, especially for European Union countries whose authorities are concerned primarily with creating a level playing field for all EU companies and keeping control over payments by the State.

The limited space for industrial policy

In this limited space, the exercise of industrial policy has struggled to find reasons to exist. Even though a movement of “normalization”, dear to Dani Rodrik, currently seems to be affecting the study of industrial policy (see Aghion et al., 2011), it is still not part of “normal” policy in the same way as monetary, fiscal, or trade policy, for example. Industrial policy is exceptional policy resulting from exceptional circumstances. It is in the definition of this term “exceptional”, of its nature and its temporality, that industrial policy derives its legitimacy. Even recently, exceptional circumstances, both political and economic, have served as strong grounds for industrial policy, whereas they actually conceal policies to promote employment and satisfy electoral objectives. Illustrations of this include businesses set up to rescue factories, from Lejaby lingerie units to SeaFrance, as well as announcements of regulations on plant closures when a buyer exists. Even though these interventions have the benefit of reducing information asymmetries between the players by offering mediation that is often useful, they are not really part of industrial policy.

The only “authorized” industrial policy today that is consistent with the institutional and legal framework of Europe and America is one that meets the conditions inherited

from liberal doctrine on state intervention in the functioning of the economy. One may wish that the rules on intervention were re-defined – which by the way, would bring a little more transparency into state practices – but the ambition of this note is both more modest and broader. This note aims to show that, even within the minimalist framework of the free market approach, industrial policy must be defined in accordance with a social project that engages the productive specialization of the economy.

As a general principle, liberal doctrine considers competition to be the most efficient process for allocating resources. In other words, competition is the best system for maximizing wealth creation. Indeed, it is supposed to foster emulation between the players and motivate them to increase their productivity and performance; to allow the eviction of inefficient activities that waste poorly exploited resources; and, finally, to ensure equality and freedom among the players with respect to market entry, and thus the free exercise of economic activity. Liberal economic theory thus envisages only very specific situations for the exercise of industrial policy.

In this framework, state intervention is justified (i) to restore competitive conditions concerning transparency of information; (ii) to support investment in activities that generate positive externalities, such as R&D, or conversely to discourage activities that generate negative externalities, such as pollution, and (iii) to support activities that are considered strategic. Note that these are precisely the three justifications that underpin the European Union's policy on industry and competition. It should be noted above all that while the last two reasons do indeed call for an industrial policy, they demand a higher principle of a political nature that invokes the collective preferences of present and future generations.

Encouraging the externalities that arise from R&D spending

does not of course necessarily reflect a political choice. Indeed, the underlying economic logic might be sufficient: the externalities from R&D include a boost in productivity induced by the diffusion of knowledge, which benefits society as a whole. This increased productivity provides additional growth that fuels the creation of jobs and wealth. It is indeed this economic dynamic that is emphasized by the European authorities, including the European Commission (see Buch-Hansen and Wigger, 2010; EC, 2011), just as it underpins American policy on subsidies for R&D (Ketels, 2007). The policy decision to support R&D and more generally investment in human capital can thus be based simply on economic logic.

Any policy that is intended to guide specialization involves society's future

Nevertheless, this logic is not enough: once we have accepted that investment in R&D is needed, then it is necessary to decide how to ensure that public resources, which are scarce and whose opportunity cost is rising as debt mounts, are invested in the wisest way. The definition of industrial policy must be based on a set of political (and legal) guidelines that are precise enough to lead business to invest in technology whose returns are inherently uncertain. For example, companies do not spontaneously tend to invest in clean technologies. Incentives need to be created that induce them to adopt sustainable development pathways, as is shown by the results of Acemoglu et al. (2011).

In general, any policy that aims to guide specialization involves the future of society: directing the production process towards sustainable development and environmental protection is a decision that will ensure the sustainability of resources, the quality of life and technological innovation. Directing capital towards strategic technologies, such as biotechnology, nanotechnology or space, is a necessity in light of the heavy investments – the fixed costs – that are associated with their development, given that mastering these

technologies is essential to society's future well-being. Finally, investing in human capital, a prerequisite to any policy to support R&D, is a way not only to improve people's living standards and quality of life and to qualitatively strengthen their ability to adapt to technological change, but also to ensure the strength and sustainability of democracy (Glaeser et al., 2007).

A commitment to a policy of support for investment in research and education is of course widely shared by political leaders, as it is a general feature of a progressive vision of society, or, in short, a certain vision of social welfare. And a package of measures to meet the objectives of a policy to support R&D in France does clearly exist: the research tax credit for the country's "competitive clusters"; in this respect, France is often seen as a driving force in terms of its industrial policies. But the purpose evoked to justify these measures is to ensure competitiveness, and not specifically economic growth *per se*.

Nevertheless, the selection of promising technologies and investment in the specializations of the future demands that politics takes precedence, as it must take a stand on the technological future of society, including in matters of protection, security, health and the environment. Ultimately, even a free market industrial policy assumes political choices that correspond to a vision of society. And it is in the name of this social vision that the expenditure associated with industrial policy can be justified. The justifications related to the economic mechanisms set the constraints, but policy choices must set the goals. The expression of collective preferences during the forthcoming electoral processes requires that the technological implications of policy proposals be expressed as clearly as possible.

References:

Acemoglu, D., Aghion, P., Bursztyn, L. and Hemous, D. (2011), "The environment and directed technical change", *MIT WP*, June

28, 60 pages.

Aghion, P., M. Dewatripont, L. Du, A. Harrison & P. Legros (2011), "Industrial Policy and Competition", *CEPR Discussion Paper Series* No.8691, June 28.

Buch-Hansen, H. and Wigger, A. (2010), "Revisiting 50 years of market-making: The Neoliberal transformation of European competition policy", *Review of International Political Economy* 17(1), 20-44.

Commission Européenne (2011), Industrial policy: Reinforcing competitiveness, *COM* (2011) (642).

Glaeser, E.L., Ponzetto, G. and Shleifer, A. (2007), "Why does democracy need education?", *Journal of Economic Growth* 12(2), 77.

List, F. (1841), *National System of Political Economy*, New York & London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1974, pp. 70-82.

Rodrik, D. (2008), "Normalizing Industrial Policy", *Commission on Growth and Development Working Paper* No.3

Ketels, C.H.M. (2007), "Industrial policy in the United States", *Journal of Industry Competition and Trade* 7,147-167.

Pack, H. and K. Saggi, 2006. "Is There a Case for Industrial Policy? A Critical Survey" *The World Bank Research Observer*, 21:267–297

www-wds.worldbank.org/.../436150PUB00B0X0327375B01PUBLI

“Buy French”: From the slogan to the reality

By [Jean-Luc Gaffard](#), [Sarah Guillou](#), [Lionel Nesta](#)

The current election campaign is lending weight to simplistic proposals like the slogan “buy French”, which evokes the need for France to re-industrialize. And to accomplish this, what could be simpler than to convince the population to buy native products designated with a special label? This is also more politically correct than advocating a straightforward return to protectionism. Employment is expected to benefit, along with the balance of trade. But if we look more closely, not only is it difficult to identify the geographical origin of products, but even if that were possible, any preference that these products might enjoy could well wind up in job losses. This solution for dealing with the need for re-industrialization ultimately reflects a refusal to get to the bottom of the problem.

Can we really define what it means to “buy French”? Does it mean buying the products of French companies? What about buying products made in France by foreign companies instead of buying products made abroad by French companies? These simple questions show that it is not so easy to pin down what is “Made in France”. One major difficulty is that the final goods produced in a country usually incorporate intermediate goods manufactured abroad. It may even happen that the components of a final product are manufactured by a competitor in another country. The iPhone is emblematic of this [fragmentation](#). Should we refrain from purchasing intermediate goods from low-wage countries even though this makes it possible to produce final goods at a lower cost and boost exports by being more competitive on price? Those who think so should no longer be touting German industry as an example, since everyone knows about the growing share of imported

inputs in the production of the final goods Germany exports (OECD, *Measuring Globalisation: OECD Economic Globalisation Indicators 2010*, p. 212).

Imagine, nevertheless, domestic consumers who are able to identify products with a high labour content and are ready to make sacrifices out of a spirit of economic patriotism. Don't the polls tell us that over two-thirds of consumers would be willing to pay more for French goods? While there are doubts about whether they would actually do this, it would be risky to ignore the opportunity cost of such a choice. Buying more expensive products simply because they are French reduces purchasing power. Other goods and services would not be purchased or would be bought for less abroad. The balance sheet for employment is far from certain.

Should this exercise in economic patriotism actually materialize, it would be a way that consumers form attachments to certain types of products, in this case based on their place of manufacture, which would in turn reduce the intensity of competition. This could lead the companies concerned to cut back on their efforts to become more competitive on price and other factors. Why, indeed, should they shell out for expensive and risky investments when have a guaranteed customer base? It's a safe bet that they will not do this much, if at all. The national economy would then be locked in a low technology trap, doomed to slower growth, obviously with damaging consequences for employment in the medium and long term. This would also deprive the economy of the means to innovate and improve the competitiveness of its products.

Finally, it is likely that the willingness to buy French products would benefit products that replace goods made elsewhere in Europe rather than goods made in developing countries, either because the latter are no longer manufactured at all in France or because the price differences with French products would still be prohibitive. Ultimately it would not be possible to avoid further shifts in production to

low-wage countries, with the consequent job losses. Furthermore, from a European perspective the non-cooperative character of this kind of measure could lead our European partners to adopt reciprocal measures, which would be detrimental to exports and employment.

The slogan “buy French” masks a refusal to see that the downturn is a global phenomenon which calls for a comprehensive response at the European level, and a refusal to consider a proactive industrial policy that takes into account the realities of supply as well as demand.

This is not just a matter of looking the other way. France is undergoing a deindustrialization process that threatens its capacity for growth. But who can deny that this phenomenon has accelerated with the crisis and that this acceleration is set to increase [as the general austerity measures and restrictions on bank credit further undermine domestic and European demand](#) for consumer durables? Unless we are willing to accept that an entire segment of industry in France and elsewhere in Europe is destroyed, with no hope of ever returning, and with as a consequence still greater disparities between countries and sharper conflicts of interest, it is clearly urgent to support this kind of demand.

Is this kind of support “the solution”? Of course not: propping up demand will not be enough, as an industrial policy aimed at strengthening the supply side is also needed. The point is not to protect domestic production nor to promote the conquest of foreign markets through competition on taxation or social charges, but to stimulate investments designed to produce new goods and services, which is the only way to create stable jobs. Rather than try to rely on dubious slogans, the goal should be [to consolidate production that has the advantage of being high quality in terms of design, safety and reliability](#), and which corresponds to what French and European consumers genuinely want.

